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Abstract 
One of the most interesting ways to follow the development of a religion over time is 
to look at the way that basic religious terms have been perceived in various times, 
places and circumstances.  The term bid‘a in this respect is unique, since it touches 
the very essence of the development of Islam itself: in particular, what is permitted to 
be innovated, and who should have the authority to decide what is or is not permitted. 
This work opens with a short historical survey of the origins of this term, and the 
ways it was understood in the first centuries of Islam.  The research spans the 
‘modern’ period from the end of the eighteenth century up until the late 20th century – 
an era of great social, geographic and political changes, which in the Middle East also 
saw the decline and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire that had ruled the region for 
centuries under the authority of Islam. 
We will look into modern conceptualisations of bid‘a of two main groups – 
conservatives and revivalists. More specifically we will delve into the writings of two 
groups: 
1. The early ‘salafi’ revivalists and the Muslim Brotherhood, the latter being in many 
respects the main group which continued the course of the former. 
2. Prominent ‘ulamā’ from the Wahhābī trend, to which we dedicate two chapters, 
examining both classic and more recent views, and the ways they adopted to return 
to their notion of ‘pure’ Islam; 
We will look at the causes which brought about the decline of Islam according to their 
thinking, and their thoughts on the relationship between the neccessity for renewal in 
Islam and deeply rooted religious guidelines – in this case, on the question of 
innovation.  
In each chapter we will also try to determine the overall scope of the discussion on 
bid‘a, and its place in light of the discussions on related religious terms, such as 
tajdīd, ijtihād, shirk and ḍalāla. 
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Note on Transliteration 
 
The transliteration throughout the text is based on the system of the International 
Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES), and efforts have been made to adhere to the 
Arabic format, both in the singular and the plural. Letters accentuated with a 
shadda (  ّ ) were doubled. Some common words were anglicised and capitalised, for 
example: Qur’an; Sura; Hadith; Sunna; Shari‘a; Shi‘a; Sufi; Jihad; Hajj; Mufti.  
 
In referencing and bibliography, names of personalities and various institutions, titles 
of books, journals and articles have been rendered as locally spelled and transliterated; 
this is particularly significant if they are non-Arabic or appear in a non-Arabic text, 
thus in some cases the spelling is different from the one in the body of the text. In the 
text itself, non-Arabic names of organisations like the Jamaat-e-Islami or Tablighi 
Jamaat appear in their common English spelling. 
 
Following is the table of transliterations: 
 
ء ’, ā    ز z   ق q 
ب b    س s   ك k 
ت t    ش sh   ل l 
ث th    ص ṣ   م m 
ج j    ض ḍ   ن n 
ح ḥ    ط ṭ   ه h 
خ kh    ظ ẓ   و w, ū  
د d    ع ‘   ي y, ī 
ذ dh    غ gh 
ر r    ف f 
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Glossary of frequently used Arabic terms 
‘almāniyya – secularism 
bid‘a – innovation (plural = bida‘) 
bid‘a ‘amaliyya – innovation related to acts   
‘ādāt – innovations related to customs 
‘aqīdāt – credal innovations 
‘ibādāt – innovations related to ritual devotion 
bid‘a ḥaqīqiyya – truthful innovation 
bid‘a iḍāfiyya – relative innovation / innovation which has to do with adding words 
bid‘a i‘tiqādiyya – innovation related to creed and belief 
bid‘a mukfira – innovation which leads to unbelief 
bid‘a mufsaqa – innovation which leads to a sin 
bid‘a qabīḥa – repugnant innovation 
ḍalāla – deviation /going astray  
da‘wa – proselytising  
farīḍa – religious duty  
farḍ ‘ayn – individual duty 
farḍ kifāya – collective duty 
fasād – corruption 
fiqh – jurisprudence 
fitna – sedition 
ghulūw – excessiveness 
ḥākimiyya – governance 
ijmā‘ – consensus 
ijtihād – independent reasoning 
‘ilm – knowledge 
irjā’ – a separation between the claims of faith and deeds of worship 
iṣlāḥ – reform  
ittibā‛ – tradition 
kufr – unbelief 
madhhab – religious school 
makrūh – a disliked practice 
mawlid – annual commemoration of the birthday of a saint / prophet 
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milla – religious creed 
mu‘āmalāt – social transactions 
munkar – denounced issues 
murtadd – apostate 
qaṣad – intent 
qiyās – analogy 
ṣaḥāba – companions of the Prophet 
ṣalāt – the five obligatory prayers 
shirk – polytheism 
shubbuhāt – doubts 
tābi‘ūn – followers of the companions 
tajdīd – renewal 
taqlīd – imitation 
tawḥīd – divine unity 
ta’wīl – interpretation 
‘ubūdiyya – servitude 
ʻulamā’ – religious scholars 
umarā’ – rulers 
umma – nation 
wasaṭ – middle path 
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Introduction 
 
One of the most interesting ways to follow the development of a religion over time is 
to look at how basic religious terms have been perceived in various times, places and 
circumstances.  While it may seem that any religion is based on permanent 
fundamentals that would not change with the passing of the years, such an overview 
usually demonstrates how this elementary terminology is differently conceptualised in 
Islam by the ‘ulamā’ – a clerical hierarchy in charge of religious law, theology and 
the community of believers -- in the light of changing historical, geographical and 
political environments.  Therefore, in order to understand what sometimes lies behind 
the simple word ‘religion’, we must try to reflect the essential conditions under which 
these ‘ulamā’ operate, conditions which, in their turn, influence the interpretations 
provided by religious figures.  
Most attempts that have been made in this field to follow the origins and development 
of basic religious terms across time have been made by scholars of the last generation; 
the most recent comprehensive effort has been made by Michael Cook in his 
outstanding study Commanding right and forbidding wrong in Islamic thought 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), which opens a window on the development and 
emergence of the notion of al-amr bi’l-maʿrūf wa’l-nahy ʿan al-munkar, one of the 
main foundations of Islamic social and political ethics from the Qur’an to modern 
times.  As part as our discussion of the different conceptualisations of bid‘a, we will 
also deal with al-amr bi’l-maʿrūf wa’l-nahy ʿan al-munkar, and the way we translate 
it into English has been adopted from Cook’s work. 
The term bid‘a in this respect is unique, since it touches the very essence of the 
development of Islam itself: in particular, what is permitted as an innovation, and who 
should have the authority to decide what is or is not permitted. It should be noted, 
however, that throughout history this term has been employed strictly in the context of 
inter-Islamic discourse. 
At the core of this research lies the ‘modern’ period towards the end of the nineteenth 
century -- an era of great social, geographic and political change, which in the Middle 
East also saw the decline and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire that had ruled the 
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region for centuries under the authority of Islam as mediated by the Caliphate. 
Although we will in some cases examine non-Arab, non-Middle Eastern ‘ulamā, the 
general scope of this work is the Sunni Arab world across the Middle East; other 
‘ulamā’ (mostly from the Indian subcontinent) were deeply connected to the groups 
which are at the core of the research, and sometimes had an even greater influence on 
Middle Eastern scholars than on their native audience.  
This work proposes to look at modern conceptualizations of bid‘a by two main groups 
– ‘conservatives’ and ‘revivalists’.  Since in many cases, the penetration of 
problematic innovations [bida‘] into religion is attributed to sources from outside 
Islam, or fringe sects which existed throughout history, it should be interesting to see 
how they deal with it in the light of changing environments in the Middle East.  More 
specifically, we will delve into the writings of  
1. The early Salafi revivalists and the Muslim Brotherhood, which in many respects 
are the main groups which have held fast to their original intention of reviving 
Islam by emphasising its roots. 
2.    Prominent ‘ulamā’ from the Wahhābī trend, to which we dedicate two chapters, 
examining both classical and modern scholars, and the ways they reacted to change 
in order to return to their notion of ‘pure’ Islam; 
Those factors will be looked at which, in the ideology of these ‘ulamā’, brought about 
the decline of Islam, and their thinking will be examined about how to build a bridge 
between the need for a vigorous renewal of Islam and their own deeply-rooted 
religious views on the question of innovation, for example.  Covering the views and 
foci of each scholar within these groups will also help understand more about their 
inner dynamics and the subgroups that have emerged from the main body of their 
allegiance.  
It should be noted that although these are theoretically two distinct groups, there exist 
between them many cross-links and common denominators; these derive, among 
other things, from the early Salafis will to expand the geographical and demographic 
basis of the discourse on Islamic renewal to as many regions and countries as 
possible, and the personal admiration of some of them for the Wahhābiyya in its fight 
against the many innovations they considered to be the main cause of the decline of 
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Islam.  Another important aspect is the long-term historical connection between the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudi state.  This began as a consequence of the ‘ordeal’ 
[miḥna] the Muslim Brotherhood suffered under Egyptian President Gamal ‘Abd Al-
Nasser, which led many of its leaders to flee to Saudi Arabia, where they received a 
warm welcome and assisted in spreading radical Islamic ideology on a global scale.  
This cooperation entered a gradual decline due to religio-political developments, 
starting with the support of Muslim Brotherhood figures in the Islamic revolution in 
Iran (1979), moving to the loud objections of the Salafis and hardline Wahhābīs to 
Saudi-American cooperation during the first Gulf War (1990-1991), and ending with 
the emergence of global terrorism, especially the September 11 attacks in the United 
States (2011), in which the attackers included a majority of Saudi nationals.  In 2002, 
the Saudi Minister of the Interior, Nāyif bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz famously accused the 
Muslim Brotherhood of ‘ruining the Arab world’, adding that over the years the 
Saudis had granted them too much support.  It should therefore be interesting to 
observe the different ways in which conservatives and revivalists see things, and, 
above all, to detect their ideological similarities.  It will be argued that they are in 
agreement when it comes to the way Islam should be implemented and re-established 
as the central element in communal and political life in the Arab and Muslim worlds. 
Thus, when coming to the methodology employed in this study, several elements must 
be considered: 
1. In each relevant group, the writings of individual ‘ulamā rather than organisations 
of any kind will be carefully examined. 
2. In general, and in addition to examining the writings of individual scholars, each of 
them will be seen as a prominent figure in his time, or at best representing a 
specific subgroup within his community. 
3. In each group, at least one of the scholars has bought himself the reputation of 
being a devoted fighter against bida‘. Naturally, in each chapter there are some 
who deal with the subject more extensively than the others. In several cases, at 
least, this clearly has a social or geopolitical connotation. 
4. While the focus of the research is on purely religious, scholarly writing, in the case 
of the ‘revivalists’ their more popular publications are also looked at, since they 
use them as a vehicle for spreading their ideas.  The most outstanding example in 
13 
 
this case is the periodical Al-Manār, which was published between 1898 and 1935, 
and gradually developed into an international platform of discourse regarding 
Islamic revivalism. 
5. Wherever possible, the personal or ideological relationship of each scholar to 
‘ulamā’ discussed in other chapters will be examined. 
It is worth noting that using this methodology and choosing relevant figures is often 
challenging. For example, in the chapter which looks into the writings of early 
Wahhābī ‘ulamā’, a historic range is explored which suffers in part from a lack of 
sufficient academic research; therefore, it has, to start with, been an interesting 
experiment to decide which ‘ulamā to focus on, and secondly to try to locate their 
main writings, which are often hard to find.  On the other hand, since the Muslim 
Brotherhood in its wider, international context is examined, here the first question was 
how to pick the most relevant individual among the large number of well-known 
writers, who would best represent the several subgroups within the Brotherhood that 
we point to, and who might also be considered ‘ulamā’, given the structure of the 
Brotherhood, which includes many leaders from other backgrounds. 
Another challenge comes from the changing pattern identifying how previous 
generations dealt with bid‘a.  While for many centuries, a large part of the discourse 
was carried on through a genre of books dedicated to the subject (what may be termed 
bid‘a literature), this does not prove to have been the case for a wide majority of 
‘ulamā’.  This means that the only way to cover their views on the subject sufficiently 
has been to engage in a systematic overview of their literary heritage while 
familiarizing ourselves with their overall views on related issues, which allows a 
better understanding of their backgrounds and the circumstances in which they are or 
were living, and how this may have affected their world view and religious foci. 
Each chapter will, therefore, open with a general background and introduction to the 
relevant group and the scope of the research it encompasses.  This will be followed by 
a discussion of the viewpoints of the relevant ‘ulamā’ on the sources of religious 
authority like the Qur’an, Sunna, ijtihād and ijmā‘ on the one hand, and affiliated 
religious terms like shirk, ḍalāla, commanding right and forbidding wrong on the 
other.  While dealing with terms like bid‘a, such an emphasis is part of the dynamic of 
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an inclusive understanding.  For several of the ‘ulamā’ featured here, bid‘a constitutes 
the direct opposite to Sunna, even though they do not always say so specifically.  
In addition, looking at their views regarding issues such as ijtihād and ijmā‘ is, firstly, 
of considerable interest in itself, and secondly, at least in some cases, deals directly 
with the concept of bid‘a, in accordance with various perceptions of the scope and 
legitimacy of clerical opinions.  
Many sources which cover the evolution of the term bid‘a also refer to its frequent 
appearance next to other terms.  In some cases it helps the ‘ulamā’ who discuss the 
subject to refine their definition of bid‘a; in other instances there is either no 
separation between two related terms, or they are presented as part of a series of 
actions, each unavoidably leading to the other.  A similar pattern continues in the 
conversations of the ‘ulamā’ we explore.  Thus, broadening the research will help to 
enhance understanding of the different conceptualisations of bid‘a, and also determine 
the overall scope of the discussion on bid‘a, and its place in light of the debates over 
opposing and affiliated religious terms. In presenting the discourse on bid‘a in each 
chapter, we will ask ourselves several questions – what is the definition of bid‘a?  Are 
there any possible ways to try to avoid it?  What are the main examples provided and 
dealt with by the relevant ‘ulamā’.  And under which category do they usually fall and 
why? 
Several scholars have looked into the subject of bid‘a, usually focusing on its 
emergence in the first generations of Islam.  Classical scholars like Goldziher or 
Bernard Lewis, both of whom tried to define basic religious terms, referred to the 
subject, mainly looking at bid‘a as the opposite of Sunna and raising initial questions 
such as who decides what falls under Sunna and what under bid‘a, and the fluidity of 
such matters in a manner that might lead to the ‘bid‘a of today being the Sunna of 
tomorrow’, as explained by several classic scholars.  
In 1960, Mohamed Talbi wrote an article on the subject, looking at the development 
of the term during the first three centuries of Islam.  Talbi looks at the emergence of 
Islamic jurisprudence, based on the approach of Joseph Schacht.  He ascribes the 
emergence of the negative connotation of bid‘a to the emergence of Sunna as a 
concept within fiqh, as well as to historic developments in early Islam, like the rise of 
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the Umayyad dynasty.  Talbi continues to survey religious literature up to the days of 
the early Salafis and the Wahhābiyya (as we do here), connecting the use of the term 
to Islamic conservatism, and putting it on the same level of importance as terms like 
unbelief [kufr] and impiety [fisq]. 
Vardit Rispler’s 1991 article, ‘Toward a new understanding of the term bid‘a’ looks at 
the issue from a viewpoint opposite to that of Talbi.  Rispler looks into the bid‘a 
literature and concludes that there is actually a difference between the etymological 
meaning of the word bid‘a and the negative connotation it eventually acquired.  
Rispler looks at the relevant material (whose main sources will be further discussed in 
the background chapter) which treated or named certain actions as ‘good’ bida‘.  Her 
conclusion is that since the second century of Islam, especially following the closure 
of the gates of ijtihād, bid‘a, instead of having a negative, restraining influence on the 
advance of the Muslim society and law, sometimes served as a ‘back channel’ for 
‘ulamā’ to allow innovations to enter religion; this was achieved by defining such 
innovations as bida‘ rather than placing them in a more rigid framework. In addition, 
she points to modern influences on this discourse, which inserted new classifications 
like ‘irreligious’.  
Maribel Fierro has looked at the subject rather systematically.  Her 1992 mapping of 
the bid‘a literature and the other sources in which such discussions may be found 
(such as al-milal wa’l-niḥal) serves as a main point of reference to the whole subject 
and its evolution in previous centuries.  Her work has served as the starting point for 
this research.  Another article which explores a different region is nevertheless 
relevant to this work: Muhammad Khalid Mas‘ud’s 1993 examination of South Asian 
fatāwā literature, which focuses mainly on the views of Ḥanafi‘ulamā’, including 
those affiliated with Deobandi thinking, a species of Islamic doctrinal ideology which 
is, in some aspects, considered to be close to Wahhābiyya.  It should also be said that 
although several articles which look at perceptions of bid‘a in specific Asian countries 
or other areas have contributed to the background of the present research, they fall 
outside the scope of the current discussion. 
Several dissertations are relevant to our discussion, some dealing with specific issues 
and others looking at developments over a wider period of time.  Asep Saepudin Jahar 
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dedicated his MPhil thesis to an examination of the concept of bid‘a by the fourteenth 
century scholar Abu Isḥaq al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388), based on the latter’s main relevant 
work on the subject, Al-I‘tiṣām. Al-Shāṭibī is one of the central figures who have 
shaped debate over the issue in the past few centuries. He himself was widely accused 
of introducing bida‘ into religion, and wrote this book in response, reformulating the 
concept on the basis of a strict legal methodology. As will be seen later, his works 
served as an inspiration to some of the ‘ulamā’ in discussion.  We therefore dedicate 
some space to a more profound look at his works and ideas regarding bida‘. 
Zakaria bin Mat’s 1987 MPhil dissertation compares the perception of bid‘a by two 
‘ulamā whose writings will be surveyed in this study – the classic Ḥanbalī scholar Ibn 
Taymiyya, and the founder of the Wahhābiyya, Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb.  Ibn 
Taymiyya served as a great inspiration to several ‘ulamā’, and a close examination of 
his thinking on the subject will be embarked on as part of our background chapter.  
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and his descendants are the focus of chapter four.  
Nasser Tuwaim’s 1992 PhD, ‘The discussion of the concept of bid‘a from early Islam 
up to the twelfth century A.H.’, provides the widest historical picture so far, dealing 
as it does with the evolution of the concept of bid‘a from the days of early Islam to 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Tuwaim covers the writings of the major 
contributors to the discussion, whom he divides into three periods, maintaining that 
the first period is principally occupied with the discussion of credal innovations 
[‘aqīdāt]; the middle period emphasises ritual and customary innovations [‘ibādāt and 
‘ādāt], and also presents a theoretical discussion on the concept of bid‘a; and the third 
period accommodates a discussion of all varieties Our discussion will follow 
Tuwaim’s tripartite division.  While Tuwaim’s discussion covers a rather long period 
in Islamic history, the present work aims to look closer at a shorter, modern period 
which is very challenging when dealing with the whole subject.  
Having gone through studies relevant to the subject of bid‘a, the overall impression is 
that, due to the complexity of the subject, the difference between the lexical meaning 
of the word and the connotations it has acquired over time, a necessity could be 
identified of clarifying and synchronising them.  Relying on definitions set out in 
these works and adding material from primary sources which have not been 
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discussed, our work opens with a historical survey of the origins of the term bid‘a and 
its evolution during the first centuries of Islam. 
The first and second chapters look at the ‘revivalist’ trend, which aspired to bring 
about a renewal [tajdīd] of various aspects of religion through educational and social 
reforms, largely as an answer to the final decline of the Ottoman Empire during 
World War One and the disintegration of the Caliphate in 1924.  
The first chapter will introduce the writings of the three principal ‘ulamā’ together 
known as the ‘early Salafis’ – Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ‘Abduh and 
Rashīd Riḍā.  Although the differences between their basic worldviews and focuses 
will be looked at, in general it can be said that they sought to combine Islam and 
modern science, pointing their arrows of criticism at the religious establishment, who, 
they claimed, had failed to make an adjustment between Islam and modernity.  
‘Abduh, and Riḍā even more, gained the reputation of being staunch fighters against 
bid‘a and the various issues of malfunction and corruption which had penetrated 
Islam and brought about its rigidity.  They positioned themselves at the forefront of 
the fight to reform the state of Islam and to allow it to flourish again in contemporary 
life.  
Among the primary sources examined in chapter one, the most important is the al-
Manār periodical, which during most of its years of publication was edited by Riḍā, 
though it started as a joint initiative between him and his teacher ‘Abduh (who died 
after several years).  For many years, al-Manār managed to create an international 
platform for dialogue between scholars from around the world who shared similar 
world views, and to arouse a renewed interest in Islam as a basis for unity through its 
reports on Muslim communities in various countries.  Of course, earlier publications 
like al-‘Urwa al-wuthqā, published by Afghānī and ‘Abduh will also be thoroughly 
examined, in addition to the relevant personal writings of the three men.  
As a point of comparison, three other scholars who were active in the same period 
were chosen to be considered, each one having some connection to this group while 
keeping his personal focus -- ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī, who is perceived as a 
herald of Pan-Arab nationalism, drew on an Islamic perspective to create an image of 
the society he hoped to bring into being; Shaykh Maḥmūd Shaltūt, an open-minded 
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disciple of ‘Abduh who served as Grand Imām of Al-Azhar during the Nasser years 
from 1958 until his death in 1963; and Abu ‘Alī Ḥasan Nadvi, an Indian scholar 
educated according to the principles of the Dār al-‘Ulūm Deoband, was very close to 
the circles of al-Manār and admired the Muslim Brotherhood, the next group we 
discuss. 
In the second chapter, we look at the Muslim Brotherhood from the point of view of a 
current, global ideology.  The Brotherhood is usually viewed as the most outstanding 
‘new effendi’ movement to have followed the path of the ‘early Salafis’.  It also 
further developed the notion of renewal [tajdīd] that will have a special place in the 
discussion. In this chapter several trends within the Brotherhood are looked at. The 
first, ‘mainstream’ trend is represented by the Brotherhood’s founder, the young 
school teacher Ḥasan al-Bannā, who formulated and implemented a ‘practical’ 
approach on his way to position Islam as the basis for national education, and later as 
a platform on which to reunite the Islamic ‘nation’ [umma].  At a very early stage of 
his career, al-Bannā issued calls to the Egyptian government to focus most of its effort 
on Islam.  At the same time, he started to provide activist proselytising [da‘wa] to the 
younger generation, using simple — even simplistic — religious content, combined 
with political substance. 
Throughout its history, the Muslim Brotherhood has had to re-emerge and re-engage, 
undergoing several metamorphoses, yet al-Bannā still remains the seminal theorist of 
the movement.  In general, this trend looks for a gradual revival of the faith, focusing 
on da‘wa and long term strategies, and makes use of both Western and Islamic 
concepts. 
Shaykh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, a keen follower of al-Bannā and himself once favoured 
for leadership of the Brotherhood, represents a second trend of the current, globalised 
form of the Brotherhood’s ideology, and like al-Bannā also combines his religious 
work with political activism.  Qaraḍāwī, who joined the Brotherhood still in Egypt at 
an early age, was able to raise himself to the level of an international leader under the 
patronage of the ruling family in Qatar, where he has been living since the 1960s.  His 
‘Shari‘a and Life’ show on al-Jazeera Television which has millions of followers, as 
well as his religious rulings, touch the everyday lives of Muslims, including those in 
Western countries where Muslims live as a minority.  Qaraḍāwī was one of the first 
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‘ulamā’ to develop a new field of jurisprudential endeavour: ‘Minorities 
Jurisprudence’ [fiqh al-aqaliyyāt], in which he deals with the day-to-day life of 
Muslims living in non-Muslim (mostly Western) countries and reflects on the cultural 
tensions between the Western and Islamic points of view. 
A third subgroup is the more conservative Qutbist trend, which has been known to 
focus more on offensive Jihad and separatism.  During the 1950s and 60s, Sayyid 
Quṭb, perhaps the most important thinker of the Brotherhood, developed a gradual 
revulsion, first towards Western, and then to Islamic societies, stating that they were 
now all under a permanent state of jāhiliyya, from which the true believer is required 
to distance himself.  Here we may also examine the views of Abu al-A‘lā Mawdūdī, 
the founder of the sub-continental Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) whose thinking has been very 
influential within the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially among Quṭb and 
his followers after many of Mawdūdī’s works had been translated into Arabic. 
Lastly comes the ‘democratic-Islamist’ trend, which believes that the global 
revolution should be brought about using democracy and making alliances with other 
forces on the way to promote Islamic interests.  The two main representatives of this 
trend are Ḥasan al-Turābī from Sudan and Rāchid al-Ghannouchī, head of the 
Tunisian Al-Nahḍa Party.  However, it must be said that these individuals contribute 
less than others to the discussion, as regards dealing with the most relevant issues. In 
terms of quantity, Qaraḍāwī is probably the most outstanding. 
In the third and fourth chapters, a thorough examination of ‘conservative’, Wahhābī 
thinking is made, from its very early days through to the twentieth century.  Bid‘a and 
the uncompromising fight against it is one of the major themes whenever the 
Wahhābiyya is referred to.  But while the revivalists hold that cleansing Islam of 
bida‘ would clear the way for it once again to play a significant role in society and 
politics, and would provide a means to unite Muslim communities around a 
modernized religion, the conservative camp believes this fight means a return to a 
‘pure’ Islam, clear of outer influences which have corrupted religion and brought 
about its decline. 
Chapter three covers the period of the first and second Saudi states, up to the early 
days of the third and current state.  It begins with a careful examination of the 
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writings of Ibn ‘Abd Al-Wahhāb, who brought his religious doctrine into being on the 
basis of a strict observance of belief in the unity of God [tawḥīd]; the immediate 
consequence of this was a hard-fought battle against everything which goes against 
this unity – polytheism [shirk], deviation [ḍalāla] and bid‘a.  Having the power of a 
ruler, and initiating a social attempt to bring the tribesmen under one rule, Ibn ‘Abd 
Al-Wahhāb could implement his doctrine by demolishing the tombstones of saints 
and stopping various annual events like the Hajj which did not fit the standards of 
tawḥīd as he understood them. Following the discussion of Ibn ‘Abd Al-Wahhāb are 
four other ‘ulamā who represent a consecutive chain of his descendants and who have 
played crucial religious roles in the Saudi states in each respective period. 
This chapter specifically, will hopefully assist in filling a gap which exists in current 
research regarding the history of the first and Saudi states, and here will be examined 
the ruling structure of ‘The rulers and the learned’ [al-umarā’ wa’l-ʻulamā’] which 
may have influenced each scholar’s approach.  An interesting question also raised in 
this chapter is the attitude of Wahhābī ‘ulamā’ towards drinking coffee and smoking 
tobacco, which were both associated with bida‘ by Western travelers and scholars. 
Chapter four looks into a division which emerged out of several geopolitical, 
economic, demographic and social developments in the current Saudi state and which 
changed the traditional balance between umarā’ and ʻulamā’. This breach brought 
upon the stage non-establishment ‘ulamā’ alongside official ones.  At the heart of this 
chapter stand the writings of three of the most prominent ‘ulamā’ in Saudi Arabia 
since the formation of the present Kingdom – Shaykhs ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn Bāz and 
‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn -- who represent the clerics of the Saudi establishment; and 
Shaykh Safar al-Ḥawālī, one of the leaders of the ‘Awakening Movement’ [shuyūkh 
al-ṣaḥwā], who are also known to have been affected by Qutbist ideology.  In several 
places the writings of Shaykh Ṣāliḥ al-Fawzān, another ‘official’ scholar considered 
very strict and conservative, will also be looked at. 
Many of the issues we discuss in this work are not merely academic.  They now have 
a daily presence in the world news, especially various reports we hear about radical 
actions such as demolishing graves of saints or even more extreme acts committed by 
those commonly referred to as Salafi-Jihadis.  It is best here to avoid getting into a 
discussion of what the present-day meaning of ‘Salafiyya’ amounts to, and only point 
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to the very long historical cooperation between the Saudi state and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which has given birth to at least some of these groups.  
Before turning to the work itself, the ongoing debate regarding the use of electronic 
databases and the internet as academic sources should be noted.  As part of the 
information revolution the world has witnessed in the past few decades, the amount of 
material available online on websites and social networks is growing rapidly.  By the 
way, sometimes even common references to Facebook as bid‘a can be found...  
While the majority of primary sources used in this work have been located in their 
printed versions, electronic and online resources considered as databases have been 
used in several cases – personal official websites, especially of the current 
Wahhābī‘ulamā’; comprehensive online databases such as shamela.ws or daawa-
info.net.  In the background chapter, a selection of Saudi originated CD-ROMS has 
been consulted, especially in the section dealing with fiqh literature.  Several books 
here could not be located elsewhere, which also creates a problem in listing them 
properly in the bibliography.  The choice was between ignoring these sources or using 
them as they are and saving the full record, something that was also done with the 
online resources (in which the last date entered has also been indicated). 
 
Many people should be thanked for helping to bring this work to its conclusion.  First 
and foremost is my supervisor Dr. Kate Zebiri for her dedicated support as well as her 
professional guidance; my dear parents, wife and children as well as many friends, 
each providing his unique input and contribution to this work and its completion. 
Special thanks to Lily Amior for the very professional and wise editing; to the ISEF 
Foundation and the GCT for their long-term financial and moral support and the 
Spalding Trust for the grant it awarded me. My heartfelt thanks to every one of them.   
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Background Chapter: Bid‘a – the crystallisation and 
development 
I. The early days  
The term bid‘a itself does not appear in the Qur’an.  Its root, however, appears a 
number of times; some of these passages or single occurrences have positive 
connotations relating to Allah, the creator [badī‘] of the world;1 and others are more 
neutral.  In the first of these, the Prophet, aspiring to point out the continuity of his 
newly presented religion as well as his place in the chain of messengers, when he is 
told to say: 
 
I am not an innovation [bid‘an] among the messengers, and I know not what shall be 
done with me or with you. I only follow what is revealed to me; I am only a clear 
warner.   [Qur’an 46:9] 
 
The second, which might be interpreted as subtly veiled criticism, says:  
 
Then We sent, following their footsteps, others of Our apostles; and afterwards We 
sent Jesus son of Mary, and gave unto him the Gospel; and We set in the hearts of 
those who followed him tenderness and mercy. And [as for] monasticism, they 
innovated it [ibtada‘uha] – We did not prescribe it for them; only the seeking for the 
good pleasure of Allah...    [Qur’an 57: 27] 
 
An even earlier use of the term, dating back to the period of transition between the 
jāhiliyya and the early days of Islam, bears the meaning of ‘invention’ as well, and is 
reported in the sīra by Ibn Hishām in the name of Ibn Isḥāq.  The story relates to the 
escape of the Prophet’s followers to the land of al-Habash (Ethiopia, a Christian state), 
and the delegation sent by Quraysh to persuade the king/Negus to hand them back. 
The argument that the two delegates tried to put before the king was:  
 
                                                 
1
 Qur’an 6:101; Qur’an 2:117 
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Some ignorant persons escaped from us to the king’s land. They have abandoned 
their tribe’s religion, do not fit into yours, and have brought an invented [mubtada‘] 
religion which is known neither to you nor to us.
1
  
II. Bid‘a in the Hadith 
Various aḥādīth leading to different conclusions have been quoted in relation to bid‘a. 
These aḥādīth make frequent appearances in this study, with each scholar picking the 
most suitable to justify his views. 
 
The first recorded use of the term bid‘a in early Islam relates to the extra prayers and 
prostrations [rak‘as] prescribed for the fasting month of Ramaḍān [tarāwiḥ].  The 
Hadith is narrated by ‘Abd al-Qārī, one of the younger companions of the Prophet 
[ṣaḥāba], who tells the following story: 
 
One night in Ramaḍān I went out with ‘Umar bin al-Khattāb to the mosque, and the 
people were separated in different groups. One man was praying on his own, 
and another with a group behind him following his prayer. ‘Umar said, “I think it 
would be better for all these people to join together behind one reciter”. So he 
decided to gather them behind ‘Ubay bin Ka‘b. Then another night I went out with 
him again, and all the people were praying behind one reciter. ‘Umar said, ‘This is 
an excellent bid‘a [ni‘mat al-bid‘a], however the one they sleep through is better 
than the one they are praying,’ — meaning the prayer in the last part of the night. 
People used to stand in prayer during the first part of the night. 
 
This means that ‘Izzat ‘Alī ‘Aṭiyya is mistaken in dating the first bid‘a together with 
the first fitna (sedition) -- which, of course, appeared later, following the assassination 
of ‘Uthmān.2  
 
The background of this Hadith is the Prophet’s encouragement to his followers to add 
prayers in the nights of Ramaḍān.  As can be seen, ‘Umar is said to have initiated the 
custom for such gatherings to be made in congregation, rather than simply praise it. 
                                                 
1
 ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Hishām, Al-Sīra al-nabawiyya, Beirut, Dār al-Fikr li’l-Tabāʻa wa’l-Nashr wa’l-
Tawzīʻ,  1992, vol. 1, p. 357 
2
 ‘Izzat ‘Alī ‘Id ‘Aṭiyya,  Al-Bid‘a: taḥdīduha wa mawqif al-Islām minha, Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al- 
Ḥadītha, 1973, p. 44 
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So the perception of bid‘a as an ‘innovation in religion’ was already known shortly 
after the days of the Prophet. 
 
It is, however, unclear when bid‘a also started to acquire the negative connotations 
that are prevalent today.  ‘Aṭiyya claims it began after the assassination of ‘Uthmān,1 
and Zakaria Bin Mat even concludes that the Prophet made a shar‘ī distinction 
between good [ḥasana] and bad [sayyi‘a] bida‘.2 Such a conclusion can, perhaps, be 
based on a few aḥādīth that al-Tirmidhī relates,3 as well as a Hadith reported by both 
al-Bukhārī and Muslim and reported in the name of ‘A’isha, who said:  
 
Whoever brings a novelty [aḥdatha] into our religion which has no roots in our 
tradition is rejected.
4
 
 
Bin Mat may also be referring to another Hadith, attributed to Abu Juḥayfa al-
Kūfī from among the ṣaḥāba, who quotes the Prophet making such a distinction 
while not using the term bid‘a -- but rather by juxtaposition with the term ‘Sunna’: 
 
Whoever introduces a good Sunna [sunna ḥasana] that is followed after him, will be 
rewarded for it and in addition the equivalent of their reward, without that 
detracting from their reward in the slightest. But whoever introduces a bad Sunna 
[sunna sayyi‘a] that is followed after him, will bear the burden of sin for it and in 
addition the equivalent of their burden of sin, without that detracting from their 
burden in the slightest.
5
 
 
                                                 
1
 ‘Aṭiyya, p. 34 
2
 Zakaria Bin Mat, The criteria of Islamic civilisation: a study of the concept of innovation (bid‘a ) – a 
case study of Ibn Taimiyya (1263M-1328M) and Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1703M-1791M), 
MPhil thesis, University of Birmingham, Department of Theology, Faculty of Arts, 1987, p. 39 
3 Muhạmmad ibn ‘Īsā al-Tirmidhī, Al-Jāmiʻ al- ṣaḥīḥ: wa-huwa sunan al-Tirmidhī, Cairo, Musṭafā al-
Bābī al-Hạlabī,  1937, vol. 4, pp. 150-151 Also, full Arabic/English text on 
http://www.weebly.com/uploads/1/0/4/8/10482374/jami-a-tirmidhi-sunan-altirmidhi-english_1.pdf  
4 Muhạmmad ibn Isma‘īl al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʻ al-ṣaḥīḥ, Beirut, Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, 1984, Kitāb al-
ṣulḥ, no. 5; Muslim ibn al-Hạjjāj al-Qushayrī, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Beirut, Muassasat ʻIzz al-Dīn, 1987, 
Kitāb al-‘Aqdiyya, no. 17 
5 Muhạmmad ibn Yazīd ibn Māja, Cairo, 1952, Muqaddama, no. 207; Muslim, vol. 13, p. 61 
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In any case, the main Hadith utilised in the negative sense is attributed to the Prophet 
and narrated in the name of ‘Utba bin ‘Abd Allah;1  according to him, the Prophet 
used to say in his khutba: 
 
Whomever Allah guides, none can lead him astray, and whomever Allah sends 
astray, none can guide. The truest of word is the Book of Allah and the best of 
guidance is the guidance of Muḥammad. The worst of things are those that are newly 
invented [muḥaddatha]; every newly-invented thing is an innovation [bid‘a] and 
every innovation is a deviation [ḍalāla], and every deviation belongs in hellfire. 
 
Another Hadith, which perhaps takes the harshest approach with regard to the 
treatment of a mubtadi‘ still in this world, is narrated by Abū Ḥudhayfa, who quotes 
the Prophet as saying that Allah would not accept a person who brings a bid‘a into 
religion [ṣāḥib bid‘a], in matters such as fasts, prayers, zakāt, Hajj, ‘umra or Jihad. 
Such a person, according to this Hadith, will be expelled from Islam in a way similar 
to that by which ‘leaven is taken out of dough’.2 
 
Many of the aḥādīth which condemn bid‘a are presented in the name of the ṣaḥāba, 
while the Prophet himself, in a way similar to ‘A’isha’s Hadith, usually speaks about 
novelties [muḥadathāt].3  In addition, it is clear that neither the concept nor the term 
had been either crystallized or thoroughly discussed in the early days.  Most of the 
negative citations of the term simply emphasise the need to avoid bid‘a.  
 
Such aḥādīth state the necessity for Muslims to ‘embrace the Sunna and avoid the 
bid‘a’,4 or say that ‘adhering to the Sunna is better than producing a bid‘a’.5  Other 
aḥādīth from this era seem to be more flexible: Abū Dā’ūd relates a Hadith which can 
be regarded as apologetic, saying that people do not follow bid‘a unless they obtain 
                                                 
1
 This Hadith is quoted in most canonical sources; see: Muslim, Kitāb al-Jum‘a, p. 43; Sulaymān ibn 
al-Ashʻath al-Sijistānī, Abū Dāʼūd, Sunan Abī Dāʼūd, Ḥims, ̣Muhạmmad ʻAlī al-Sayyid, 1969, p. 5; 
Ahṃad ibn Shuʻayb al-Nasā’i, Kitāb al-sunan al-kubrā́, Beirut, Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmiyya, 1991, Kitāb 
al-‘Abadayn, p. 22; Ibn Māja, Muqaddama, p. 7; ʻAbd Allāh ibn ʻAbd al-Rahṃān Al-Darīmī, Sunan al-
Darīmī, Cairo, Dār al-Fikr, 1978, Muqaddama, pp. 16, 32; Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, pp. 3, 310, 371, 4, 126-
7 
2
 Ibn Māja, vol. 1, p.  
3
 Nasser I. A. Tuwaim, The discussion of the concept of Bid‘a from early Islam up to the twelfth 
century A.H., PhD thesis, University of Lancaster, 1992, pp. 72, 74 
4
 Al-Tirmidhī, Kitāb al-‘ilm, p. 16 
5
 Aḥmad ibn Muhạmmad ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad al-imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, Beirut, al-Maktab al-
Islāmī, 1993, vol. 4, p. 150 
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proof that there is Sunna in at least a part of it.
1
  Another group of aḥādīth is relevant 
to this study’s later reflections on bid‘a and its place, in the light of discussions on 
related religious terms such as exaggeration [ghulūw],2 and doubts [shubbuhāt].3 
 
From the discussion thus far, it is apparent that the division of bid‘a into different 
categories had already been made in the early days, even if not intentionally.  Some of 
the aḥādīth are concerned with religious devotions and rituals [‘ibādāt], and the right 
conduct for a believer while performing them; others touch on customs [‘ādāt], which 
possess a more individual nature and concern the daily lives of believers; and a third 
group, which may be characterized as credal innovations [‘aqīdāt], focuses on the 
condemnation of certain factions in Islam which arose during the early period. 
 
In the aḥādīth which concern ‘ibādāt, the most common is the one stating that the 
way some people were performing the ḍuḥā prayer is considered bid‘a.4  In less 
customary Hadith collections, many refer to certain prayers and specific rituals during 
the month of Ramaḍān.  For example, breaking stones to throw at Muzdalifa is 
considered bid‘a,5 and the same applies to the matter of circling the ka‘ba [ṭawwāf].6 
Other aḥādīth focus primarily on certain ways of conduct during the prayer. For 
instance, raising hands during formal prayer is considered a bid‘a.7  
  
A number of aḥādīth that fall within the category of ‘aqīdāt deal with the 
condemnation of certain sectarian groups or factions.  Many of these tried to develop 
different ways of thinking from the Islamic mainstream, and can thus be found under 
the definition of bid‘a.  These include the qādiriyya, the murji‘a, the rāfiḍa, the 
                                                 
1
 Abū Dā‘ūd, vol. 4, p. 203 
2
 Al-Bukhāri, Kitāb al-i‘tiṣām, p. 5 
3
 Al-Darīmī, Muqaddama, p. 23 
4
 See Al-Bukhāri, Kitāb al-‘umra, no. 3; Muslim, Kitāb al-ḥujaj, no. 220; Abū Dā‘ūd, Kitāb al-ṣalāt, 
no. 44; Mālik ibn Anas, Muwaṭṭā al-Imām Mālik, Jeddah, Dār al-Shurūk, 1985, Kitāb al-ḥujaj, no. 54; 
Ibn Ḥanbal, vol. 6, p. 155 
5
 Abu Bakr Muḥammad bin Isḥāq bin Ḥazīma , Ṣaḥīḥ ibn Ḥazīma, Al-Maktab Al-Islāmi, 2003, vol. 4 
p. 274 
6 Muhạmmad ibn ʻAbd Allah al-Azraqī, Akhbār Makka: wa-mā jā‘a fīhā min al-āthār, Dār al-Andalus, 
1965, vol. 1, p. 231 
7 ʻAli Jundī, Qurrat al-ʻayn fi Ramaḍān wa’l-ʻīdayn, Cairo, Matbaʻat al-Ahrām al-Tijāriyya, 1969,  
vol. 1, p. 54 (Jundī is leaning on a book by Al-Bukhārī titled Kitāb fi rafʻ al-yadān fi’l ṣalāt) 
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nāsibiyya, the mu‘tazila and the jahmiyya.1  These names will be found throughout 
this study, as part of the various ‘ulamā’ under discussion. 
 
Turning to personal matters [‘ādāt], it is worth noting that almost all of the early 
Hadith collections, whether canonical or not, discuss the subject of divorce (and 
Muslim even dedicates a whole book to the subject).  The most common statement is 
that pronouncing the word ṭalaq three times on a single occasion during the process of 
divorce is a bid‘a.2 In addition, a weak Hadith adds that for a divorce to be lawful and 
not a bid‘a, the woman has to be ritually pure.3  Judging from this varied range of 
aḥādīth, it is therefore more likely that the claim that the term bid‘a began to be used 
in a negative connotation only in the time of the ṣaḥāba4 is more accurate. 
 
In the Tafsīr literature, it is worth mentioning al-Ṭabarī, who treats all innovation in 
religion harshly and regards bid‘a as its major cause. Allah sent the ḥanīfī Islam and 
its Prophet, after Jews and the Christians performed bid‘a in their respective faiths, 
thus excluding themselves from the ‘Abrahamic religion’.5  A main concern of Ṭabarī 
is his refusal to accept any form of speculative Qur’an interpretation [ta’wīl].  He 
states that ta’wīl is forbidden and is an ‘innovation in religion’, ‘whether it had been 
made possible by Allah or by the words of His Prophet’.6  
III. Further developments since the third century of Islam 
 
Moving on to the third Islamic century, and focusing on the fiqh literature, the term 
bid‘a is used more frequently, and it is used by ‘ulamā’ from all Sunni schools of 
jurisprudence (mostly Mālikīs and Shāfi‘īs).  More discussions on the essence of 
bid‘a can be found, including early attempts to define it.  Progress in these attempts is 
                                                 
1
 See for example: Abu ʻAlī bin al-Ḥasan bin Naṣr al-Ṭawsī, Mukhtaṣar al-aḥkām, Dār ibn Ḥazm, 
2011, p. 321; Abu ʻAbd Allah ʻUbaydullah bin Muḥammad bin Batta al-ʻAkbarī al-Ḥanbalī, Al-Ibāna 
ʻan Sharīʻat al-firqa al-nājiyya wa mujānabat al-firqa al-madhmū̄ma, ʻAmmān, Dār al-Rāya, 1994, 
vol. 2, p. 250 
2
 Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, vol. 9 (Kitāb al-ṭalaq), pp. 4-5 
3
 Abu’l-Faraj Jamāl al-Dīn ʻAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʻAlī ibn Muḥammad al-Jawzī, Zād al-masīr fi ʻilm al-
tafsīr, Beirut, Beirut, Dār al-Kitab al-ʻArabī, 2001, vol. 8, p. 228 
4
 ʻAbd al-Malik bin ʻAbd Allah al-Juwaynī, Al-Burhān fi uṣūl al-fiqh, Beirut, Dār al-Kitāb al-ʻIlmiyya, 
1997, vol. 2, p. 861 
5 Muhạmmad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʻ al-bayān ʻan taʼwīl al-Qurʼan, Cairo, Dār al-Salām, 2007, vol. 
1, p. 558 
6
 ibid, vol. 3, p. 177 
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visible in a new genre of writing dedicated to the subject -- bid‘a literature.  This 
started to emerge during the same period, the first book being introduced by 
Muḥammad ibn Waddaḥ al-Qurṭubī (d. 899) in al-Andalus,1 and was later used in 
different compilations of fatāwā.  Maribel Fierro connects this to what she says was 
an inevitable process of religious degradation that Islam, like previous religions, had 
undergone following the death of the Prophet.
2
 
 
Tuwaim says that the three main areas of discussion on bid‘a remained ‘ibādāt,‘ādāt 
and ‘aqīdāt.3  Based on the writings of this period, Bin Mat concludes that there 
emerged two groups which differed in their approach and emphasis.
4
  The first group, 
which, according to al-Atawneh, consisted mainly of Shāfi‘ī and Ḥanbalī ‘ulamā,5 
defined the concept of bid‘a in a narrow way.  The second group, Bin Mat says, 
expanded the concept of bid‘a and saw it in the wider context of the Sharī‘a.  It seems 
that most of the ‘ulamā’ belonging to this group came from the Shāfi‘ī and Mālikī 
schools.  
 
Notable ‘ulamā from the first group are Imām al-Ash‘arī (d. 935?), al-Malātī (d. 988), 
‘Abd al-Qāhir ibn Ṭāhir (d. 1037), al-Bayhaqī (d. 1066), Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-
Karīm al-Shahrastānī (d. 1153), Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 1201?), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), Ibn 
Rajab (d. 1393), Idrīs ibn Baydakīn al-Turkumānī (d. 13/14th century) and Ibn Ḥajar 
al-‘Asqalānī (d. 1449). 
 
To the ‘ulamā’ within this group, every bid‘a automatically constitutes a ḍalāla, and 
they find the proof for this in the Hadith.  Such judgments, Bin Mat adds, lead to an 
extreme interpretation of the concept of bid‘a, according to which any new ideas or 
thoughts are to be rejected, and religion remains rigid.  Tuwaim believes that the 
reason for taking this stand was the difficulty Islam faced as a result of its triumphs 
and expansion, which exposed it to new cultures, ideas and problems.
6
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Here is a good place to note that several major books on the subject were written in 
the area of Islamic Spain [Al-Andalus], where the encounter between Islam and 
Christianity had historically been the most apparent.  Tuwaim also believes that this 
encounter between religions and cultures could be a possible explanation of the major 
attention focused on bida‘ of ‘ibādāt and‘ādāt from the middle of the fifth and the 
seventh centuries of Islam,.
1
  
 
Al-Qurṭubī, a Mālikī scholar who titled his book al-Bid‘a wa’l-nahy ‘anha (Bid‘a and 
its rejection), was the first of the classical ‘ulamā’ to condemn bid‘a as a clear 
violation of religious codes.  He contested novelties of any kind and did not grant the 
permissibility of bid‘a ḥasana, saying innovation is always evil and unlawful.2  He 
was particularly concerned with bida‘ in ‘ibādāt, mostly the ones that were  related to 
prayer.
3
  From the date and structure of al-Qurṭubī’s book, Rispler suggests that at the 
time of crystallisation of Islamic law, a whole body of material which was not 
included in the fiqh books found its way there.
4
  
 
Imām al-Ash‘arī, as the eponymous founder of the Ash‘arī School, wrote three 
relevant books on the subject – Kitāb al-luma‘ fi’l-radd ‘ala ahl al-zaygh wa’l-bid‘a; 
Maqālāt al-Islamiyyīn wa-ikhtilāf al-muṣallīn; and al-Ibāna ‘an uṣūl al-diyāna.  Most 
of the bida‘ discussed in his books are from the type of ‘aqīdāt, and fit his image as a 
reviver of the Sunna and one of the symbols of the fight against unbelief [kufr].  
 
The next Shāfi‘ī scholar in this group is al-Malātī, who wrote his book Al-Tanbīh 
wa’l-radd ‘ala ahl al-ahwā’ wa’l-bid‘a -- which is also completely devoted to 
bida‘ of ‘aqīdāt -- out of fear of the previously mentioned groups which emerged 
during the first century of Islam.  In this book, al-Malātī lists as fundamental beliefs 
of the Sunnis those items which were matters of controversy to those groups.
5
  
 
The next ‘ulamā’ in the list wrote books of the al-milal wa’l-niḥal variety, all 
concentrating on credal bida‘ of ‘aqīdāt. The first, ‘Abd al-Qāhir ibn Ṭāhir al-
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Baghdādī, was a Shāfi‘ī scholar who followed al-Ash‘arī.  Apart from his al-milal 
wa’l-niḥal literature, he wrote another relevant book on the subject, al-Farq bayna’l-
firaq.  He was followed by his student al-Bayhaqī, who is only concerned with 
bida‘ of ‘aqīdāt, especially the grave danger that he sees presented by the views of 
such groups as the khawārij, the murji‘a and the mu‘tazila. 
  
Tuwaim thinks that the next notable Shāfi‘ī scholar, al-Shahrastānī, chose to write on 
this subject in order to provide some guidance concerning basic matters relating to 
‘aqīdāt, at a time when the vast majority of other relevant writers emphasized the 
bida‘ of ‘ibādāt.1  Tuwaim adds that the books authored by these four scholars are the 
most important sources for information on sectarianism in Islam, and indeed, they are 
still widely consulted by modern writers studying sectarian movements.
2
  
 
Ibn al-Jawzī, a Ḥanbalī scholar, also rejected every novelty touching on ‘ibādāt and 
‘ādāt.  He contended that the restrictions of the Sunna were to be preferred to reliance 
on ijtihād in ambiguous matters.3  
 
In the beginning of his survey of the subject, Ibn Rajab cites the Hadith narrated by 
‘A’isha referred to earlier, and adds another in the name of the Prophet which insists 
that believers follow the Sunna.  From these he concludes that whatever contradicts 
the Sharī‘a may be branded as apostasy [ridda], and that bida‘ fall under the 
categories of either rituals or social behaviour (which he calls mu‘amalāt).  Ibn Rajab 
continues this theme, stating that contradiction of the Shari‘a encompasses everything 
which is not covered by either Allah’s word or the Prophet’s conduct.4 
 
It is interesting to note that the first Ḥanafi book on the subject, Kitāb al-luma‘ fi’l- 
ḥawādith wa’l-bida‘ was published as late as the thirteenth/fourteenth century by Idrīs 
bin Baydakīn al-Turkumānī.  Al-Turkumānī discusses the subject of bid‘a from the 
standpoint of both a jurist and a preacher.  According to Subḥī Labīb, who wrote the 
preface to the book’s reprint in 1987, al-Turkumānī’s uniqueness and importance lay 
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in writing a book which went in the opposite direction to most treatises of his day, as 
al-Turkumānī himself states.1 
 
Most of al-Turkumānī’s definitions of bid‘a contain additional words [iḍāfiyya], 
which occur several times in the course of this work, and in the focus of his 
discussion of the bida‘ of ‘ibādāt.  Al-Turkumānī also divides bid‘a into four 
categories, possibly corresponding with the five categories of permissible and 
impermissible actions in Islam: permissible [mubāḥ], recommendable [thawāb], 
undesirable [makrūh] and forbidden [ḥarām], but he insisted that bid‘a is forbidden in 
any case, and therefore the last two categories are the only functional ones.
2
  
 
Al-Turkumānī strongly attacks women for their behaviour during the Hajj period – 
whether singing, dancing or lack of modesty.  His book also contains issues which, on 
the whole, had not been dealt with before, such as playing chess.  In matters of 
‘aqīdāt he speaks a lot about the imitation of Christians – especially the Copts in 
Egypt - and about Sufism as well.
3
  Ibn al-Ḥajj (d. 1347), a Mālikī scholar, treated 
bid‘a in his large work al-Madkhal in an incidental way only, and did not discuss the 
issue of bid‘a as a whole.  In general he regards all bida‘ as evil, but at the same time, 
Tuwaim notes, he agrees with the ‘ulamā who divided the subject into five 
categories.
4
  Most of the bida‘ discussed in the book are of ‘ibādāt, such as the 
conversion of graves and other holy sites into places of worship.  Al-‘Asqalānī 
provides the first definition in the fatāwā literature which Muhammad Masud could 
locate.  His definition of bid‘a is: ‘Any belief contrary to the common knowledge of 
the Prophet [i.e. his practice], held abominably, not inimically’.5 
 
The ‘ulamā in the second group looked at bid‘a from a comprehensive point of view 
that included all changes occurring after the time of the Prophet, whether in line with 
Shari‘a or not.  They rejected bida‘ which were not in line with the prophetic practice. 
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In case a bid‘a was introduced that was not evil in itself and did not contradict the 
Qur’an or authorities of religious life, they accepted it as an unobjectionable bid‘a.  
 
This group, in addition to relying on the precedent of a bid‘a ḥasana set by ‘Umar, 
also relied on the Hadith that speaks about the reward given to anyone who creates a 
sunna ḥasana.  The outlook of this group allows the Muslim to accommodate the 
requirements of time and to embrace and encourage progress.
1
  According to al-
Atawneh, the ‘ulamā who belonged to this group actually established a broad base for 
accepting bida‘ of ‘ibādāt and ‘ādāt.  Their acceptance of ‘ibādāt also prepared the 
ground for the perception of a required bid‘a [bid‘a wājiba].  As for the bida‘ in ‘ādāt, 
he says their approach is based on the judicial principle which permits the foundation 
of customs [al-aṣl fi’l-‘ādāt al-ibāḥa].2 
 
The chief ‘ulamā’ in this group are al-Shafi‘ī (d. 820), Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064), Abū 
Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), al-Ṭurṭūshī (d. 1126/1131), Ibn al-Athīr (d. 1232), ‘Izz 
al-Dīn ibn ‘Abd al-Salām (d. 1262), Abu Shāma (d. 1266), al-Nawawī (d. 1277), Ibn 
al-Ḥajj al-Abyārī (d. 1336), al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388), al-Suyūtī (d. 1505) and al-
Wansharisī (d. 1508).3  
 
Al-Shafi‘ī, after whom the Shafi‘ī school of jurisprudence is called, divided the lawful 
meaning of bid‘a into two sections, ‘good’ [maḥmūda] and ‘denounced’ 
[madhmūma].4  Bin Mat says it is most likely that al-Shāfi‘ī would have designated as 
‘denounced’ those bida‘ which belong to the category of ‘ibādāt.5  
 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Salām, also a Shāfi‘ī scholar, was the first to divide bid‘a into the same 
five categories of human acts: obligatory [wājib], unlawful [ḥarām], recommended 
[mandūb], offensive [makrūh] and permissible [mubaḥ]. This division is made in his 
book Qawā’id al-aḥkām fī maṣāliḥ al-an‘ām.  His approach, says Tuwaim, was 
opposed to the approach of most of the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī ‘ulamā’.6  
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In a small section of the book which discusses the issue of bid‘a, Ibn ‘Abd al-Salām 
defines it as an action or performance which had not been observed during the time of 
the Prophet.  He too divides bid‘a into five categories: obligatory (wājiba), prohibited 
(muḥarrama), recommended (mandūba), undesirable (makrūha) or permissible 
(mubāḥa), but does not explain how it is possible to decide which category each bid‘a 
belongs to.  He explains that the only way to do so is by checking it against the rules 
of the Shari‘a.1 
 
Al-Ṭurṭūshī, a Mālikī scholar, says he wrote his book in order to make people aware 
of the novelties and innovations that had crept into Islam, dividing them into ‘known’ 
and ‘unknown’.  Ṭurṭūshī’s first category is not thoroughly discussed in the book, 
since it contains bida‘ and muḥadathāt already known to the elite and to the masses as 
forbidden and wrong.  He makes no distinction between bid‘a and muḥadatha: his 
main concern is to present those innovations and novelties which were not yet known 
to the general public, especially the ones concerning ‘ibādāt.2  His analysis is very 
general and relies only on textual evidence from either the Qur’an or the Sunna. 
However, Tuwaim says, there are some similarities between him and Ibn ‘Abd al-
Salām, such as the division of bida‘ into clear cases as against ambiguous ones.3 
 
In a similar vein to al-Ṭurṭūshī stands Abū’l-Qāsim al-Maqdisī (Abu Shāma 1203-
1267), who defines both bid‘a and muḥadatha as matters which have no precedent in 
the Qur’an, Sunna and ijmā‘.  Abu Shāma was the first Shāfi‘ī scholar to write a 
whole book dedicated to the subject of bid‘a, and it is very close in its approach to 
that of al-Ṭurṭūshī.  They differ in their general attitude, however, with Abu Shāma 
supporting the division of bid‘a into ‘good’ and ‘evil’.4 
 
This group is best represented by the Mālikī scholar Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388) 
who, Asep Saepudin Jahar says, discussed the concept of bid‘a at length, attempting 
to clarify the concept by fitting his terminology into a framework of legal philosophy. 
This attempt led al-Shāṭibī to put the bid‘a into legal terms, thus actually moving the 
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debate a step forward into becoming pure shar‘ī.1  Al-Shāṭibī’s works served as an 
inspiration to some of the ‘ulamā’ dealt with here, and he, therefore, deserves a more 
detailed discussion.  His most important book, Al-I‘tiṣām, was written as an answer to 
many charges directed at him of having actually introduced bid‘a into religion.  This 
accusation arose as a result of Al-Shāṭibī’s opposition to various practices of some 
fuqahā’, in particular mentioning the name of the Sultān in the khutba and praying for 
him towards the end of the ritual prayers.  Al-Shāṭibī called this practice a bid‘a.2  
Ella Landau-Tasseron further discusses these accusations and the way al-Shāṭibī 
introduced his innovative work, pointing out the discrepancy between the ideal and 
practice when defining what constitutes a bid‘a in a negative connotation and what 
does not.
3
  
 
Al-Shāṭibī’s main concern with bid‘a is that performing it makes people stray from 
the straight path [al-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm], which is the Sunna.4  Bid‘a, he says, 
eliminates the Sunna, and leads to the destruction of the essence of Islam.  In this 
respect he refers to the salaf, who, he continues, maintained that abandoning the 
Sunna leads straight to bid‘a,5 which means that he sees the two as polar opposites. 
Furthermore, performing a bid‘a leads to unbelief [kufr], which strips off the religious 
creed [milla].
6
  The book opens by separating the bida‘ that belong solely to‘ibādāt 
from those which are exclusively related to ‘ādāt.7  The former are taken for granted 
as submission [ta‘abbud] to Allah, while the latter can be modified according to 
human need and ijmā‘.8  
 
In this way, bid‘a can be subdivided into two types: ‘real’ [bid‘a ḥaqīqiyya], which 
relates to the category of ‘ibādāt; and ‘relative’ [bid‘a iḍāfiyya], which relates to ‘ādāt. 
The first category is contradictory to Islam and presents a clear violation of the 
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Qur’an, Sunna and ijmā‘.1  With regard to the second, however, the lack of an 
authentic source for a specific custom is a bid‘a.2  A second subdivision is based on 
ambiguous proofs [dalīl] or no proofs at all, and may, therefore, be considered as 
either negative or positive [bid‘a wājiba]. In addition, positive bida‘ which occurred 
shortly after the days of the Prophet are actually regarded by al-Shāṭibī as Sunna.3  
 
Al-Shāṭibī does not accept the division of bida‘ into five categories, and denounces 
those ‘ulamā’ who accept it.  Sometimes, he says, ‘ulamā who have to be rational 
have themselves performed bida‘.  He also refers to the lack of knowledge [jahl] 
which in some cases makes it hard to distinguish between a Sunna and a bid‘a.  In 
other cases, the mubtadi‘ performs a bid‘a and makes others follow, thinking that it is 
the correct guidance.  He is working against the set of laws of the Shari‘a, and, in a 
way actually suggesting an alternative set of laws to it.  In order to stress the 
importance of confronting bid‘a, al-Shāṭibī tries to trace it back to the Qur’an, saying 
that although the term itself is not mentioned, it is discernible from the following 
verse, which addresses passages that have more than one meaning: 
 
It is He (Allah) Who has sent down upon thee the Book, wherein are clear verses that 
constitute the Essence of the Book, and others that are ambiguous. As for those in 
whose hearts is doubt, they follow the ambiguous part, desiring dissension, and 
desiring its interpretation; and none knows its interpretation save only Allah. 
[Qur’an 3: 5-6].
4
  
 
In another of his significant works– al-Muwāfaqāt – al-Shāṭibī maintains that bid‘a is 
a device for ‘imposing silence [sukūt] on the Shari‘a’; here he labels bid‘a as qabīḥa 
[repugnant].
5
 Al-Shāṭibī refers to both non-Muslims and various Islamic sects as 
being problematic for believers.  He says that Jews did not believe in the Prophet 
[kufr], and Christians do not believe in heaven.  The khawārij are referred to as ahl al-
bid‘a, who pushed themselves out of the body of the ahl al-sunna wa’l jamā‘a.  
Another issue he raises (and which is referred to by other ‘ulamā’) is the ignorance 
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[jahl] which leads to bid‘a and mistakes.  This is true, for example, of Sufis, who due 
to their ignorance even went as far as the invention [ikhtirā‘] of ‘ibādāt.1  In addition, 
he says that to perform ijtihād out of ignorance of the source on which it is based may 
lead to ḍalāla.2 
 
Tuwaim tries to explain the logic behind al-Shāṭibī’s work.  Al-Shāṭibī’s period, he 
says, can be characterised as one in which jurists and Sufis allowed their standards to 
decline, leading to the adoption of uncharacteristic positions.  On the one hand, jurists 
were too lenient in substantiating and articulating the law, while on the other Sufis 
were overly rigid and unduly demanding in its application.  Therefore, he concludes, 
their attention to religious practices was sometimes distorted from the authentic 
injunctions prescribed in the Qur’an and Sunna.  It was al-Shāṭibī, he says, who 
opposed these trends by insisting on the supremacy of the Sharī‘a over reason in order 
to resist bid‘a permeating religion, and by emphasising respect for the ends and the 
spirit of the law, despite the fact that he himself was accused of being a mubtadi‘.3  
 
Another scholar, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (1445-1505), further divides ‘bad’ bida‘ into 
‘ibādāt and ‘ādāt;  bida‘ of the first category, according to him, were generally 
invented by innovatory groups; he calculates a total of 72 newly-presented rituals. 
The second category of innovatory customs is further divided into additional sub-
groups, which are not part of the discussion here.
4
 
 
Ahmad al-Wansharīsī (d. 1508), also a Mālikī scholar, is relevant to this discussion 
because of his book Al-Mi‘yār al-mu‘rib wa’l-jāmi‘ al-mughrib.  In this book he 
preserves the fatāwā of al-Shāṭibī, and defines the work of the muftī as mainly the 
issuing of fatāwā.  He sums up the views of the four schools, and it is interesting to 
note that he regards the creator of a bid‘a as acting in good faith.  He says that the 
‘ulamā’ who consider bid‘a in terms of ‘ibādāt only think it is an invention inserted 
into religion because of exaggeration [ghulūw] in the will to worship Allah, and that 
others who speak about ‘ādāt say that these are inventions which are similar to shar‘ī 
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acts and were meant to be followed as such.
1
  Al-Wansharīsī further points out the 
difficulty of differentiating between good and bad bida‘.2  According to Tuwaim, 
much of his discussion is devoted to ‘aqīdāt.3 
 
The fiqh literature includes many discussions regarding bida‘ of ‘ibādāt, with more 
significant and primary discussions than before.  Once again, acts relating to the Hajj 
and ‘umra can be found, but also issues such as the question of women performing 
adhān (which is considered a muḥadatha and therefore bid‘a)4 and the beginning of 
significant discussions that will frequently be referred to in this study.  These include 
commemorations of the Prophets’ birthdays [al-mawlid al-nabawī],5 over which 
disputes have been raging ever since.  In the field of ‘ādāt, there are many discussions 
on the format of divorce,
6
 and others such as the claim that having a banquet is 
considered Sunna, but playing games during the banquet is bid‘a.7  Another bid‘a, 
quoted from the Hadith compilation of Mālik bin Anas, is shaving one’s moustache.8 
There is also a ‘good’ bid‘a of washing the concealed parts of the body.9 
 
A deeper insight into this literature will once again reveal many references to conduct 
during prayers, the most common of which states that praying aloud [juhr] is a 
bid‘a.10 Parts added to the prayers are named bid‘a, including common ones -- for 
example saying the basmala during the prayer;
11
 Psalms [mazāmīr];12 as well as 
certain additions to the Friday prayers;
13
 and acts like sajdat al-shukr that the Prophet 
is said to have performed whenever he heard good news.
14
  Certain requirements of 
the imām in the mosque, such as a discussion of when he should stand and sit during 
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the prayer, and the location of his seat opposite the qibla, may also be considered 
bid‘a.1  
 
Some ‘ādāt made by believers which are considered bid‘a include placing shoes 
behind one’s back during a prayer,2 and, after making a sacrifice, asking Allah to 
accept it.
3
  Another discussion which involves both the imām and the believers 
concerns prayers which are not delivered in public and are named bid‘a.4  There is 
also a discussion about whether to greet the imām during the prayer.  
 
Al-Qarafī, a Mālikī scholar, included in his book Kitāb al-furūq, a repetition of the 
five categories of bid‘a which had been mentioned by his teacher ‘Izz al-Dīn ibn ‘Abd 
al-Salām as the basis of the whole subject.  A discussion of this book was written by 
Ḥusayn al-Makkī, another Mālikī scholar who was also influenced by al-Shāṭibī. 
Tuwaim notes that al-Makkī’s major concern was the theoretical discussion about the 
correctness of the division of bida‘ into five categories; therefore there is hardly any 
discussion on the various types of bid‘a.5 
 
It is important to note that there are ‘ulamā’ from all schools in both groups under 
discussion.  According to Tuwaim, it seems that the Mālikī school has contributed 
more than the others to the deliberations.  The second great contribution was made by 
the Shāfi‘ī ‘ulamā’, who also developed the concept of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ innovations. 
They are followed by the Ḥanbalīs, and then the Ḥanafīs.  In general, says Tuwaim, it 
can be said that the two groups differed in the way they perceived developments after 
the lifetime of the Prophet, seeing them as noble [maḥmūd] or contemptible 
[madhmūn].6 
 
A special place in this chapter should be dedicated to Ibn Taymiyya, the prominent 
thirteenth century Ḥanbalī scholar (d. 1328), mistakenly believed by many to belong 
to the first group of ‘ulamā’ defined above, whose name is frequently brought up as a 
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staunch fighter against bida‘ in his time and who has served as inspiration to many of 
those under discussion. 
 
Abū ‘Alī Ḥasan Nadvi has written in some detail about Ibn Taymiyya’s works, and he 
will figure prominently in the chapter concerning the early Salafis.  Nadvi says that at 
the time of Ibn Taymiyya, shirk resulted from a mixture of Muslims, non-Muslims 
and Sufis; bid‘a and ḍalālāt came about alongside corruption, which became 
widespread, and there was a war between jāhiliyya and Islam.1  Jundi adds that people 
lost their faith and their sense of tawḥīd, and became involved in bid‘a, and Ibn 
Taymiyya took upon himself the battle to defend religion.
2
  
 
Praising Ibn Ḥanbal for his opposition to the mubtadi‘ūn,3 Muḥammad ‘Umar Memon 
says that Ibn Taymiyya took the fight against bid‘a a step further and considered it 
Jihad.
4
  Bid‘a for Ibn Taymiyya applies to anything without precedent, whilst in the 
legal sense it stands for any act which cannot be supported by a shar‘ī argument. 
According to the Sharī‘a, nothing accepted by the Qur’an or Sunna can be considered 
bid‘a. Bid‘a applies to everything munkar in religion.  It does not appear in the 
Qur’an or Sunna and does not correspond with the Shari‘a; neither Allah nor his 
Messenger like it, and the ṣaḥāba did not allow Satan to seduce them to ḍalāla in the 
way he did to some of the ahl al-bid‘a.5 
 
Ibn Taymiyya often places bid‘a and shirk together, sometimes speaking about bid‘at 
al-mushrikīn, especially in the field of ‘ibādāt – which, according to him, ahl al-bid‘a 
had learned from the mushrikūn.  Both shirk and bid‘a are based on lies and 
inventions, and hence are far from tawḥīd and Sunna.  Shirk is said to be the most 
ẓulm element, and āʾimat al-mushrikīn is the opposite of āʾimat al-ḥunafāʾ, relying on 
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the Abrahamic story.
1
  However, in his opinion, the Prophet, when declaring that 
every innovation is an error, clearly did not mean that every new act was forbidden, 
but only the new acts which do not follow the fundamentals he had laid down.
2
  The 
problem lies with the knowledge sent by the Prophet and his ṣaḥāba, which became 
adulterated by the whims of those who tampered with the scriptures and the 
mubtadi‘ūn.  This means that Ibn Taymiyya cannot be placed among the ‘ulamā from 
the first group, who completely rejected any innovation. 
 
Basing his remarks on a Hadith about ‘Umar, who praised the tarāwīḥ prayers [ni‘mat 
al-bid‘a], Ibn Taymiyyah learns that everything which came after the Prophet had 
been called bid‘a.3  He speaks of those who divide bid‘a into good [ḥasana] and 
repugnant [qabīḥa] relying on this Hadith, and says that a bid‘a known and supported 
by Muslims should be accepted.  The problem begins when such a bid‘a is supported 
by the views of jāhilūn. 
 
Ibn Taymiyya agrees that ijmā‘ will never embrace ḍalāla.4  Both ijmā‘ and ijtihād 
are accepted as important sources of sunna, although he warns that the latter might 
lead to mistakes.  He also draws up a formula, saying that people do not create 
anything they do not consider beneficial. If they believe it is harmful, they will not 
create it, because neither reason nor faith calls upon them to do so.
5
 
 
Ibn Taymiyya’s suggestion is, therefore, that a bid‘a ḥasana is in fact not bid‘a at all, 
and what ‘Umar said was not a matter of Shari‘a but a matter of language.  As 
previously mentioned, in linguistic terms, bid‘a means the invention of new things. 
Regarding the tarāwīḥ prayers themselves, Ibn Taymiyya says they are not bid‘a in 
the Shari‘a rather than the Sunna -- relying on the following Hadith:  
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Allah has prescribed for you the fasting of Ramaḍan, and this was given to you as 
Sunna for resurrection…
1
 
 
Ibn Taymiyya refers to the middle path [wasaṭiyya] of the ahl al-sunna waʾl-jamā‘a, 
as opposed to that of the ahl al-ḍalāla in the community.   
This term will appear several times in this study, especially in the chapter on 
Qaraḍāwi and the Muslim Brotherhood. This community, Ibn Taymiyya continues, is 
also wasaṭī in comparison with previous peoples, some of whom are guilty of 
exaggeration [ghulūw] in religion -- like the Christians who are guilty of it regarding 
Jesus, or the Jews who killed Zecharia and John and tried to kill Jesus as well.  As far 
as Muslims are concerned, he said the Qur’an promised righteousness: 
 
And thus we have made you a just community that you will be witnesses over the 
people and the Messenger will be a witness over you.  [Qurʾan 2: 143] 
 
Furthermore, they are also wasaṭ between the groups which are mubtadi‘a and which 
distorted the straight path [al-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm].  According to Ibn Taymiyya, the 
correct way to membership of the ahl al-sunna waʾl-jamā‘a is to follow exactly what 
the Prophet said in both the internal and the external aspects of the faith, following the 
path of the muhājirūn and the anṣār, and adhering to all the commandments of the 
Prophet. 2  
 
Nadvi discusses Ibn Taymiyya’s role in promoting iṣlāḥ and tajdīd, saying that he 
raised the flags of Jihad and tajdīd with regard to shirk traditions recommending 
grave worship, an issue which will be examined closely.  Nadvi refers to the four 
main points to which, he says, these traditions have contributed: 
 
1) Renewal (tajdīd) of belief in tawḥīd and abolition of unIslamic (mushrika) beliefs 
and traditions. 
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2) Criticism of Greek philosophy, logic (manṭiq) and the science of kalām, which he 
considered bid‘a, and favouring the ways and methods of the Qur’an and Sunna in 
every other matter. 
3) Answering non-Islamic groups and confronting their beliefs, traditions and 
influences. 
4) Tajdīd of the sciences of Shari‘a.1 
 
Ibn Taymiyya writes at length about the field of ‘ibāda.  He defines ‘ibāda as a genre 
that relates to everything desired by Allah.  It may be concealed [bāṭiniyya] or visible, 
and it includes al-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf and also Jihad against the non-believers [kuffār] 
and hypocrites [munāfiqūn]. ‘Ibāda is first of all connected to the Divinity, and 
therefore relates to tawḥīd.  As before, he considers the mushrikūn as blameworthy; 
they commit bid‘a by allowing what was prohibited – ‘ibāda in its non-shar‘ī form 
has a meaning derived from revelation: 
 
And they say, ‘These animals and crops are forbidden; no one may eat from them 
except whom we will,’ as they claim. And there are those [camels] whose backs are 
forbidden [by them] and those upon which the name of Allah is not mentioned - [all 
of this] is an invention of falsehood about Him. He will punish them for what they 
were inventing.
2
 [Qurʾan 6: 138]  
 
As will be seen in later chapters, tomb-worship [‘ibādat al-qubūr] occupies a large 
place in Ibn Taymiyya’s discussion of the subject.  Visiting graves, he says, is not 
something that the salaf would have done.  He maintains he does not know how the 
ṣaḥāba and tābi‘ūn acted when they visited the graves of the Prophet and others; he 
has access to various sources, each saying different things, and therefore assumes they 
are all wrong.  There are also many false aḥādīth on this matter.3 
 
Nadvi says that Ibn Taymiyya wrote that performing ziyāra to graves was unknown in 
the days of the Prophet, ṣaḥāba, tābi‘ūn and tābi‘ū’l-tābi‘īn, and this only came into 
Islam after the third century AH.  These entered Islam through the rāfiḍa and 
bāṭiniyya.  This, he continues, is also supported by several aḥādīth which state that 
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mosques belong only to Allah, and he argues that there is a possible risk of 
performing shirk in such places.
1
  One of these is a Prophetic Hadith: 
 
Do not make feasts on my grave, pray for me wherever you are, for your prayer will 
be delivered to me.
2
  
 
It should be noted, however, that Ibn Taymiyya differentiates between the visits made 
to graves by the ahl al-tawḥīd, who either come to perform du‘ā on them or to pray 
alongside them during a funeral, and the ahl al-shirk who put the Creator and what He 
has created on the same level and worship both; in doing so, they introduce ghulūw to 
their prayers, which makes it a bid‘a of unbelief.  The ṣaḥāba therefore abandoned 
forms of bida‘ connected to graves, such as ziyārāt to the grave of the Prophet, and 
were also careful not to imitate Jews and Christians, who transformed their graves 
into places of worship.
3
 
 
Ibn Taymiyya says that erecting mosques over graves [mashāhid] is a renewal 
[muḥadatha],4 a Satanic bid‘a which apparently entered Islam during its third century; 
the Prophet forbade the building of mosques over graves, and it is also forbidden to 
bury people inside mosques.  The main risk with such mosques, Ibn Taymiyya 
maintains, is that it may lead to the shirk of praying to those buried in  
them.
 5
  
 
Therefore, all ‘ulamāʾ agree that it is better to pray in a regular mosque rather than in 
one which has been built over a grave. True believers do not transform the graves and 
relics of prophets and saints into sanctuaries, where they intend to pray, to implore for 
divine help, and to revere a personage for whom others have no reverence; they revere 
Allah alone. In fact, even invoking Allah’s mercy upon the Prophet’s grave while 
entering the mosque as people in Medina used to do is considered to be bid‘a.6  In 
addition, Ibn Taymiyya says, bowing next to graves or surrounding them or putting 
curtains on them as if they were the ka‘ba are all ḥarāmāt. 
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In various places, Ibn Taymiyya discusses the several occasions on which people fast, 
as well as annual commemorations; in most cases he states that these are bida‘ that 
have been generated from non-Muslim sources, and have more to do with imitation 
[ittibā‘] than with ibtidā‘.  Nevertheless, most bida‘ in the shar‘ī meaning are said to 
have entered Islam during its third century as a result of the conquests and subsequent 
occupation of non-Muslim land.  Some fasts are said to have come under the 
influence of Christians or are connected to the Shi‘ī ‘Āshūrā.  On the other hand, the 
preparation of special meals for the ‘Īd al-fiṭr and the ‘Īd al-aḍḥā, a custom said to be 
observed without any religious significance -- has attached itself to the festivals 
themselves.  
 
The origins and acceptability of various annual commemorations will be discussed in 
almost every chapter of this work, especially with regard to the celebration of the 
Prophet’s birthday [al-mawlid al-nabawī] which Ibn Taymiyya denounces as bid‘a. 
This commemoration was fairly new in his era; it began under Christian and Sufi 
influences in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in the Levant, and spread to the 
Muslim world primarily from Cairo.  Aviva Schussman notes that this mawlid started 
to receive a limited legal recognition in the Sunni world towards the end of the 
fifteenth century.
1
 
 
Ibn Taymiyya seeks to speak to the hearts of the believers, and encourages them to 
think. Jundi explains that according to Ibn Taymiyya, an important cause of bid‘a is 
people who study and do not apply their knowledge properly.
2
  Another dispute in 
which he engages — also relevant to other chapters — is the issue of special prayers 
on the night of 15 Sha‘bān.  For him, this is a night of special merit, and if anyone 
chooses to pray by himself, in congregation, or as part of many groups among the 
salaf, this is better.
3
 
 
Less intense, but still conspicuous, is Ibn Taymiyya’s discussion of different ‘ādāt. 
These bida‘ consist of general principles and specific cases.  Among the cases he 
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discusses, on the subject of prayer, for instance, is the wish of believers to give their 
prayer a rigid formal shape by observing it habitually in a mosque amid large 
congregations with a well-defined number of rak‘āt.1  The visit of a believer to a local 
mosque on the day of ‘Arafa for du‘ā and dhikr constitutes a local ta‘rīf (definition) --
about which the ‘ulamā’ differed, some considering it a bid‘a and others not.  More 
examples are cited and attributed to al-Ḥasan bin ‘Alī who said that:  
 
Raising the voice in du‘ā is truly a bid‘a, so is raising hands for du‘ā, and so is the 
congregation of men and women.
2
 
 
Ibn Taymiyya’s basic assumption was that Allah’s words to the Prophet were very 
precise and that everything must have been included in them.  For this reason, as 
previously mentioned, he believes that all bida‘ necessarily comes from non-Muslim 
sources, and that the imitation of Jewish, Christian and Zoroastrian practices makes it 
clear that not even the most trifling resemblance must be allowed to exist between 
Muslims and non-Muslims; in Memon’s words, all Muslim life must begin from the 
point where a perfect dissimilarity to non-Muslims has been achieved.
3
  
 
Ibn Taymiyya speaks about whoever follows a religion which changes the Shari‘a as 
someone who has left the religion of Islam.  He refers to the Jews who changed the 
Torah and lied to Jesus, then lied to Muhammad, and the Christians who changed the 
Gospel and lied to Muhammad.  Every mubtadi‘ who contradicts the Prophetic Sunna 
and dissembles when it comes to some of the truth, and commits a bid‘a in false 
issues on which the Prophet did not introduce regulations – has similarly abandoned 
Islam.  Interestingly, Ibn Taymiyya speaks about Christians and Mushrikūn separately 
on several occasions.
4
  
 
Actions that are based on imitation fall into three categories: 
(a) Those about which the applicability for Muslims is uncertain, but are nevertheless 
practised by them.  
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(b) Those which were once lawful for Muslims but were later abrogated by Qur’anic 
law.  
(c) Those which had never been lawful but were invented by non-Muslims 
[aḥdathuhu].  
 
Each of these three categories applies with respect to ritual acts [‘ibādāt] exclusively 
or to customs [‘ādāt] only, or else to a conflation of both.  In all, therefore, nine 
different forms of bid‘a can be created.1  
 
Ibn Taymiyya says that the Christian belief in Jesus as God is denounced in general, 
and monasticism is also declared bid‘a.  On the subject of ritual or cultic purity 
[ṭahāra], he goes on to say that Jews are heavily shackled; whilst Christians, in the 
course of their bid‘a, abandoned all these restrictions without divine sanctions -- to 
the extent that they considered nothing to be unclean.
2
  Ibn Taymiyya sums it up by 
saying: ‘unbelief is like a malady of the heart or even worse.  Once the heart is sick 
none of the limbs can be altogether healthy.  You may gain much if you do not imitate 
the heartsick in any respect… he whose heart is sick may entertain doubts about the 
very injunction to differentiate oneself from the unbelievers, because he lacks 
perception of its advantages’.3  
 
Ibn Taymiyya maintains that all the things that Christians do are ‘ibādāt muḥadatha 
with an element of bid‘a.  The source for ḍalāla is anything which was not rendered 
shar‘ī by Allah, or acceptance of anything prohibited which should not be forbidden. 
In many places he refers to Jews and Christians as mushrikūn, and refers to the 
necessity not to adopt anything from other nations so the Muslims do not become like 
them.
4
 
 
Other famous groups which he includes among ahl al-bid‘a are the khawārij, the 
rāfiḍa, the qadariyya, murji‘a and jahmiyya, all of whom introduced innovative 
practices or concepts of some sort.  Ibn Taymiyya refers to the rāfiḍa as ahl al-bid‘a 
wa’l-ḍalāl.  Such groups, he adds, make ziyāra to the graves of their shaykhs and 
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imāms, naming such visitations as the Great Hajj, and even manufacture special flags 
for these occasions -- and thus the real Hajj becomes for them the small Hajj.
1
  In this 
respect, Nadvi reminds his readers of the late influences of the Fatimids and the 
Ismaili Shi‘a in Syria.2 
 
Interestingly, Ibn Taymiyya’s discourse contains early signs of the doctrine of al-walā 
wa’l-barā’, (Loyalty and Disengagement), whereby Muslims must refuse to imitate 
the people of other religions or the ways of errant Muslims (who have, in fact, left 
Islam).  It should be noted this doctrine still exerts a profound effect on ‘modern’ 
Salafists and others, for whom separation from non-Muslims trumps all else -- even 
when Muslims are living in non-Muslim countries.  This doctrinal requirement has 
also led to widespread discussions of fiqh al-‘aqaliyyāt, the jurisprudence regarding 
Muslim identity as a minority within a broader sphere of allegiance; and it forms a 
key element of the chapter on the Muslim Brotherhood.  
Chapter one: The perception of bid‘a by the early Salafis 
I. General introduction 
The last decade of the 19
th
 century and the early years of the 20
th
 saw the awakening 
of a new intellectual approach, which aspired to formalise a modern attitude towards 
Islam, in order to establish it as the new basis to unite the nation [umma].  The leaders 
of this approach were all acquainted with the West, its ideas and strengths, and 
wanted to revive Islam, which they perceived as rigid and irrelevant to the present.    
The Ottoman Empire continued its final decline, which eventually caused it to 
disintegrate in 1918. At the same time, Western countries continued to increase their 
involvement in the Middle East.  The new ideas were meant to use the traditional 
Islamic values as a framework for renewal and growth, rather than what they saw as 
the source of stagnation.  Most of the activities of those who developed this approach 
were directed towards the exchange of ideas, either orally, or, in a later stage, via 
books, pamphlets and periodicals.  The centre of this activity was Egypt. 
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During the 19
th
 century, Egypt developed de-facto as a separate country, even though 
it still remained an Ottoman Province [velayet].  The rulers from the house of 
Muḥammad ‘Alī created a ruling dynasty and other institutions such as an army, a 
local administrative system, and an independent economic system closely bound to 
the Western empires.  Subsequently, the pre-Islamic history of the country was 
gradually re-discovered, thus raising Egyptians’ self-awareness of their own 
Pharaonic history.  Egypt, therefore, was a major attraction for intellectuals from all 
over the region, who felt themselves more independent in this country and better able 
to interact with Western literature and scholarship. 
 
This newly established trend mostly owes its development to Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī 
and his student Muḥammad ‘Abduh.  Their main focus was the revival of the whole 
umma, a concept best manifested in the joint periodical of ‘Abduh and his student 
Rashīd Riḍā, al-Manār.  Al-Manār was published between 1898 and 1935, and 
gradually became a platform for discussion for intellectuals from throughout the 
Muslim world, which, from today’s perspective, could be seen as a major contribution 
to the later development of global ties.  This also prepared the ground for what is 
sometimes referred to today as the ‘Islamic Movement’ -- as will be partly reflected in 
the chapter on the Muslim Brotherhood.  This chapter, however, will reflect the 
tension caused by the aspirations to revive religion and apply it to modern times, 
while at the same time avoiding wrongful innovations.  It will also look into the 
tension between the two major aspects of renewal according to Esposito’s definition – 
the return to the ideal pattern of Islam on the one hand, and the ability to practise 
ijtihād on the other.1 
 
The heart of the chapter will pore over the thinking of three scholars, whose 
biographies are sketched below.  It is worth noting that while Afghānī travelled across 
much of the Muslim world, the two scholars who stood behind the operation of al-
Manār still held very Egypto-centric views, and in many respects they saw Egypt as 
the heart of the unity they aspired to establish.  
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Biographies of the relevant scholars  
 
Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-1897) was a philosopher and politician of Iranian 
origin, who promoted the concept of unity of the umma in opposition to the British 
occupation of Egypt in particular and global Western interests in general.  Throughout 
his life he migrated to and operated in many countries, some in the Middle East, 
mainly Egypt, in addition to India and its neighbouring countries.  His most important 
work, though, was written in Egypt during the 1870s.
1  Afghānī was deeply affected 
by the Shī‘ī rational philosophy, to which he was exposed during his stay in Iraq and 
India (in fact, he was probably born a Shī‘ī).  
 
Keddie says that Afghānī was the principal figure among the young oppositionists; 
they chose a different direction from Egyptian intellectuals like al-Ṭahṭāwī, who 
welcomed nearly every Western innovation without trying to justify this intellectually. 
Working to find Islamic precedents for the reforms he advocated, Afghānī’s real 
concern was to find arguments that would mobilize the masses so that they would 
defend their country’s independence against the now encroaching West.2 
 
Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) was an Egyptian religious scholar and jurist from a 
Sufi background, who was deeply influenced by his teacher Afghānī.  But unlike his 
teacher, ‘Abduh separated politics from religion and aspired to an Islamic revival that 
would merge education and reform within the religious institutions. Keddie states that 
‘Abduh became the founder of the school of Islamic modernism; returning to a quasi-
Mu‘tazilī interpretation of Islam, he tried to prove that modern science and other 
modern principles were encompassed in the Qur’an.3  
 
Both Afghānī and ‘Abduh believed that the modern West’s power lay in part in its 
science and technology.  In their view, unlike many traditionalist scholars, Islam at its 
very core was in fact eminently modern and certainly compatible with modern 
science and technology.  At the end of the 19
th
 century, ‘Abduh’s Risālat al-Tawḥīd 
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was adopted by al-Azhar as a textbook in theology.
1
  However, ‘Abduh’s carefully 
mediated attempt to bring about change and revitalisation through reason and 
education was to undergo extensive changes in the teaching of his leading disciple 
and biographer, Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā. 
 
Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935), a descendant of a prominent Syrian family, 
went to Egypt in 1897 to study under ‘Abduh, inspired by his admiration of al-‘Urwa 
al-Wuthqā, a Muslim anti-British paper which Afghānī and ‘Abduh published in Paris 
between March and October 1884.  Like ‘Abduh, Riḍā initially emphasized education 
and the adoption of Western scientific and technical skills as the prerequisites for 
revival.  
 
By the 1920s, however, faced with growing Westernization, secularization, and 
nationalism (notably in Turkey, Iran, and Egypt), Riḍā grew more reactionary and laid 
increasing stress on the Ḥanbalī school of jurisprudence, which is considered very 
strict and conservative, especially regarding questions of creed.  He was much less 
open towards the West than his teacher, did not condemn slavery, and accepted the 
traditional view that the gate of ijtihād was closed after the first three Islamic 
centuries.
2
 
 
The scholars under discussion rejected the continued dominance of imitation [taqlīd] 
over ijtihād by ‘ulamāʾ, whom, they thought, occupied themselves mainly with 
commentaries.  Rather than adding to the knowledge of their ancestors, they served 
the negative purpose of giving an aura of sanctity to the earlier works, and their 
disciples also became intellectually static.
3
  These scholars are considered the 
forefathers of the Salafi approach, which attempted to draw a sharp distinction 
between historical and cultural variables and the unchanging principles of Islam as 
practised by the earliest generations of Muslims.  
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The objectives were to reform Islam and return it to its believed original condition at 
the time of the early Muslim community; to revivify the Arabic language; to promote 
the interests of the Islamic community by reconciling reason and science with 
revelation;
1
 and to dissociate contemporary Islam from its latter-day tradition, both 
scholarly and mystic, presenting it as the cause of the decline of Muslim civilisation 
and as an impediment to the adoption of useful Western innovations.
2
  
 
The Salafiyya introduced a new approach in which abstaining from sin and the 
company of the deviant was no longer enough; society and religion as a whole had to 
be purified, reformed and modernised.
3
 
 
Al-Manār, the aforementioned periodical which serves as a main source in this 
chapter, deals very widely with the relevant subjects.  Naturally, since ‘Abduh died a 
few years after it was founded, the work was carried on by Riḍā and reflects his views 
better.  It has to be noted though, that the authors of many articles are not identified; 
thus there can be no certainty that all the relevant articles were written by Riḍā 
himself.  Whenever possible, the name of the writer will be highlighted. 
 
From time to time, in order to establish a point of reference, the work of three other 
‘ulamāʾ will be explored.  All three were active at around the same time and had 
common theological inspirations, yet offered slightly different directions, each in his 
way: 
 
 ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī (1855–1902) was a Syrian scholar who was 
perceived as a herald of Pan-Arab nationalism; yet he drew his image of the 
society he wished to see directly from the Islamic perspective, with a Caliph 
from Quraysh elected by a shūrā based in Mecca, which will be a spiritual 
inspiration for a just society.  
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 Shaykh Maḥmūd Shaltūt (1893-1963) was a rather open-minded disciple of 
‘Abduh, who took a different route from the one advocated by the Muslim 
Brotherhood.
1
  
 Abu ‘Alī Ḥasan Nadvi (1914-1999), an Indian scholar, was one of the more 
important figures; he was educated according to the principles of the Dār al-
‘Ulūm Deoband, which is not examined here, but which is considered close to 
Wahhābī perceptions.  Nadvi is best known for his long years of membership 
in the Nadwat al-‘ulamāʾ Lucknow, on whose behalf he spent a whole year 
travelling in the Middle East.  Nadvi was also among the founding members of 
the Muslim World League (MWL),
2
 an international da‘wa organisation set up 
by the Saudi government in 1962 with the help of many members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  In the course of his Middle Eastern travels, Nadvi met 
with the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood; for many years, he spoke of the 
movement with admiration.  He himself served as an inspiration to scholars 
who are studied in separate chapters -- men such as Sayyid Quṭb and Yūsuf al-
Qaraḍāwī.  Nadvi was in constant communication with various 
contemporaneous scholars who are also studied here. 
II. The sources of authority 
 
The early Salafis were mainly concerned with the consequences of the adoption of 
thoughts and customs from sources outside what they considered as ‘pure’ Islam.  
This, as will be evident later, owed much to their initial claim that those who had the 
authority to re-interpret religion misunderstood it.  With regards to adopting practical 
rituals, it appears that they were mainly concerned about the image they may create of 
the ‘pure’ Islam they wanted to achieve – namely, of not being sufficiently 
progressive. 
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(a)  Qur’an and Sunna 
 
In general, it can be said that the first three scholars look on the Qur’an as the main 
source for the modernity they wish to establish in Islam.  The Sunna, an adjunct to the 
Qur’an, directly follows it in importance.  The Qur’an, Afghānī says, contains hidden 
references to modern sciences and their discoveries, which can be understood now for 
the first time.  Since, Afghānī maintains, reasoning can lead to further interpretations, 
everyone who has sufficient knowledge of Arabic, a solid mind and knowledge of the 
salaf is enabled and entitled to use ijtihād in order to apply the rules of the Qur’an 
anew to problems of the time; refusal to do this causes stagnation [jumūd] or taqlīd, 
which, according to Afghānī, are the enemies of true Islam exactly as is materialism.1  
 
‘Abduh, who according to Hourani, admired European achievements,2 highlights in 
his writings two positive perceptions which, he argues, people learned from the West 
and were unconnected to religion but central to each human: free will and the freedom 
of thought. Some European thinkers, ‘Abduh maintains, say that these were the bases 
on which countries have been built.  ‘Abduh says that this is an understanding which 
Christians only started to be aware of in the sixteenth century (of the Gregorian 
calendar).  In Islam, however, the Qur’an says that the most important task is to 
understand the divine book. The ‘ulamāʾ themselves decreed for the masses that they 
should not learn and understand these books, but merely recite them.
3
 
 
‘Abduh says that the salaf of the umma lies in the Sunna of Allah, which also assisted 
in elevating the spirit of Muslims in sticking to these beliefs, for otherwise they would 
have filled the world with bid‘a.4  This would mean that he sees the two terms as 
opposites.  He also points out the Qur’anic teachings of commanding right and 
forbidding wrong; it seems that Al-Kawākibī believes that not following this 
command is the source of all problems that the umma is facing.
5
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Riḍā sees in the Qur’an an international revolution in human logic that was sent to the 
Arabs and the rest of the nations, and having a double effect -- both on the believers 
and by taking people away from shirk, the influences of the mushrikūn and what he 
calls trendy bid‘a  (bid‘a kanasiyya).1  Nadvi states that it is necessary to learn the 
Qur’an in a manner that is clear of any external influences and foreign cultures.2 
 
Regarding the question of who has the authority to re-interpret religion for the sake of 
its revival, as well as the ability to explain religion correctly to the masses, the early 
Salafis were not united in their views.  According to Zebiri, Shaltūt’s fatāwā show he 
considered the authority of the Qur’an and Sunna3 to be the same.  Al-Manār 
considers the Sunna and the Hadith as the texts which clarify the Qur’an; the two texts 
serve to draw the lines to distinguish a believer from a non-believer, and a mushrik 
from a unifier.
4
 
 
To al-Manār, people who join the world of the non-believers oppose the Qur’an and 
Sunna, thus straying from the Salafi path and joining the ranks of ahl al-bid‘a wa’l 
ahwā (desires); in Salafi thought, a non-believer is one who neglects one of the pillars 
of Islam.
5
  
 
Among the ‘ulamā’ under discussion, it seems that ‘Abduh was mostly interested in 
the subject of tawḥīd, which is more broadly dealt with by the other ‘ulamāʾ discussed 
elsewhere, and especially the Wahhābīs.  As already mentioned, ‘Abduh dedicated a 
whole risāla to the subject, also speaking about what he refers to as the science of 
tawḥīd which, he maintains, deals with the presence of Allah and the ways he should 
be described; according to him, the source of tawḥīd is that God is one with no 
companion (sharīk).6  In one place, Riḍā speaks about Jews who moved away from 
tawḥīd to worship idols, and Christians who refer to Jesus as God.7 
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(b) fiqh 
 
According to ‘Abduh, Hourani says, in order for a society to be moral, it must 
conform to a law of some sort.  All things which have been created have their natural 
laws; if a human being goes beyond those laws, he or she is in danger of destruction.   
Therefore the laws set the limits. ‘Abduh, he continues, thought that laws should have 
some connections to the country in which they apply-- or else they will not fulfill the 
essential function of law, which is to direct human actions and mould human habits.   
In fact, Hourani adds, Riḍā says that according to ‘Abduh, they will not be laws at all. 
Riḍā himself was opposed to dividing fiqh into ‘ibādāt and mu‘amalāt (ritual 
devotions and social transactions).  He also says the jurists themselves distinguish 
between religious faith and the execution of justice, saying ‘this is permissible from 
the legal but not from the religious point of view’.  It is interesting to see the use of 
the term ‘ibādāt in this context as well, which might point to a practical approach 
which looks at tangible aspects of religion. In the chapter dedicated to the Muslim 
Brotherhood we look at the frequent use of this term in-depth. 
 
To Riḍā, the true distinction between religious and non-religious law, then, is not 
between the ‘ibādāt and the mu‘amalāt, but between ‘ibādāt and those parts of the 
mu‘amalāt that have a moral significance on the one hand, and on the other those 
parts of the mu‘amalāt that are purely questions of administrative organization and 
practical convenience, and therefore have no inherent moral importance.  The 
function of religious law in Islam, properly understood, is to regulate all human 
actions having any connection with religious morality.  Yet the distinction between 
‘ibādāt and mu‘amalāt is nevertheless valid in another way, and it is here that the 
basis of the community’s power of legislation can be found.  
 
This distinction has been explained in al-Manār’s well-known series of imaginary 
debates between the reformer and the ‘slavish imitator’ [muqlid].  In these debates, 
the young reformer, who represents Riḍā, takes the view that the fixed shar‘ī 
principles in the mu‘amalāt are of a general character only, allowing for considerable 
adaptation by successive generations of Muslims in light of the demands of their 
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worldly welfare, while it is only the ‘ibādāt, governing matters of ritual and worship, 
that do not admit of interpretive change.  
 
Riḍā acknowledges that if the main body of the mu‘amalāt is to be determined by a 
broad interpretation of current social needs and not by a purely philological study of 
the exact texts of Qur’an and ̣Hadīth, then there is no avoiding a partial intrusion of 
human guesswork and error, which are inherent in any judgement of probability. 
According to Malcolm Kerr:  
 
In truth power belongs to the Community, so that if their interpretation can be 
sought on a matter and they should reach unanimous agreement, their decision is 
binding on all. Neither the Caliph nor other officers have the right to contradict or 
oppose their ijma‘, nor to oppose their representatives and delegates who are the 
ahl al-ḥall wa’l-‘aqd. The agreement of this latter, if they are limited in number, is 
called ijma‘ by the jurists, provided only that they be persons qualified for ijtihād. 
Should they disagree in their interpretation, the subject of their disagreement must 
be referred to the two basic sources, the Qur’an and the Sunna. Action must then be 
taken on the basis of what is indicated by one or both of these two sources, in 
keeping with the Qur’anic verse [4:58]: that, after commanding obedience to God, 
the Prophet, and those in authority, says: “And if you dispute in anything, then refer 
the matter to God and the Prophet, if you are believers in God and the Judgement 
Day; that is the best interpretation”. This means that this is better and sounder than 
other procedures, such as acting on the opinion of a majority of the delegates of the 
nation in enacting the statutes of Europe and her imitators, for our Law is opposed 
to them in this matter. It is one of the advantages of our Law that a dispute within 
the Community ceases with giving of judgement by the Qur’an and the Sunna, and 
that all the delegates of the Community are satisfied with what appears to be the 
most likely indication in them, so that there is no room left for rancour and 
dispute”.1 
 
The issue of ‘ibādāt and how at least part of them relate to bid‘a will be discussed 
later in reference to Muslim Brotherhood scholars. 
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It is worth noting that part of the wider discussion on the question of authority 
concerns persons who have the power to determine what comes under Sunna and 
what does not.  Such a discussion generally derives from al-Manār’s perception of 
ijtihād, ijmā‘ and other similar terms.  An analysis of these terms follows. 
(c) ijma‘ 
 
For ‘Abduh, unlike to many other jurists and theologians, the concept of 
ijmā‘ represents a much more informal principle, being only the expression or 
collective rational judgement and conscience, not too different perhaps from the 
concept introduced by ibn Taymiyya for a later community but which he preferred not 
to call ijmā‘.  ‘Abduh believes that as long as the jurists are in voluntary agreement, 
and bear the interests of the community in mind, they should be obeyed ‘for it can be 
said that they are free of error in their consensus’; however, this is so not as a matter 
of dogma but only as a reasonable expectation. 
 
Kerr adds that ijmā‘, defined in this way, loses its revolutionary infallibility and no 
longer presents the classic problem of how it can be institutionalized without 
corrupting its special character.  It is no longer necessary to distinguish between 
reasoning and ijmā‘, for the latter is now only the collective aspect of the former.  
 
Kerr also refers to Henri Laoust’s note that this new approach has been made possible 
by the fact that ‘Abduh first of all raised the value of reasoning to a higher status than 
was traditionally assigned to it, so that any exercise in judgement, whether in the 
traditionally recognised form of ijmā‘ or otherwise, is valid and true, so long as it is 
indeed based on sound reason and not a distortion of it.  But since human beings are 
usually imperfect in their mastery of reason and do not submit exclusively to its 
dictates, their image of the truth – collectively or individually reached – is often 
distorted unless guided by revelation.  Therefore it was only natural for ‘Abduh to 
ignore certain traditional dogmas, supposedly sanctified by ijmā‘, in some of his 
pronouncements, since ijmā‘ as he conceived it was always subject to review.1 
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On the whole, Kerr says, it is the natural law approach that is dominant in ‘Abduh’s 
attitude.  It is thus not surprising that the principle of ijmā‘ should represent a very 
different thing to him than to the orthodox jurists and theologians.  The orthodox idea 
of ijmā‘  referred to the agreement of the Islamic Community on certain hitherto 
unresolved questions in certain circumstances, as an infallible source of law and 
doctrine, in keeping with the Hadith: ‘My community will never agree upon an 
error’.1  
 
Since the limitations were severe – only unanimity on points of fact and interpretation, 
not subject to review by later generations, was recognised – it was possible to regard 
ijmā‘ as an indirect, inspired kind of revelation, and therefore much more than a mere 
aggregate of personal opinions; it enjoyed a value equal to the Qur’an and Sunna, or 
was even superior to them according to some scholars.  
 
In order to demonstrate that Islam can reconcile with modern life, ‘Abduh himself 
gradually adopted elements of modern thought.  In his line of thought, maṣlaḥa 
(benefit) gradually turns into utility, shūrā into parliamentary democracy, and 
ijmā‘ into public opinion. ‘Abduh, who tried to prevent secularism from entering the 
world of Islam, actually opened the door to innovations of the modern world.  Riḍā, in 
his later writings, reaffirmed that legislative interpretation is to be carried out on a 
broad scale on the basis of the concept of maṣlaḥa.  But shortly after, we are told that, 
in effect, public benefit suspends standing rules in special circumstances but actually 
creates new ones as dictated by human needs.  For Riḍā, ijmā‘ was a process of 
positive legislation, not a canonical proof. If it is to do its new work, there is clearly 
no room for a principle of unanimity.
2
 
  
According to Hourani, especially in matters of social morality, Riḍā thinks that there 
can be no ijmā‘, even in the first generation.  This means that only the rulers can have 
legislative power, but not the community.  Thus, he also rejects the old conception of 
ijmā‘ to create a new one – the ijmā‘ of the ‘ulamāʾ of each age, a legislative rather 
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than judicial principle, working by a quasi-parliamentary process.  They are also the 
only ones allowed to perform ijtihād.1  
 
Kerr continues with a similar interpretation with regards to Riḍā, saying that he 
implies a traditional concept of the religious source and justification of the Law and 
uses it to characterize the Law’s positive application.  This is the same process he 
followed in his constitutional theory of the Caliphate, mistaking a doctrine of 
authority for a programme of action and ending by attributing sovereignty to a 
circularly defined group of ‘those in authority’. Riḍā’s progressive doctrine of 
interpretation, instead of contributing to a revived recognition of the Shari‘a as a 
living foundation on which to build an entire modern legal structure, may have served 
if anything as an opening wedge toward a frank espousal by others of the principle of 
secular legislation.
2
 
 
Riḍā suggested the creation of a new body that will be both legislative and judicial, 
for its agreement to institute particular ordinances has the force of ijmā‘, in the sense 
that it is an authoritative pronouncement of law valid for its particular time and place.   
With it, there does not seem to be a comprehensive and systematic statement by Riḍā 
on the various types of ijmā‘ or on their respective values as legal sources.  
 
Laoust, Kerr asserts, claims that Riḍā considered even the ijmā‘ of the ṣaḥāba valid 
only for its own place and time, and their opinions no more than ijtihād, but cites no 
source for his claim; this is while Jomier, on the other hand, finds that Riḍā says the 
ijmā‘ of the ṣaḥāba is a final ijmā‘ binding for all times, unlike the later ijmā‘ of the 
schools or the present day ijmā‘.3  Riḍā says that regarding political questions, the 
decisions of the leading mujtahids on matters of public interest are authoritative and 
binding, and their ijmā‘ is a ‘legal source’ [ḥujja shar‘iyya], although this is not true 
of purely religious matters.  These mujtahids, says Riḍā, are obliged to take a broad 
view of all considerations affecting the public interest rather than to:  
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take literally the example set by the Prophet in all its particulars even when this 
obliges them to ignore the public interest.
1
  
 
Shaltūt uses the term ijmā‘ in its nominal and verbal forms in several places in his 
fatāwā and in one place even describes it as the ‘third source of law’ (although it is 
never cited as an independent source of authority).  In most places it is referred to, 
ijmā‘ is said to be based on the Qur’an and Sunna.2  
 
While the classical scholars, Zebiri continues, attempted to confine the sphere of 
operation of ra’y in Islamic law to analogical reasoning based directly on the sources, 
modern reformers, Shaltūt included, are generally less reticent about admitting the 
importance of human value judgements in the process of legal deduction, as embodied 
for example in the principle of maṣlaḥa.  In cases where Shaltūt does resort to analogy, 
the rules of qiyās are relaxed so that the analogy can be based on the general 
principles of the Shari‘a rather than a specific effective cause (‘illa).  Shaltūt sees 
qiyās as a sub-category of ra’y. Zebiri concludes that, like the majority of Muslim 
scholars, he believes the practice of the ṣaḥāba has a special value, and sometimes 
cites it as evidence for or against particular practices.
3
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(d) ijtihād, iṣlāḥ and tajdīd 
 
Many times, Afghānī expresses his regrets that for the Sunnis, the doors of ijtihād are 
closed.  Afghānī does not understand how and why this happened and says that 
everyone who is knowledgeable in the sīra knows that analogy [qiyās] could be made 
relying on reliable aḥādīth.1 
 
Under the title ‘the freedom of thought… and renewal [tajdīd]’ ‘Abduh, perhaps 
paving the way to the Muslim Brotherhood in this respect, says that Islam has turned 
away from tradition, and all the pillars of belief of its nations have been destroyed.
2
  
 
Nevertheless, the fear of adopting thoughts from outside Islam seems not to include 
current notions which help them promote the cause. Afghānī has no problem adopting 
views from outside Islam, including European ones, believing that these are based on 
certain principles understood and accepted there; therefore, if Muslims imitate 
Europeans, they do not necessarily become like them.
3
  
 
At the same time, Afghānī is careful as to who should be involved in such processes.   
The great philosophers, he continues, said that only the select few could be persuaded 
by scientific, demonstrative argument, while for the masses only emotional rhetoric 
would be persuasive.  Therefore the common people should be told not to pay any 
attention to abstract intellectual matters.  They should not be told the true 
interpretation (ta’wīl) of revelation, for reasons of expediency.4  
 
‘Abduh speaks about the ‘disagreement between religions on religious practices’, 
saying that one of the main issues which brought Islam to its current situation was 
misunderstanding.  He further maintains that one of the roles of da‘wa should be that 
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people understand their duties properly.
1
  Riḍā is positive towards ijtihād, as long as, 
in his words, it does not involve ḍalāla.2  Riḍā, however, is less tolerant of outer 
conceptions.  In this respect he believes that Jihad is legitimate, not only for defending 
Islam but also against those who refuse its faith.
3
  
 
Al-Manār’s discussion on the issue of renewal [tajdīd] is also very similar to the way 
it discusses the other close terms.  Under the title ‘On renewal [tajdīd], renovation 
[tajaddud] and reformers [mujaddidūn]’ it says that renewal means a creation which is 
in itself all new, and demonstrates the power of God.  Nevertheless, al-Manār 
continues, the Hadith claiming that there is nothing really new under the sun has to be 
kept in mind, and renewal or renovation can never replace the Sunna.
4
  
 
As with other terms, al-Manār divides renewal into several types: social, political, 
civil and religious, and says that all these fields are human needs.  It separates 
between the elements of renewal, bid‘a and ghulūw, even when it comes to renewals 
in religion.  Unlike bid‘a, every renewal [tajdīd], al-Manār says, has a place in 
religion and it is out of lack of knowledge that people prefer one to another.
5
  
 
In every generation, al-Manār explains, there is no choice but to renew while 
preserving the old; in the process of renewal there are both good and reprehensible 
things, some useful and some that do damage.  Those who can think independently, 
al-Manār continues, do not judge things according to their being new or old but 
according to logic, and if anything ancient is better than a new one they prefer to keep 
the ancient one.  In this context, al-Manār praises the English for preserving their 
heritage, which, it says, is better preserved than the Muslim one.  Many new things, 
al-Manār adds, were brought into Islam by non-Arab scholars.  In Egypt in particular, 
it continues, the Copts made a great contribution to bringing new elements into 
religion, which comes out of their da‘wa to the Muslims to leave their religion.  Their 
da‘wa is often given a platform in university circles, and at its core lies the 
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government’s acceptance of non-shar‘ī rules in financial issues and punishment in 
several civil areas.
1
  
 
Al-Manār continues to speak about other concepts like Pharaonism, which, it says, 
gained popularity and started to create a differentiation between Egypt and other 
countries.  Such an attitude, it continues, allowed a mixture of an international Sufi 
literary-philosophical approach which has no religion within it; and even the Baha’i 
religion, over which there has been debate in Egypt regarding its legitimacy.  In a 
different discussion, under a similar title, al-Manār speaks again on the necessity for 
renewal, both in religion and in the practical world.
2
  It cites the words of a scholar 
from India who says that the views of the ‘ulamāʾ there are rigid; some speak about 
the need for a social and political revolution, and others object to any changes in the 
existing situation.  This is why, the scholar claims, the British occupation over India 
still remains.  A very similar situation, al-Manār adds, applies to the ‘ulamā’ in 
Turkey.
3
 
 
One of the meanings of renewal, al-Manār continues, is the revival of the Arabic 
language in speech, writing and preaching.  Al-Manār claims that the umma does not 
need any renewal in religion itself, and this option has been sealed by Allah because 
of the danger of creating bida‘.  Atheism, according to al-Manār, is also a renewal 
which has to be fought against.
4
  
 
There are two types of renewal that it discusses: the first relates to the common 
interest and whatever needs special religious ruling (tashrī‘); this is covered by the 
Hadith regarding the award given to whoever brings into religion a ‘good’ Sunna 
(sunna ḥasana).  This Hadith, al-Manār says, lays the foundation for useful sciences 
and the establishment of schools, hospitals and other institutions which societies and 
governments benefit from.  Any religious ruling regarding these subjects, al-Manār 
adds, depends on logical thinking on the part of the relevant persons, and the ijtihād in 
such a subject does not have a specific form.  The second type concerns issues of 
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daily life such as agriculture, industry and more, and it relies on the Hadith: ‘What 
belongs to your religion is mine and what belongs to daily life you know best’.1 
 
An interesting element of this discussion is introduced in al-Manār via a series of 
imaginary discussions, as previously mentioned, between a traditionalist and a 
reformer.  In one of these discussions, Abu Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s role in preserving 
religious traditions is examined.  The two debate the right for ijtihād over tradition or 
ijtihād inside one’s school of law (madhhab).  The reformer says that he does not 
contradict al-Ghazālī’s tradition.  Other names of mujtahidūn are mentioned, saying 
that some of them made mistakes in their logic when performing ijtihād as well as in 
their right to do so, having no religious authority.  The reformer emphasizes again and 
again that the right to practise ijtihād is reserved for the proper religious authorities.2 
 
Nadvi speaks about the decline of the ‘ulamā over the generations; the gate of ijtihād 
was closed, and the scope of fiqh was no longer broadened to cope with new issues 
and problems.  He says that the Muslim world, due to various developments, has been 
hit with what he calls intellectual apostasy (ridda fikriyya).  Furthermore, some 
‘ulamā have been using fiqh for their personal interests.  He states that fiqh has to be 
re-dressed in Muslim clothes,
3
 and that there needs to be iṣlāḥ and a constant fight 
against corruption.
4
  
 
Qaraḍāwī, who will be very widely discussed in the chapter on the Muslim 
Brotherhood, notes that Nadvi focused on iṣlāḥ of the individual first in his soul [nafs] 
and heart – which would also direct Islam to concentrate on the purification of the 
heart and the rejection of shirk.  According to Qaraḍāwī, Nadvi’s views apparently 
derived from an overly Westernized outlook, and various issues which led the umma 
to abandon the enforcement of the right and the prohibition of the wrong.
5
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Nadvi, referring to the work of Muḥammad Iqbal in India, notes that some say tajdīd 
is merely a cover for inserting foreign traditions into Islam.
1
  Yet, he affirms, there is 
no other solution to the current state of affairs which he sees as jāhiliyya,2 except for a 
broader tajdīd.3 
 
Like other ‘ulamā’ under discussion, Nadvi aspires to a new, righteous (ṣāliḥ) 
generation.  He highlights Muḥammad Abduh’s contribution in promoting education 
and bringing religion to the new generation, and expresses his admiration of the 
Muslim Brotherhood: the Brotherhood, which uses tajdīd, is the only modern 
movement which has taken upon itself to push the line of iṣlāḥ and da‘wa;4 it is the 
greatest religious and political Middle Eastern movement in renewing Islamic power 
and affecting the struggle to face Western culture, using the active dā‘i. 
III. Terms affiliated with bid‘a 
shirk and ḍalāla 
 
Afghānī maintains that there are Muslims with whom Islam is not satisfied – although 
they are not defined as unbelievers – and in general do the opposite at any time, like 
laughing when they should cry and so on.
5
  ‘Abduh maintains that if a believer 
worships Allah, thinking what gains it will bring to him, such approach leads to shirk; 
shirk is defined as a belief that anything other than Allah has an effect over what He 
has granted, or that things beyond the abilities of what had been created [al-makhlūqāt] 
could be controlled.
6
 
 
‘Abduh’s position on free will goes through a pragmatic process.  His main concern in 
this issue is on a psychological level, with the individual’s consciousness of his ability 
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or inability to determine his own actions and their consequences, rather than with a 
complete and systematic philosophy of causality.  Such a position, according to Kerr, 
is taken by ‘Abduh under the influence of the mu‘tazila.  In his Risāla, Kerr continues, 
‘Abduh says that to claim free will for men is not to commit the heresy of shirk; shirk 
will be implicit only by the attribution to anyone but Allah of freedom of action 
unrestrained by natural forces.
1
 
 
Al-Manār puts shirk alongside ḍalāla many times.  The term itself is advanced as the 
direct opposite of the concept of unity [tawḥīd].2  In practical terms, al-Manār speaks 
about many terms like shirk, unbelief, immorality and injustice as falling into two 
types, each with two degrees of severity – those which derive from religion and those 
which do not.  We see a division made between the ‘big’ and ‘small’ shirk.  For al-
Manār, the greater shirk is the one derived from religion, whereas the smaller is not, 
like the hidden shirk of pride [riyā].3  In one of his books, Riḍā states that Islam has 
referred to riyā in this way, while discussing the issue of politics.4  In another place, 
Riḍā also speaks in this context about the necessity of preventing ghulūw in religion,5 
a term which will be examined more closely in the chapter on the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and especially Qaraḍāwī. 
 
Those who brought shirk into religion, according to al-Manār, were close to Jews and 
Christians, and the Prophet distanced himself from them.
6
  Both Jews and Christians, 
al-Manār says, were considered mushrikūn together with the Quraysh, even though it 
has been said that they agree it was God who created the skies and land.  This is 
because of a Hadith narrated by the Prophet about the Quraysh, which states that 
‘Whoever vows not in the name of Allah is a non-believer and commits shirk.’  After 
that, al-Manār adds, acts such as sacrifice that are not made for Allah or visiting the 
houses of idols were considered shirk as well.
7
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Al-Kawākibī’s approach towards shirk is very similar, but the language he uses is 
milder.  He says that it is something natural to human beings, who tend to worship 
what they see rather than what is logical.  It is Satan, he continues, who tries to make 
people deviate from their religion [ḍalāl].1  In order for a Muslim to know what shirk 
is, he continues, he must first understand what belief, Islam, worship and unity mean.
2
     
It is also interesting to note that Al-Kawākibī sees the issue of building on graves as 
an aspect of shirk, or at least a path to shirk,
3
 whereas many of the other figures under 
discussion consider it a major manifestation of bid‘a.  However, it is possible that his 
statement here derives from social experiences, since he refers to those who put idols 
in graves and worship them, or those who make a sacrifice next to graves. 
 
In Shaltūt’s discussion, Jews and Christians are also referred to as one of the sources 
of shirk, and the isrā’īliyyāt are denounced as misleading [muḍallila].4  The Quraysh 
and their mushrikūn who worshipped idols are also mentioned.5  Qaraḍāwi speaks 
about Nadvi’s ambitions to achieve pure belief [al-‘aqīda al-salīma], clear of 
shirkiyyāt.6  Nadvi himself refers to idolatry and shirk next to his arguments regarding 
the state of jāhiliyya in which the Muslim world finds itself.7 
 
The ‘ulamā considered in this chapter placed much less focus on creating a 
differentiation between ḍalāla and shirk than those in the other chapters.  ‘Abduh, 
who, according to Kerr, wholeheartedly believed in the promise of worldly success 
for the righteous, could only conclude that conditions in society which are evidently 
good or bad must stem from correct or incorrect religious belief and practices.     
‘Abduh’s basic approach, Kerr says, was that ‘if history has not rewarded the 
Muslims, somehow in their beliefs they must have gone astray’.8 
 
Many times, Nadvi places ḍalāla and shirk next to his discussions of jāhiliyya.  For 
example, he states that in periods of jāhiliyya, strong belief is lost, and people start to 
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question the presence of Allah; philosophy, which – according to Qaraḍāwī – Nadvi  
sees as a main factor for ḍalāla,1 as well as shirk, have helped to weaken this belief 
further.  For Nadvi, the only way for men to gain a proper knowledge of the Divinity 
(ma‘rifat Allah) comes via the prophets, who have neither jahl nor iḍlāl.2  Speaking 
about Ḥasan al-Bannā, Nadvi claims that he fought against the ḍalāla beliefs and 
jāhilī customs.3  
IV. Bid‘a – definition & types 
 
‘Abduh started to attack the subject of bid‘a in his editorials in the 1880s, as editor of 
the bi-weekly Al-Waqā’i al-Maṣriyya.  However, according to Sedgwick, these 
attacks were not necessarily against the bid‘a in its religious / negative meaning, but 
rather against superstitions.
4
  In the religious discussion of the term, ‘Abduh speaks 
about Jews and Christians, who forgot the purity of their book, and inserted into their 
religion stories about heroes and various bida‘.5  Riḍā asks why many Muslims do not 
follow Christian da‘wa; his answer is that Islam also accepts the true prophecy of 
Jesus, yet stays away from the superstitions [khurāfāt] and bida‘ which Christians 
have inserted into their religion.
6
 Riḍā further maintains that there have been 
mubtadi‘ūn throughout history.  At the same time, bid‘a did not enter religion 
independently, but through changes in tradition itself.
7
 
 
According to Mas‘ud, ‘Abduh used to advise his students and scholars to study al-
Shāṭibī’s Al-Muwāfaqāt fi uṣūl al-sharī‘a, in order to understand the real nature of 
‘Islamic Law making’ [al-tashrī‘ al-Islāmī].8  One of the ways by which ‘Abduh 
attempted to readjust Islamic doctrine to accommodate modern thought was to 
eliminate bid‘a.9  He thus led the way to focus on the subject.  Riḍā, himself a warrior 
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against bid‘a, was largely responsible for creating the image of al-Shāṭibī as a 
crusader against it.
1
  
 
Riḍā asserts that al-Shāṭibī is without precedent in his ability to distinguish between 
maṣlaḥa mursala (the traditional category for a ruling based on human welfare on an 
issue not mentioned in the text) and bid‘a.2  As will also be seen later, al-Manār 
published extracts of al-Shāṭibī’s discussions on the subject several times. 
 
Al-Manār addresses several aspects of this issue.  A major campaign of al-Manār was 
the struggle against bid‘a and khurāfāt in Sunnism;3 and indeed, al-Manār deals 
rather widely with the issue of bid‘a.  Before this discussion, its stance regarding the 
sunna-bid‘a debate should be clarified.  This can be seen in al-Manār’s response to a 
question regarding the alleged contradiction between the two famous aḥādīth, 
‘…every bid‘a is a ḍalāla…’ as opposed to the one which speaks about the reward for 
a ‘good’ Sunna.  The answer is signed by Riḍā himself.  First of all, he says, 
everything renewed by people which is not based on the Qur’ān or the Prophetic 
Sunna is a ‘bad’ bid‘a [bid‘a sayyia] and ḍalāla, and thus deserves punishment in hell.  
Religion had been sealed in everything connected to beliefs and practices, permitted 
and prohibited but not secular and earthly matters.  On such issues, the Shari‘a 
changes according to circumstances, time and place.  
 
Whoever invents new ways to make things easier does not follow the Salaf.   
Nevertheless, anything which has been transmitted from the first generations will not 
be considered bid‘a.  When it comes to ‘good Sunna’ [sunna ḥasana] or ‘bad Sunna’ 
[sunna sayyia] as referred to in the second Hadith, they both include whatever people 
do in everyday life.  It is thus better to speak instead about an erring bid‘a [bid‘a 
laghwiyya] or mundane bid‘a [bid‘a dunyawiyya].4  
 
Al-Manār further claims that in the bid‘a there are matters of unbelief or things which 
lead to unbelief, and there are forbidden [mamnū‘] things and hateful [makrūh] things 
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as well.
1
  A separation between the legal bid‘a [bid‘a shar‘iyya] and the non-legal, or 
erring bid‘a [bid‘a laghwiyya] can be defined, relying on a fatwā by Ibn Ḥajar al-
Makkī, who set the latter definition.  The former is said to be completely forbidden 
since it is a matter of shameful ḍalāla, as Allah completed his religion, thus 
everything which in the days of the Prophet was not religious, will never become 
religious after him.  
 
The bid‘a shar‘iyya is defined by the Hadith ‘…every bid‘a is a ḍalāla…’. In a 
different place, al-Manār defines it as making a legal ruling [shir‘] that God did not 
command, which amounts to lying to Allah.
2
 
 
The second type is drawn from the division of bid‘a into five categories.  Al-Manār 
further suggests that Al-Shāṭibī’s explanation is actually better than that of al-Makkī, 
who, it says, was mistaken in some of the examples he provided.  Al-Shāṭibī’s 
interpretation, according to al-Manār, justifies ‘Umar’s sayings about the tarāwiḥ 
prayers during the month of Ramadan which have already been referred to, that they 
are a ‘good bid‘a’.3  Al-Manār’s acceptance of al-Shāṭibī’s views on the bid‘a can 
also be seen in another place, in which it quotes the latter’s division of the subject 
between the truthful [haqīqiyya] and relative [iḍāfiyya] bida‘.4  
 
This type of bid‘a, al-Manār says, relies on the Hadith already mentioned regarding 
the reward that whoever brings a new Sunna to Islam deserves.  In talking about Islam, 
they add, he refers to the era which came after the jāhiliyya, meaning the first era.5 
 
Al-Manār advances the views of other scholars who distinguish between those who 
say that bid‘a is strictly ‘bad’, relying on the Hadith which states that every bid‘a is a 
ḍalāla, and those who say that it is divided into five categories.  In one case, an 
Egyptian scholar and guest in the fatwā section writes that some of the bida‘ are 
positive, like studying grammar and understanding the Shari‘a as a result; some are 
negative, such as the views of the qadariyya; some are regrettable; some are hateful, 
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like putting ornaments inside the mosque; while the last ones are permissible, like 
greeting a person while standing behind the post of the call to worship adhān or 
reading the Qur’an at a funeral.1 
 
Nevertheless, al-Manār’s own stance is that by dividing the bid‘a into ‘good’ and 
‘bad’, a loophole had been created by those ‘ulamā’ who allowed it, and the current 
situation of widespread bid‘a is a result of this act, which brought about perplexity 
and a lack of knowledge.
2
  This stance fits the basic approach taken by al-Manār, 
which has already been referred to, that the deviation from the Qur’an is a gradual 
procedure which reached its peak in the latest eras, and resulted from the leaders who 
did not follow the traditions as the first mujtahidūn did.  It also fits what seems to be 
both ‘Abduh’s and Riḍā’s aspiration to find some kind of a middle path [wasaṭiyya], 
titling fanaticism [ta‘assub] as an act of bid‘a which had been renewed, and 
influenced people to follow it even though it is forbidden.
3
 
 
In another case, Al-Manār enters a comprehensive discussion regarding the repugnant 
bid‘a [bid‘a qabīḥa], saying it poses a danger to anyone who believes in Allah and the 
Last Day.  Al-Manār asserts that whoever introduces a bid‘a of such a kind likely 
views religion too lightly, and such a general approach might eventually pervade and 
affect his family’s perception of religion.  Such a person, al-Manār says, might 
disrespect the mosque he prays in without even noticing.  An act which is considered 
a bid‘a qabīḥa by al-Manār is, for example, the prevalent phenomenon of showing 
disrespect to mosques in Egypt, urinating on their fences or performing other 
shameful acts while standing next to them or passing by.  Such acts are considered by 
al-Manār as ḍalāla, and are repudiated and shameful.4 
 
Regarding the qadariyya, al-Manār claims that this belief had been acknowledged as 
a bid‘a as early as the first century of Islam, and the salaf and their followers agreed 
that it is a deviation.  This matter, continues al-Manār, should obviously not be 
mentioned alongside the issue of commanding right and forbidding wrong; this is 
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because it is connected with choosing whether to contradict Sunna, which in turn 
encourages the individual to focus his efforts on the most efficient course of action.
1
 
 
According to Hourani, a similar approach to bid‘a as a whole is taken by al-Kawākibī.     
His starting point too is that Islam has fallen into desuetude because of the spread of 
bida‘ throughout history, in particular the introduction of mystical excesses that are 
alien to its spirit, and because of imitation [taqlīd], the denial of reason, and a failure 
to distinguish what is essential from what is not.  Al-Kawākibī lays an even greater 
emphasis on the false spirit of passive taqlīd by leaders than Afghānī and ‘Abduh.2 
 
Shaltūt wishes people to observe religion as Allah has asked, and to avoid bida‘ and 
repudiated things [munkarāt];3 however, his discussion is a bit similar to ‘Abduh’s.  
In one instance he even quotes ‘Abduh, who does not tend to mention the term bid‘a 
as often as Riḍā does, for instance.  However, ‘Abduh does say that many of those 
who introduced such innovations dishonestly claimed they were part of the tradition.
4
 
 
Shaltūt’s starting point on the subject is that the essence of the bid‘a is straying 
[inḥirāf] from religion.5  He, too, says that it includes both rituals and beliefs, and 
combines permitted and forbidden acts.  The phenomenon of creating a bid‘a, he 
continues, is also related to the progress of history, thus sometimes things which were 
correct in other times are irrelevant these days.  In his view, innovation, as a whole, is 
permitted, as long as it does not contradict the message of Allah.  However, he asserts, 
the bid‘a made people lose their connection to the Creator.  Therefore many ‘ulamā 
forbade a lot of good things, classifying them as bid‘a.  There are fields, Shaltūt says, 
which have been left for people to decide and think about.  There are also general and 
specific Islamic identities, and the bid‘a, which has been created by people, can never 
be accepted within the framework of Islamic identities. 
 
Such an issue comes under the heading of a Hadith which states that ‘these are the 
boundaries set by God, do not trespass them; whoever trespasses the boundaries 
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of Allah is a tyrant [ẓālim]’.  Concerning such people, it was said: ‘whoever 
brings something new into our religion, something that was never in it before, is 
performing apostasy’[rāddun].  
 
Throughout the years, says Shaltūt, bid‘a became the major source of sectarianism. 
Everyone who created bida‘ followed his own bid‘a, and the unity of religious 
identity was damaged.  When applied to belief it could lead to shirk or the worship of 
other beings than God, and when used for rituals people would add or omit certain 
parts, or change the way the ritual is practised.  As far as permitted and forbidden 
things are concerned, people might misunderstand it.
1
  Zebiri discusses a suggestion 
that Shaltūt made to an academic board of the Jamā‘at kibār al-‘ulamā’ (which was 
established in 1911) to investigate disputes or differences between ‘ulamā and to lay 
down criteria in order to differentiate between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ bida‘.  He told the 
leaders and the ‘ulamā that it was his aspiration for them to work together in order to 
achieve a united Islam.
2
  
 
Of all the ‘ulamā’ dealt with in this chapter, Nadvi presents the most decisive 
approach towards bid‘a.  To him, bid‘a is any dogma or ritual not laid down by Allah 
and his messenger, which has been accepted as an approved part of religion, or which 
is treated as something sacrosanct and helps in achieving proximity to Allah. Bid‘a is 
therefore ‘a man-made law forced into the system of law given by Allah’.3 
 
Bid‘a, Nadvi continues, essentially refuses to accept that creed and Shari‘a are 
complete, and that nothing could be added to the corpus.  From time to time, it makes 
Islam so convoluted, difficult and bewildering that people are forced to leave the 
religion altogether.  Unlike creed and Shari‘a which remain the same, a bid‘a could be 
based on a certain regional or historical development, or may emanate from the 
preferences of a certain individual; it thus differs from place to place, and runs 
counter to the Sunna.  All bida‘ are considered vile and wicked, and:  
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Even if we suppose that certain actions appear as virtuous and good to certain 
persons owing to a deficiency in their discernment, they would have nothing 
but sorrow and remorse when they are granted necessary comprehension and 
discretion.
1
 
 
Nadvi specifically focuses on ‘One of the greatest fallacies that had very often led the 
people astray, namely bid‘a ḥasana, which, he continues, can never be accepted’.2  
V. Bid‘a – what needs to be done to avoid it 
 
The very Egypto-centric approach of both ‘Abduh and Riḍā is well reflected in their 
suggestions for the best ways to counter what they perceived as the bid‘a 
phenomenon.  
 
Al-Manār says that bid‘a is now widespread in mosques across the country, as well as 
the celebration of holy commemorations [mawālid] linked to the Sufi orders, and 
similar phenomena that will be discussed in detail.  The way to counter this in Egypt, 
according to al-Manār, is for the head of the ‘ulamā’ to establish a committee in al-
Azhar, composed of ‘ulamā’ from all four schools of law, and write a booklet to be 
signed by tens of ‘ulamā’; then all ‘ulamā and heads of religious establishments 
should dispatch this booklet and speak about it in the mosques.  Al-Manār further 
hopes that such a booklet will be distributed by the Ministry of Endowments [awqāf] 
to be preached from the pulpits, and that writers will also be suggested to address the 
subject of bid‘a and warn people against it.  This, al-Manār says, will make it easier 
for the government to call off these bida‘, especially those of commemorations and 
celebrations which, it says, the government itself has a hand in.
3
 
 
The ‘ulamā’ discussed in other chapters have mentioned another group, which, 
according to al-Manār, had been responsible for introducing the bid‘a into religion– 
namely, ‘those who were supposed to be knowledgeable’.  In their writings, the 
journal continues, scholars of this group in fact made wrongful ijtihād and permitted 
things which are not allowed, thus introducing ḍalāla and bid‘a.  Some of these 
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scholars, al-Manār explains, had no knowledge of certain aḥādīth, and thus made 
mistakes which caused al-Nawāwī to condemn the prayers of Rajab and Sha‘bān as 
repugnant [bid‘a qabīḥa]; other fuqahā’ condemned additional rak‘as during the Hajj.  
Those writers are called upon by da‘wa to return to reliance on the Qur’an and Sunna 
only, based on the Qur’anic phrase ‘today I completed your religion’.1  
 
Al-Manār tends to pay tribute to books about the subject, for example a book by an 
Egyptian writer named Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Salām Khaḍr al-Shukayrī,2 which 
is praised for exposing the bid‘a and khurāfāt in the country.3  Al-Kawākibī in this 
context also refers to Jews and Christians as a source from whom bid‘a is carried into 
Islam, but in general his writings on bid‘a derive from the discussion on shirk or on 
matters which involve mistakes in identifying what comes under the injunction to 
command right and forbid wrong.
4
  
VI. Other types of bid‘a 
In its attempt to fight the ‘phenomenon’ of widespread bid‘a in Egypt, al-Manār also 
discusses specific cases; the wide majority of them falls under the category of ‘ibādāt.   
Its view on the subject is rather clear: nobody permitted to change ceremonies in 
Islam by either adding or taking anything from them, and no mujtahid has ever 
permitted such acts – or else it would have created new religions.5  While, as already 
stated, the majority of bida‘, according to Riḍā, penetrated Islam in later times, there 
are such bida‘ which did so as early as the days of the followers of the Prophet’s 
companions [tabi‘ūn]. 
 
Al-Manār concentrates in one case on many rituals that are performed during the 
month of Ramaḍān, defined as the month of ‘spiritual sports’ by Muslims.  Al-Manār 
says that none of the rituals performed during the month, such as special prayers or 
recitation of the Qur’an (talāwa) are genuinely Islamic and that more can be done to 
avoid such acts of bid‘a and repudiated elements [munkarāt].  These, the journal 
continues, may derive from a lack of knowledge on the part of the preachers in 
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mosques, who preach in favour of corruption.
1
  Al-Manār even calls on both the 
Shaykh al-Azhar and the Shaykh of the al-Ḥusaynī mosque to prevent such people 
from preaching, characterising them as ignorant [jāhilūn] and impostors [dajjālūn]; to 
the ‘good’ ‘ulamā’, al-Manār offers to put in their mosques leaflets and guides to 
argue against these issues.
2
 
Adding adhāns to prayers 
 
The custom of adding calls to prayer (adhān) on other occasions is said to be a 
repudiated bid‘a, although in al-Manār it is said that a fatwā had been issued claiming 
it was bid‘a ḥasana.3  The ritual of adhān, al-Manār continues, has been basic to 
Islam from the days of the Prophet; in most of the canonical books the nature and way 
of each adhān is described, and no change by analogy [qiyās] or religious discretion 
[istiḥsān] had ever been accepted.  Al-Manār refers again to al-Shāṭibī, reminding its 
readers that he classified acts which are connected to time and place into the category 
of bid‘a iḍāfiyya; therefore, al-Manār continues, the majority of the jurists referring to 
the bida‘of the night of desires in Rajab and the prayers in the middle of Sha‘bān say 
that they are repudiated.  Al-Manār says that the adhān belongs to the first type 
(which is bound to time and place), and therefore it cannot be permitted, and nothing 
is allowed to be added to it.  
 
In a manner similar to its approach to other cases, al-Manār goes on to explore the 
sources of this custom, saying that it was first introduced by the Shi‘a – probably 
referring to the Fatimid Dynasty in Egypt in the 10
th
 century (as argued by al-Maqrīzī 
in his Khiṭat) and forbidden a few centuries later, when the Shāfi‘ī school of 
jurisprudence was implemented in that country.  Al-Ash‘arī played a part in this, and 
in time the same ruling started to be applied in Mecca and Syria [al-Shām].  There is 
emphasis on the fact that the Wahhābīs made sure not to add the extra calls, a point 
which was made clear to the al-Manār representative by Wahhābī officials.4 
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The very long historical account of events continues, followed by a furious attack on 
the bid‘a of adding adhāns, which was adopted in some villages in Egypt and thence 
to Cairo itself.  A similar attitude is also adopted towards adding ṣalawāt, a bid‘a said 
to be common to mu’adhins in modern times.1  The worst evils of a bid‘a, says al-
Manār, is that as time passes it acquires the ruling of a legitimate Sunna which people 
follow, and whoever repudiates it is considered a mubtadi‘ himself.2 
 
Shaykh Yūsuf al-Dajāwī from al-Azhar, who was said to be involved in the struggle 
against bid‘a, is quoted as having referred to a Hadith that says: ‘if you hear the 
mu’adhin, say what he says and then pray to me’, thus emphasising the importance of 
the role of the mu’adhin and his responsibility not to invent evil bida‘ or insert them 
into religion.  Nevertheless, al-Manār criticises al-Dajāwi, who tried to distinguish 
between adding to sermons and adding to other parts of prayer.  Furthermore, al-
Manār says, even al-Dajāwi’s claims that ‘ulamā’ from the four religious schools 
perceived this custon as a ‘good bid‘a’ are incorrect; those scholars were late on the 
scene and therefore cannot be considered legitimate mujtahids.  Therefore, they can 
only supply reasoning.  
 
In any case, al-Manār adds, this bid‘a cannot be referenced to the Hadith which refers 
to the reward of whoever introduces a good Sunna into Islam, for all Salafi scholars 
agree that no innovative acts of worship can be inserted into Islam as new Sunnas.     
Those who understand this point reject it completely.
3
  
 
To conclude, al-Manār says that adding more adhans is a bid‘a which was renewed 
by some people who performed ḍalāla and it should be condemned.  What is sad 
about this bid‘a, it continues, is that there are people who follow it and preach to 
others to do the same.  The best solution is to preach the truth to those who spread 
such innovations.
4
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Annual commemorations of birthdays of saints [mawālid] 
 
One of the key issues that al-Manār struggles against in the field of bid‘a is annual 
commemorations, a topic which is discussed in other chapters.  This debate is crucial 
to al-Manār for several reasons that will be considered.  Here it is worth referring to 
Schielke, who claims that unlike pre-modern debates, in which only specific practices 
related to festivals of mawālid, but not the festivals themselves, have been 
documented as subjects of discourse -- the reformist and modernist discourses started 
to define them as a specific issue.  
 
The aim was to exclude these festivals from the realm of orthodox Islam and 
progressive modernity, and thus from the true substance of the nation, not because 
there was something inherently un-Islamic or irrational about them, but because their 
particular form of festive time, their order, and their habitus did not fit the newly 
constructed habitus of the authentic yet enlightened Muslim, and did not comply with 
the new rationality of the progressive nation.  
 
Schielke says that this was an innovative approach, which created a new and dramatic 
split between ‘orthodox’ and ‘popular’ Islam and ‘modern’ and ‘backward’ culture.     
When European observers claimed Islam to be a backward and irrational religion, 
Schielke continues, Muslim intellectuals replied with a twofold strategy: 
reinterpreting part of the religious and cultural traditions as the true, authentic heritage 
that would match European standards and serve as the moral foundation of the 
nation’s progress; and excluding other parts from the modernist project by labelling 
them backward khurāfāt at worst, popular religion and folklore at best, but never 
equal to the true, at once authentic and modern culture.
1
  
 
This does not seem to be a ‘clear-cut’ approach: the separation between the festivals 
and some of the acts which accompany them is maintained, and al-Manār -- even 
though being negative in general towards these festivals -- still tries to be as objective 
as possible.  As in other issues, it develops most of the discussion from the local 
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Egyptian experience.  In one case, for instance, Ibn Ḥajar al-Haythamī is quoted as 
issuing fatāwā in several cases in order to answer the question of whether these 
birthdays and commemorations -- which were widespread in Egypt in his time -- are 
Sunna, virtues [fāḍila] or bid‘a.  Al- Haythamī’s answer is that the majority of them 
were originally bid‘a ḥasana.1  
 
Shaltūt seems to be taking a rather similar stance to Riḍā’s.  Shaltūt says that the 
mawālid are a late bid‘a that penetrated Islam.  He notes that even though some 
people say the mawālid are good for the sake of praising the name of Allah, taking 
care of the poor and other good deeds, there are still many bida‘ and repudiated acts 
[munkarāt] which take place in the process, and that ‘ulamā’ do not condemn or stop 
them.
2
  According to Zebiri, Shaltūt’s attitude towards the elements of sermonizing 
[wa‘ẓ] is most in evidence when he discusses matters about which he feels strongly, 
such as khurāfāt and bida‘.3  Schussman adds that Shaltūt criticises both the ‘ulamā’ 
for their disregard of the phenomenon, and government officials for participating in 
these festivals.  However, she notes, he avoided dealing with the question of 
legitimacy of celebrating the Prophet’s birthday.4 
Celebrating the Prophet’s birthday 
 
The Prophet’s birthday is the yearly commemoration which worries both Nadvi 5 and 
al-Manār most.  
 
As usual for al-Manār, a historical background to this celebration is provided, starting 
with al-Malik al-Muthaffar Abū Sa‘īd (d. 630h/1232) from Irbil, (currently part of 
Mosul Province).
6
  The celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, says al-Manār, is 
basically a good act, which helps improve faith and the Prophetic tradition, and to 
restore his Sunna.
7
  Nevertheless, as a widespread bid‘a, al-Manār wishes it to stop.   
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Riḍā relies on al-Ḥāfiẓ ibn Ḥajar as the main source who states that the Prophet’s 
birthday is a bid‘a.1  As in other cases, al-Manār believes this should be done through 
education.
2
  
 
In another place, Al-Manār ensures that all details are correct.  It refers to a 
compilation of clerical views concerning the celebration, said to have been signed by 
many ‘ulamā’, from Egypt and other countries.  At first sight, says al-Manār, this 
book is impressive, but on looking further inside, it was found to be full of errors.   
Writing the book in the first place, al-Manār says, comprises in itself an act of bid‘a – 
the introduction does not cite the fact that the actual celebration of the Prophet’s 
birthday is an act of bid‘a, but when telling the story of the Prophet’s birth it gives the 
impression that this celebration is something which comes from the Hadith and Sira; 
the book does not reject it but makes it into a religious ceremony.  It also concludes 
almost all its chapters with the special prayer for the event.  This, al-Manār observes, 
is the main reason why it chose not to publish this compilation.
3
  
 
And indeed, a few years later Riḍā himself declares his anger at the fact that the 
celebration, as well as speeches in the mosques, are printed in the papers and 
magazines, and also translated into other languages.  All the stories about the 
Prophet’s birth, he says, have been invented by authors; some stories repeat 
themselves, describing the wonders of his birth.  There are songs too.  Reading the 
story of the Prophet’s birth, he maintains, is a habit which was first started by one of 
the Circassian kings of Egypt.
4
 
 
Riḍā says he has been condemning the official celebration in Cairo, which is led by 
the Sufi Shaykhs.  Every year, he states, he reminds people that acts of bid‘a and sins 
take place in the course of this celebration.  Riḍā also condemns the fact that religious 
figures and ambassadors of foreign countries take part in the celebration.  The story of 
the Prophet’s birth itself, he says, has been condemned, and in the year 1334H was 
replaced by the current special prayer.  Riḍā continues to attack the existing version of 
this prayer, which, he says, is also related to the questions of subject, time, place and 
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authority.  Sayyid Bakrī, head of the celebration, promised Riḍā, so he claims, to 
replace the existing version of the prayer.  He further speaks about his efforts to 
counter this bid‘a.  A booklet titled Risālat dhikrā al-Mawlid al-Nabawī was 
distributed across the Muslim world, but, according to Riḍā, its effect in correcting 
some of the existing customs was rather weak.  
 
Riḍā says that he made some successful efforts to invite donations from Muslims in 
India for the distribution of more booklets, which were also translated into other 
languages; as well as the Sira, which was translated (probably into Urdu) for the first 
time.  In addition, he himself wrote a book which discusses the issue, which, 
according to him, has been very influential within the Muslim world.  Riḍā aspires to 
transform the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday to a ‘Muḥammad Day’,1 most 
likely meaning to celebrate his message and contribution in the form of accentuating 
the Islamic revelation rather than commemorating a date and highlighting his own 
personality. 
Other commemorations 
 
Al-Manār also discusses the bid‘a of celebrating the night in the middle of the month 
of Sha‘bān, in reply to questions addressed to Rashīd Riḍā.  Riḍā says that this 
celebration has nothing to do with the Sunna, even though people consider it to be so, 
and this night is no better than any other night.
2
  In his book, Riḍā clearly states that 
this custom is a bid‘a shar‘iyya, discussing again the differences between this type of 
bid‘a and bid‘a laghwiyya.  It is, he says, a ‘bad bid‘a’ and a proven ḍalāla.3  
 
As in the case of the Prophet’s birthday, Riḍā tries to follow the historical roots of this 
custom of celebrating the night in the middle of the month of Sha‘bān, starting in the 
Middle Ages -- saying that the person who first introduced it was ignorant [jāhil], that 
the Hadith it is based upon is weak, all the virtues [faḍā’il] attributed to it are 
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incorrect, and that the special prayers that day are bid‘a, and, as some scholars have 
suggested, are false as well.
 1
  
 
This celebration is a good example of al-Manār’s perception of those who were 
supposedly in possession of the knowledge, but out of their ignorance made a 
mistaken ijtihād.  This, as already mentioned, is seen by al-Manār as the worst 
disaster to befall religion.
2
  Furthermore, prominent ‘ulamā’ like al-Nawawī wrote 
against this celebration, stating it was bid‘a.  Others also opposed this celebration, 
because of the potential wrongful acts which may accompany it.  Such acts include 
charging an entrance fee in the name of religion; the distribution of sweets (forbidden  
under Shari‘a) -- both of which are said to be common in Egypt; the presence of 
women; the combination of reciting the Qur’an and singing, which is considered to 
amount to ‘playing with religion’, and more.3  These acts, especially those involving 
women, make Riḍā declare that the whole subject of the night of the middle of 
Sha‘bān has to be treated as a khurāfa.4  
 
Al-Manār looked at another celebration, the commemoration of the anniversary of the 
death of al-Ḥusayn in the streets of Medina, and conducting ziyāra to his grave.  Here 
too, Riḍā (signed as the writer) refers to the mixture of men and women, who, he 
continues, do not cover their faces and raise their voices.  This, he concludes, is a 
bid‘a which originates in corruption.5  Al-Manār says that this is a new 
commemoration, during which women mix with men, dress immodestly and sing.   
This commemoration is even seen as a parallel offence to shirk.  This bid‘a, continues 
al-Manār, leads to decadence, and has its origin in false ijtihād.6 
 
Still, as we have already said more than once, bid‘a is seen as a result of ignorance.  It 
is interesting to see, regarding this commemoration and the customs referred to, the 
more restrained language that Shaltūt uses.  Even though his discussion of the subject 
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comes under the title of bid‘a, he does not use the term itself but says it is an act 
which leads to the corruption of manners.
1
 
 
Clear cases of bid‘a, Riḍā continues, which were described and present in the days of 
Ibn al-Ḥājj, are now even more widespread.  Riḍā refers especially to the use of 
drums, dancing and chanting during the performance of the dhikr.  He cites an answer 
by Turtūsi on the issue, saying that these rituals come from a Sufi tradition, and that 
they are false and lead men astray.  While Riḍā considers mixed dancing as bid‘a, 
both here and in other places,
2
 Turtūsī goes as far as to consider it a matter of unbelief, 
saying that the Shari‘a is based only on the Qur’an and Sunna.  Other prominent 
scholars who have dealt with the issue of bid‘a, like Qurṭubī, are also mentioned.3  
 
Riḍā expresses his anger towards European countries, which, he claims, facilitated 
this procedure by supplying electricity and gas.  According to the Prophet, he states, 
using many lights is equal to the customs of the Zoroastrians and the fire worshippers. 
 
To conclude, Riḍā stresses again the need to fight bid‘a and revive the Sunna.   
Nevertheless, he says it is permitted to perform certain rituals during this day, as long 
as they are not planned in advance.  By this he means that they are not presented as 
being in accordance with the Shari‘a. 
 
Under the title ‘bid‘a and khurāfāt’, al-Manār presents the birthday of Imām al-
Shāfi‘ī, said to be celebrated by ahl al-bid‘a.  This is a rather interesting case, as it 
involves the commemoration of a religious scholar.  And indeed, in this specific case 
all the blame is heaped upon the religious establishment as a whole, for persuading 
people that this is actually a religious ritual.  This, al-Manār concludes, is the worst 
thing related to al-Shāfi‘ī, a scholar who dedicated his life to reviving the Sunna and 
disavowing the bid‘a.4 
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Visiting graves 
 
Another issue widely discussed by al-Manār is the matter of visiting (ziyārāt) 
distinguished mosques and graves.  Visiting the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina, al-
Manār states, is allowed but is not an obligation for Muslims like the Hajj.  Yet it is a 
noble act to perform, as is stated in a few aḥādīth.1  Al-Manār’s main attack is 
reserved for those who build structures on top of graves or even visit them.
2
  This 
tendency, according to al-Manār, is comprised of six types of bid‘a, as indicated by 
Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, which are also related to shirk:  
 
1) turning graves into mosques  
2) burning manure on them  
3) making the grave a place of idolatry  
4) performing ṭawwāf around them  
5) talking over them  
6) praying to those buried in them.
3
 
 
To the question of visiting the graves of the predecessors, al-Manār’s answer is that 
visiting graves is not mentioned in the Qur’ān, nor it is part of the Sunna.  On the 
contrary, it maintains, Islam aspired from the beginning not to increase men’s 
devotion to graves, and the Prophet himself forbade building over graves or praying 
next to them.  These bida‘ and repudiated acts [munkarāt] occur at the graves of the 
Salaf and at other graves to a lesser extent.  Hence it is clear that what bothers al-
Manār most is the acts that surround the ritual rather than the ritual itself.  It is 
interesting to note that, in spite of al-Manār’s resistance to any religious acts at graves 
and in their surroundings — as in Ḥanbalī and Wahhābī thought — it distinguishes 
itself, at least from the former, by quoting Ḥanbalī ‘ulamā’ separately.  Al-Manār 
concludes by calling people who commit such acts the munāfiqūn of our time, saying 
that they make it easier to ruin religion.
4
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Al-Manār concludes by saying that it is allowed to mention the great contribution of 
the Salaf, and it is allowed to visit their graves in general, especially those who are 
known for their knowledge and righteousness, whose names al-Manār had previously 
listed.
1
 
 
Shaltūt also discusses the ban on building mosques over graves, but, as in previously 
mentioned cases, and as will be seen later, he does not categorize it as bid‘a2  On the 
issue of visiting graves, he says that doubts have been raised with regard to this 
custom, which many believe is at least repudiated.  An issue which seems to mainly 
concern Shaltūt is women visiting the graves.  He says that at first visiting was 
prohibited altogether, but as Islamic belief entered the hearts and its purposes were 
made clear, it became permitted. Shaltūt further presents a number of aḥādīth in order 
to prove this claim, and says that over time it led to performing acts of shirk.
3
 
 
The early Salafis, as previously have noted, lived in a complex era, when the Ottoman 
Empire went into a final decline, and Western countries increased their involvement 
in the Middle East to an unprecedented degree.  Nevertheless, it is interesting to note 
that Salafis barely analysed Western tendencies and acts in religious terms.  Perhaps a 
sole relevant example in the issue of bid‘a is an argument for the Ottoman 
Constitution by Sulaymān al-Bustānī, referred to by Hourani, which refutes the 
suggestion that it is a bid‘a.  According to Hourani, al-Bustāni’s main assertion is that 
it is exactly as a Muslim would have done, and a similar consitution existed in the 
first Caliphate.
4
  Such a ‘political’ stance, in the Western sense of the word, is best 
manifested in the Muslim Brotherhood doctrine that will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
 
We should note here that only one example for a bid‘a falling under the category of 
‘ādāt has been located; Riḍā refers very briefly to the custom of swearing with the 
right hand during the ceremony of divorce.
5
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Are tobacco and spirits permissible 
 
In several cases, both al-Manār and Riḍā separately discuss the issues of using 
tobacco and spirits -- of which the former will be widely discussed in the chapter on 
the early Wahhābīs.  
 
Like many others, al-Manār believes that there is no proof that the use of tobacco is 
generally forbidden, unless it causes harm to whoever uses it.  Doctors, it continues, 
agree that the nicotine it contains is harmful to some people and useful to others.  
Most people, al-Manār further claims, say that there is no visible damage in tobacco, 
but the issue is in dispute and is therefore also accepted by some of the ‘ulamā’ and 
rejected by others.  Many ‘ulamā’, says al-Manār, first rejected it as something new 
(and we should note that the term bid‘a is not raised in this context), but permitted it 
after it had started to spread.  Eventually, Shaykh al-Azhar al-Jizāwī1 issued a fatwā 
saying that this issue has three different views, ranging from a complete rejection to 
the middle path.
2
  Hence, al-Manār concludes, the issue of buying tobacco belongs, in 
fact, to the discussion of using it.
3
 
 
When discussing the permissibility of using spirits and alcohol, following a fatwā in 
India which forbade any use of them whatsoever (even for smell, colour, medical 
purposes and other cases), Riḍā again attacks ignorance and ḍalāla -- which bring 
about a situation where men can no longer distinguish between what is forbidden and 
what is permitted, and completely ignore the issue of commanding the right and 
forbidding the wrong.
4
  Spirit, Riḍā clarifies, is not wine,5 which is completely 
forbidden in Islam, adding that this was previously confirmed by ‘Abduh.6  
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VII. The Sufis in the eyes of the early Salafi ‘ulamā’ 
 
As for those who brought bid‘a into Egypt and into religion, al-Manār often says they 
were ‘ulamā’ who made a wrongful ijtihād; however, the journal also takes an explicit 
view of the role played by a majority of Sufi orders, who were responsible for the 
introduction of various bida‘ of ‘aqīdāt into religion, matters unknown to their 
forefathers.  This claim is repeated several times.  
 
Al-Manār’s approach towards the Sufis is not necessarily coherent.  In one place we 
learn that they do not follow the Shari‘a (which, according to al-Manār is derived 
from the Qur’an and Sunna only).  In this way, al-Manār says, the Sufis encouraged 
bida‘.1  But Sufism itself is regarded as an integral part of Islam,2 and is defended by 
al-Manār against those who denounce it.  Some people claim that the Sufis commit 
bid‘a, and that they had abandoned the Sunna.  Sometimes, al-Manār continues, they 
are included under ahl al-bid‘a wa’l-zandaqa.  However, in an earlier article in al-
Manār, Riḍā unleashes a fierce denunciation of a writer who attacks the Sufis, saying 
they all disavow traditions. Riḍā says this writer is not knowledgeable enough to be 
allowed to write.
3
  
 
On the other hand, in a different place, al-Manār attacks some Sufi groups.  It is clear, 
al-Manār reiterates, that at first the Sufis did follow the Sunna until they were joined 
by the likes of the ‘funded’ Sufis [al-arzāq]4, or the Sufis by appearance only [al-
rasm].
5
  Sufism, al-Manār states, must only rely on the Qur’an, Sunna and the sīra of 
the pious followers of the ancestors (al-salaf al-sāliḥ) if it does not want to be 
dragged into bid‘a.  According to the journal, some of the bida‘ in Sufi writings were  
taken from non-Muslim sources such as Greek philosophers, while others have been 
renewed by Shaykhs of some orders.
6
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According to Weismann, this distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ Sufism (which, he 
reminds his readers, was made by both ‘Abduh and Riḍā) was made when one, the 
‘true’ version, was connected with the believer’s need for spiritual experience, and the 
other had to do with the struggle against khurāfāt and practices incompatible with the 
Shari‘a.1  This could fit the previously introduced theory of the urge to reject popular 
customs that would not look modern enough in Western eyes.  In an article, Hourani 
cites a translation of a story by Riḍā, who had been invited to attend a ritual prayer for 
Jalāl al-Dīn al-Rūmī by the Mawlawī order.  Riḍā was astounded from the way they 
were dressed, the beardless youth and some of the acts.  He could not control himself, 
stood up in the centre of the hall and shouted something along the lines of:  
 
O people, or can I call you Muslims! These are forbidden acts, which one has no 
right either to look at or to pass over in silence, for to do so is to accept them. To 
those who commit them God’s word applies, "They have made their religion a joke 
and a plaything".
2
 
 
In any case, Weismann further notes that the Salafiyya movement after Riḍā no longer 
made such distinctions and condemned Sufism as a whole.
3
 
 
This tendency of accusing the Sufis of bringing bid‘a into religion is very similar to 
al-Kawākibī’s approach, although he applies it in a wider context.  According to al-
Kawākibī, those who did not follow the Shari‘a came to perform bid‘a in religion, 
some of them through esoteric knowledge [‘ilm al-bāṭin], and others either through 
the knowledge of reality [‘ilm al-ḥaqīqa] or other elements of Sufism; some invented 
rituals which entered Islam at the end of the fourth century of Islam; and some made 
fun of religion and started dancing, using drums, playing with fire and with weapons.
4
     
While reviewing the history of Sufism, he also distinguished between the ‘true Sufis’ 
and those who came after them.
5
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Nadvi, as would be expected, is much more positive towards the Sufis; he writes a 
great deal about their historic contribution to India, and speaks of them as muṣālihūn,1 
explaining that: 
 
The method employed for attaining proximity to God and avoiding worldliness 
through perfection of morals, which later on came to be known as tasawwuf or 
mysticism, was identical with the tazkiyah (purification) and ihsan (sincere worship) 
in the Qur’anic and Hadith terminology. It was, in fact, one of the four objectives of 
the prophethood of Muhammad …2 
VIII. Jews and Christians in the eyes of the early Salafi ‘ulamā’ 
 
As previously noted, the scholars examined in this chapter were highly critical about 
Jews and Christians, a position due in part to Qur’anic and Hadith anti-Semitism and 
anti-Christian polemic, and in part as a reaction to the circumstances and historic 
events of the era in which they lived and operated.  ‘Abduh speaks about the period 
when the bāṭiniyya came into being, and created sectarianism and fitna over debates 
about the creation of the Qur’an.  Some of those involved in talking about bid‘a were 
scholars whose knowledge and piety were well known.
3
 
 
Al-Manār says that it was the Christians who influenced people to start imitating 
elements from Christian practice.  Some of those who commit shirk, says al-Manār, 
hold gatherings to praise Allah, and during these gatherings sing songs which include 
shirk; others do not want to follow the Shari‘a at all and actually perform ideas and 
acts of bid‘a in Islam by adopting other modes of thought, such as ‘ilm al-bāṭin or 
taṣawwuf, which were not present in the early days of Islam.4  
 
Moreover, there are third and fourth groups which invented ritual practices and pious 
acts which were not part of Islam until the 10
th
 century, saying that God left religion 
incomplete and that they have completed it, ignoring the explicit Hadith which has 
already been mentioned.  Is it not unbelief to say that the Prophet omitted parts of his 
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message, al-Manār asks?  The sad situation, it concludes, is that the entire umma is 
now adopting acts of shirk approved by ‘ulamā’ -- acts which are often the result of 
ignorance.  
 
Nadvi cites a passage which curses Jews and Christians for turning their graves into 
sites of prayer.  However, his version is different from the one usually mentioned -- 
saying that the Prophet has warned against their acts, that Allah will kill them for this, 
and that neither of the two religions will have a presence on Arab lands.
1
  Nadvi 
speaks about what is discusses matters of interest to the Western world, which also 
led to an interest in the human body, in the culture of competition, and in horse racing 
-- all of which are very dangerous.  The West is trying to make the Arabs and 
Muslims imitate its traditions; this alien culture therefore has to be taken away from 
schools for the benefit of developing a new generation with better Islamic knowledge 
and ideology.
2
 
 
IX. The Shi‘a in the eyes of the early Salafi ‘ulamā’ 
 
The division between Sunnis and Shi‘a preoccupied the minds of some of the scholars 
dealt with in this chapter, especially Riḍā and Nadvi -- who quotes the former very 
widely.  Riḍā adheres to the myth that this division began with the conversion to Shi‘a 
[tashayyu‘] of Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, under the influence of a mubtadi‘ (innovator) of 
Jewish origin, ‘Abd Allāh ibn Saba’ from Sana‘a in Yemen.  Ibn Saba’, he says, 
reputedly called for ghulūw in order to divide the umma and corrupt its religion, for 
which purpose he recruited other Jews.  This was also advanced as the reason why the 
Prophet and the Jews went to war.  Riḍā speaks about tashayyu‘ as a bid‘a which 
spread in the Muslim world in secretive propaganda [di‘āya]; it was also the main 
reason for political disputes between various ṣaḥāba.  Another bid‘a which the Shi‘a 
have spread is distortion [taḥrīf] of the Qur’an and similar innovations.  Yet another 
bid‘a relates to the identity of the expected mahdī.  
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Riḍā, however, makes a distinction between various sub-groups, like the Zaydis, the 
rāfiḍa and others.  He refers to the rāfiḍa as non-believers,1 and accuses some of the 
current Shi‘a of acting with excessiveness in adhering to the custom of reading the 
first four verses of the Sūrat al-Tawba, which deal with God’s treatment of the 
mushrikūn on the day of the Great Hajj attributed to ‘Alī.2 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have looked at the opinions of the early Salafi scholars, who were 
the first ‘ulamā’ in centuries to regard renewal in religion as a necessity for Muslims.   
In several cases, their views have been compared to those of scholars like al-Kawākibī 
and Shaltūt, both of whom represent opinions which are deeply rooted in Islam but 
which also focus on other aspects -- either concerning the direction Islam should take 
or on its Arab origins.  We have also looked more deeply into the views of Abu al-
Ḥasan ‘Alī al-Nadvi, an important scholar connected both to them and to the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  
 
Al-Manār, which at first reflected the views of both ‘Abduh and Riḍā, and later, 
following ‘Abduh’s death, reflected more of Riḍā’s, deals very broadly with this 
subject, aspiring to eliminate what it sees as the phenomenon of widespread bid‘a and 
drawing most of its examples from Egypt.  Al-Manār deals both with 
bida‘ concerning social affairs and those that bring in a variety of religious rituals. 
Our research suggests that al-Manār is not as decisive as might have been expected in 
deciding what should or should not be considered bid‘a, despite the image attributed 
to Riḍā of a staunch fighter against bid‘a.  
 
Al-Manār accepts several types of bid‘a, yet rejects others, saying that bida‘ have led 
to the grave situation the country is in.  It appears that most of the rejected bida‘are 
connected with popular acts, which may not fit the modern image it would like to 
form for Islam.  Nevertheless, although it generally opposes bida‘ in religious issues, 
it does not define what belongs to religion and what does not. 
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Thus, al-Manār also avoids sweeping generalizations, and accuses only part of the 
Sufis, Shi‘a, Jews and Christians of having introduced bid‘a into Islam. When our 
‘ulamā’ speak about other ‘ulamā’, they tend to say that they made such mistakes 
because of misunderstandings.  But who, we may ask, is free of misunderstandings, 
unless, of course, such a category is restricted to al-Manār’s writers and those who 
participate in their debate over what has been understood and what has not?  It is 
probable that the early Salafis were forced to act like this because they were engaged 
in apologetics, since they had to guarantee that a revival of religion could take place 
while introducing changes that are considered legitimate.  
 
A much deeper discussion regarding the tension between renewal and revival and 
bid‘a will be broached in the next chapter, which looks at the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
Among the other three ‘ulamā’ whose writings we examined, al-Kawākibī follows 
more or less the same line; Shaltūt uses milder language and seems to hold a more 
positive approach, and Nadvi, in spite of the fact that he rejects any kind of bid‘a, still 
finds ways to justify renewal and revival. 
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Chapter two: The Muslim Brotherhood’s perception of bid‘a 
I. General introduction 
Toward the end of the 1920s, Egypt saw the emergence of a ‘Supra-Egyptian’ 
national tendency.  This trend wished to create a new collective identity for the 
country before the eyes of the whole Arab-Muslim world.  This identity would draw 
on religious, cultural and linguistic roots, using authentic Egyptian culture as its main 
source, while turning away from the West.  The key to its gaining further momentum 
was the ‘new effendiyya’ class, made up of young educated middle-class Egyptians 
who had undergone the processes of Westernisation and urbanisation which took 
place during the 1930s.  The economic crisis caused a drastic reduction in salaries and 
living standards, and brought about growing unemployment. Gradually, other leading 
doctrines of Egyptian identity – that Voll considers ‘adaptationist’1 – like the 
Westernised camp of the National Pharaonic movement, which cherished the ancient 
history of the country, began to lose their popularity.  Members of the young Egyptian 
parliamentary system were perceived as representing personal and sectarian interests; 
impatience and disillusionment with the existing order continued to rise.
2
 
 
The members of the ‘new effendiyya’ addressed the public using such elements in the 
collective Egyptian memory as Islamic heritage, language and culture -- while at the 
same time, increasingly turning against Western colonialism.  Simultaneously, the 
process of Islamic revival became stronger and brought about the rapid growth of the 
new salafiyya Islamic protest movements.  These movements challenged both the 
process of cultural and educational Westernisation and traditional orthodox Islam.  In 
their view, orthodox Islam failed to provide appropriate solutions to the unsettling 
questions of the era, arising from the fall of the Ottoman Empire during World War 
One and the disintegration of the Caliphate in 1924. 
 
The Society of the Muslim Brothers [Brotherhood] – founded by the young school 
teacher Ḥasan al-Bannā – began as one of these protest movements, and gradually 
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became the largest and most important of them all.  The Brotherhood’s leaders and 
thinkers were typical of the young effendi mindset.  Many of its members were 
middle-class, urban people, highly self-aware – teachers, clerks, students and white-
collar professionals – who had experienced a Westernizing process but had found no 
spiritual or social fulfilment in their Western orientation.  The most outstanding 
names in the Brotherhood were not necessarily those of religious functionaries -- an 
important point which holds relevance for this chapter. 
 
As reported by Mitchell, the Brotherhood members saw themselves clearly as 
perpetuating the work of the modern Salafi reformers who were examined in the 
previous chapter -- describing Afghānī as the ‘caller’ to Islamic reform; ‘Abduh as the 
one who formulated it; and Rida as the ‘archivist’ or ‘historian’.  Bannā, however, 
was seen as the ‘initiator’ of a renaissance, the leader of a generation and the founder 
of a nation -- and the first to provide a ‘practical’ extension to the previous 
movements.
1
 
 
In the founding meeting of the Brotherhood, when asked by his students how the 
newly formed body would be defined, al-Bannā answered that they should leave 
formality aside, for this body was unlike any other existing organisation, but rather a 
‘brotherhood’ in service of Islam, concentrating on thought, philosophy and action.2    
Al-Bannā’s ‘practical’ approach included calling on the government to focus most of 
its effort on Islam as the basis for national education.  At the same time, he started 
providing activist proselytising [da‘wa] to the younger generation, using simple, even 
simplistic Islamic content, combined with political substance.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood, therefore, concentrated its work on all aspects of life, creating religious, 
educational and social institutions such as mosques, schools, youth groups, and 
welfare organisations.  The Society focused its activities in six areas: promoting 
knowledge, common principles, fighting economic corruption, raising the standard of 
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living for the sake of society, liberating Egypt from British colonialism, and helping 
achieve world peace in the spirit of Islam.
1
 
 
These foundations all aimed to fulfil the first stages in the Society’s ‘doctrine of 
phases’ designed by al-Bannā – a personal, individual and social revival which would 
lead to the next stages of political action and then Jihad until the Islamic state, 
governed by Shari‘a, is established.  This model, Sullivan adds, still applies today, 
with the Society preparing a new generation of believers who will support the da‘wa 
and become models for others.
2
  
 
This unique structure lies at the heart of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ability to survive 
political persecution over decades, and the same unique structure has served to 
facilitate an international movement which is said to be represented in eighty 
countries, albeit with a rather loose structure.  The Muslim Brotherhood today is best 
described as a global ideology, whose local branches develop and act according to the 
circumstances in each country, and cooperate in financial or activist affairs (which are 
not of concern here); hence there are various sub-groups within the Brotherhood, 
which in many cases also overlap with each other. 
  
The primary trend, which continues the course set by al-Bannā, aims for a gradual 
revival, focuses on da‘wa and long-term strategies, and employs both Western and 
Islamic concepts.  The more conservative, Qutbist trend, which has been known to 
focus more on offensive Jihad and separatism, has been recognised as one of the 
‘founding fathers’ of modern international terrorism.  Finally, the democratic-Islamist 
trend believes that the global revolution should be brought about using democracy and 
alliances with other forces -- on the way to promote Islamist interests.  
 
The ‘Arab Spring’ of recent years has witnessed rule by both the Qutbist trend (in 
Egypt) and the democratic-Islamist trend (in Tunisia).  For the present at least, they 
have both lost power, and Gulf countries are now persecuting them in much of the 
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Middle East.  However, since the repercussions of the ‘Arab Spring’ are still ongoing, 
it is difficult to say at this stage what the future will bring for the Muslim Brotherhood.    
 
This chapter is more complicated than the others, for two main reasons. First – as 
already explained – Muslim Brotherhood thinkers, unlike ‘classic’ ‘ulamā’, tend to 
delve less into pure theology, and show a greater inclination to connect religious 
terms to political and social realities; secondly, since some of the trends have specific 
foci, they hardly ever touch those issues which are not of their immediate concern. 
The main figures from each trend will be examined in this study with the addition of 
some interesting or anecdotal views of other figures.  
 
While reviewing the available source materials, it becomes clear that a key 
personality from outside the Arab world, Abu al-A‘la Mawdūdī, has to be included, 
since he is known to have been the first to put together a detailed plan to execute the 
comprehensive ‘Islamic order’ [niẓām shāmil] that Afghānī initially introduced.  True, 
Mawdūdī is the founder of the sub-continental Jamaat-e-Islami (JI); and while the JI 
has gained a rather limited success, including in the political field in which it acts as a 
party, Mawdūdī’s thinking gained much more influence within the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  His books were translated into Arabic by members of the Brotherhood, 
and he served as an inspiration to several Brotherhood thinkers examined here.  Brief 
introductions of the main thinkers which form the focus of this study are provided 
below -- according to their trends. 
 
It is worth noting that in his programme to introduce Islamic Law in Pakistan, 
Mawdūdī  recommended the translation of al-Shāṭibī’s Al-Muwāfaqāt -- amongst 
other books on the philosophy of Shari‘a -- into national languages, “so that our legal 
experts may acquire a deep insight into and gain a correct understanding of the spirit 
of Islamic Fiqh”.1 
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Biographies of the relevant thinkers 
Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906-1949) was born to a Ḥanbalī imām in Maḥmūdiyya, a rural 
town located northwest of Cairo in Al-Buḥayra Governorate in the Nile delta, and 
graduated from the Dār al-‘Ulūm educational institution for teachers.  Dār al-‘Ulūm 
had been established in 1871 as an alternative to al-Azhar, providing both Islamic and 
modern education using Western methods and thinking.  Al-Bannā founded the 
Society of the Muslim Brothers at Isma‘iliyya as a young school teacher in 1928, and 
in 1933 moved its central activities to Cairo, where it started to gain more influence.  
 
Al-Bannā aspired to use the educational process as a means to achieve the niẓām 
shāmil, which he sought to establish as a vehicle for national unity.  He took 
Afghānī’s perception much further, and understood the Brotherhood’s call to return to 
Islam as a call for a ‘greater revolution’ that was more significant than the French or 
Russian revolutions.  This is because Islam combined radical political change with 
sweeping reforms of the nation’s material, intellectual and spiritual life.1  
 
Deeply affected by the Western educational philosophy of his day, al-Bannā created 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s institutions on the basis of a holistic approach.  His deep 
appreciation of the great holistic educators is well expressed in his memoirs -- as 
recounted in the opening of the Society’s first school in the early days in Isma‘iliyya:  
‘the picture of Pestalozzi teaching… Froebel… Herbert and Montessori in the 
education industry are still viewed as new and fresh, but all in a novel framework that 
coincides with the current Islamic tendencies and hopes that are… fed by the 
da‘wa….”.2  Al-Bannā was also deeply affected by Sufi thinking, having been a 
member of the Ḥasafiyya tarīqa as a teenager. 
 
Al-Bannā was assassinated in Cairo in February 1949: the identity or affiliation of the 
two men who shot him has remained a mystery.  It should be stated that until today, 
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al-Bannā remains the most important theorist of the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
represents the ‘mainstream’ of the movement.  
 
Shaykh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī was born in Egypt in 1926, and has been an active 
member in the ranks of the Brotherhood from an early age.  He spent time in prison as 
part of Gamal ‘Abd Al-Nasser’s ‘ordeal’ [miḥna] as a student at al-Azhar.  He now 
lives in Qatar, where he moved in 1961.  Qaraḍāwī succeeded in achieving 
widespread popularity with the rise of Muslim orientated media, and was exposed to 
the wider public mainly via his weekly show on the al-Jazeera TV channel,  
The Shari‘a and Life [al-Sharī‘a wa’l-Ḥayāt], as well as the IslamOnline.net website 
(established in 1997) -- initiated by the Qatari ruling family. Qaraḍāwī served as the 
spiritual mentor for IslamOnline.  In addition, Qaraḍāwī runs a personal website, 
which was established one year later.  During the past few years, he has been serving 
as mentor of OnIslam.net, which is gradually restoring and further developing the 
extensive database of rulings of IslamOnline.  
 
A keen follower of al-Bannā, Qaraḍāwī combines his religious work with political 
activism.  Qaraḍāwī sees in al-Bannā the main personality who brought together 
activist proponents of Islam in the recent era, at a time of plentiful controversies and 
religious divisions, and  when Westernisation was spreading, and socialism and 
communism were being promoted.
1
  Qaraḍāwī maintains that in order for the Shari‘a 
system to be restored, the Islamic spirit has to exist; the right people should be put in 
place; there should be faith in leadership, the ‘Islamic personality’ [nafsiyya] and 
thinking [‘aqliyya] have to be developed; and Muslims should be free from the stress 
of modern times and subordination to the West.
2
  
 
Qaraḍāwī developed a special interest in Muslim minorities, and was central in 
developing a new field of jurisprudence - ‘The Minorities Jurisprudence’ [fiqh al-
‘aqalliyyāt]; all these, and the long-time support by the Qatari ruling family, have 
allowed Qaraḍāwī to develop his work on a global scale.  Having twice refused to 
become the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s General Guide, Qaraḍāwī has in many 
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respects started to develop an alternative, international network to the formal 
movement, based on the same core beliefs.  
 
In 2003 he launched the International Association of Muslim Scholars (later known as 
The International Association / Union for Muslim Scholars, IAMS / IUMS), made up 
of hundreds of ‘ulamā’ and activists from around the world, who are mainly affiliated 
with the Muslim Brotherhood.  The IUMS completed Qaraḍāwī’s earlier démarche in 
1997, when he established the European Council for Fatwā and Research (ECFR) 
which deals with the daily lives of Muslim minorities, in accordance with the 
aforementioned fiqh al-‘aqaliyyāt. 
 
Qaraḍāwī’s ‘Qatari Islamists’ appear to have been so successful that the Kuwaiti 
thinker ‘Abd Allah al-Nafīsī wrote an article in February 2007, in which he said that 
they should have the lead; and that the mother organisation itself, which has become a 
‘burden’, should be disbanded altogether.1  In the past few years, Qaraḍāwī has gone 
even further, focusing his efforts on disseminating on a global scale his ‘Middle 
Nation’ [al-umma al-wasaṭ] thinking, which was first made public in 1996 in an 
attempt to form the Wasat political party in Egypt.
2
 
 
Thus, the central objective of the contemporary followers of the Brotherhood doctrine, 
(including those called ‘Wasat Islamists’) continues to be the establishment of a 
Muslim state governed by Shari‘a, rather than the sovereignty of man-made law3 
Unlike those Islamists, says Sullivan, who decry democracy as a Western construct 
which is alien to their political philosophy, the Brotherhood embraces the concept, not 
as Western, but as a set of ideals that is compatible with Islamic constructs.
4
 
 
Sayyid Quṭb (1906-1966) was raised in the Upper Egyptian village of Musha, located 
in Asyut Province.  Later he moved to Cairo and started his career as a literary critic 
and teacher.  In 1939, Quṭb started to work at the Ministry of Education.  Later, from 
                                                 
1
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tanẓīm al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn wa-yushīdu bi-najāḥ al-Islamiyyīn al-Qatariyyīn fi dhalika’ Majallat al-
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Awsat (London), 25/2/2007  
2
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3
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1948 to 1950, he lived in the United States, where he had gone to study the American 
educational system.  There he gradually developed a sense of contempt for the US, 
and the Western world as a whole.  He left a major heritage in the two fields of social 
justice and anti-Western, Jihadi values.  A main authority for him was Mawdūdī. Quṭb 
became acquainted with Mawdūdī through his follower Nadvi (whose views were 
discussed in the previous chapter), who himself served as an inspiration to Quṭb and 
also translated several of Mawdūdī’s books into Arabic.  
 
Quṭb claimed that where an Islamic state is established, Shari‘a is the authority for all 
legislation, Allah’s limits are observed, and all Muslims administer the affairs of state 
with mutual consultation. This can be considered part of the Realm of Islam [dār al-
Islām]. The rest of the world is the Realm of War [dār al-ḥarb].1 His perception of the 
current world as being in a situation of permanent jāhiliyya will be probed later in this 
chapter. 
 
In 1966, Quṭb was convicted of plotting the assassination of President ‘Abd al-Nasser 
and was executed by hanging.  From the late 1960s until the 1980s, Quṭb’s ideas 
inspired a whole strain of organisations which sought to wage the Jihad as he saw it.     
A member of one of these organisations assassinated President Sadat in 1981. Sayyid 
Quṭb and his brother Muḥammad (publisher of his brother’s works and himself an 
important thinker) also served as an inspiration to those who founded al-Qa’ida – 
Usāma bin Lādin, Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī, and their main ideologue ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzām.   
The last three individuals are irrelevant to this chapter, since they have had no direct 
dealings with the individuals under study. 
 
Quṭb’s contribution to social justice led to conceptions such as the Brotherhood’s 
economic programme, which makes both the individual and the state active and 
responsible participants in the pursuit of social justice.  The economic programme 
makes it the responsibility of all able individuals to donate funds to charity [zakāt], 
which means that Muslims are responsible for one another.
2
  On the other hand, 
Olivier Roy stresses that Quṭb was unwilling to compromise on any issue.  In practice, 
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he refused to compromise with the Ministry of Education and with President Nasser, 
and finally resigned.
1
  
 
The democratic-Islamist trend within the Muslim Brotherhood has contributed 
relatively less to this chapter, but it is still important to refer to it.  The two main 
figures who developed this trend are Ḥasan al-Turābī from Sudan, and, more 
importantly, Rāchid al-Ghannouchī, leader of the Tunisian Al-Nahḍa Party.  Al-
Turābī interprets democracy as a government whose leaders are advised by a shūra of 
‘ulamā.2  In general, he refers to the whole issue of modernity as the test [ibtilā’] of 
our time, which requires that all professions and forms of knowledge reference each 
other in order to face in unison the challenges of modernity.
3
 Al-Turābī is hardly 
concerned with the nature of innovations which challenging modernity requires. 
 
Ghannouchī goes somewhat further with the democratic idea, saying that secular 
democratic systems are based on concepts of justice and equality for all; therefore, if 
not an ideal Islamic system, they are second best and much preferable to dictatorships.   
It is a religious duty on Muslims, he says, to participate politically in any government 
that establishes good and prevents evil from dominating society.  Ghannouchī argues 
that it is a Shari‘a principle that when Shari‘a cannot be implemented, the nearest 
possible system is to be preferred.
 4
 
 
For many years, Ghannouchī, who lived for almost three decades in France and 
Britain, also gained much credit from Western liberal circles.  On several occasions, 
Western liberals even referred to him as the ‘Mahatma Gandhi’ of Islam.  On the 
other hand, according to Tamīmī, Ghannouchī has been condemned by both Jihadists 
and members of Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr as being a mubtadi‘ (innovator) and i’tidhārī 
(apologist).
5
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II. The sources of authority 
 
Unlike the Wahhābī ‘ulamā’ and others under discussion in this work, Muslim 
Brotherhood intellectuals tend to delve less thoroughly into the actual meanings of the 
basic terms explored in this study.  Nevertheless, the terminological discussion is 
rather coherent, the acceptance of each term being dependent on other relevant terms.   
For example, as part of the vows to Allah, Muṣtafā Mashhūr (1921-2002), the fifth 
General Guide of the Egyptian Brotherhood, lists among the obligations incumbent on 
all believers, a complete understanding of Allah, His Book and the Prophetic Sunna; 
and to this he adds that Islam should remain without any changes on the basis of unity 
[tawḥīd] with no sins, and without any bida‘ and khurāfāt.1 
(a) Qur’an and Sunna 
The curricular bases of al-Bannā’s instruction in sincere faith, aimed to attract a new 
generation of Muslim devotees, were the Qur’an and the Sunna.  A student was 
expected not simply to memorise the Qur’an, but was taught to internalise its lessons 
and principles.  Quṭb went even further – he sought to derive from the Qur’an and the 
Sunna a whole programme of action, and not simply moral guidance.  At the same 
time, Quṭb believed that this programme would only be effective if Muslims 
internalised the norms and rulings to be found within their pages.  Therefore, he was 
seeking to clarify the powerful moral obligations of the Qur’an and to convince 
people that the force expressed in its words was sufficient to overcome the malign 
logic of the materialistic world.  This would provide mankind with the means of 
moral self-reinvention.
2
 
(b) tawḥīd 
 
Unlike the Wahhābī ‘ulamā’, for whom, of course, tawḥīd is the most fundamental 
issue, not all Muslim Brotherhood figures even touched the subject.  However, those 
who did usually stressed its centrality in Islam, much as in the Wahhābī conception.  
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According to Tamīmī, Ghannouchī maintains that the division of lands that was 
imposed on the Arabs and Muslims is an obstacle to an Arab renaissance; 
furthermore, the current territorial state in its present form is antagonistic to the basic 
tenet of Islam, tawḥīd – which, to Ghannouchī, is the main basis for all intellectual, 
political, social and cultural progress.  Speaking about the historical revolutions and 
political status in the Arab world, Ghannouchī, according to Tamīmī, maintains that 
they always occurred against the ruling elite and had hardly any impact on society 
itself.  This situation remained until the civilizational cycle was completed.  This 
cycle started with the mission of tawḥīd that emerged out of Arabia more than 
fourteen centuries ago and ended when division and backwardness overwhelmed the 
umma under the leadership of the Ottoman dynasty in Istanbul less than a century 
ago.
1
 
 
Mawdūdī states that the most important teachings of the Prophet are faith in him and 
in the unity of Allah, as expressed in the primary kalima and ‘bedrock of Islam’, 
‘There is no deity but Allah’, which, according to Mawdūdī, differentiates between 
the true Muslim and the non-believer [kāfir] or the mushrik.  Those who believe in 
tawḥīd, Mawdūdī continues, become one single community, while those who do not – 
form the opposite group.  For the believers there is unhampered progress and 
resounding success in this world and in the hereafter, while failure and ignominy are 
the ultimate lot of those who refuse to believe in it.
2
  Tawḥīd is the highest conception 
of godhead, the knowledge of which God has sent to mankind in all ages through His 
prophets…3 
 
Qaraḍāwī maintains that the concept of tawḥīd is relevant in divinity and ruling, and 
is based on three verses in Surat al-An‘ām: not taking another God but Allah (6:164), 
not taking a walī4 but Allah (6: 114), and not looking at other than Allah as a protector 
and Creator of the heavens and the earth (6: 14).
5
  Qaraḍāwī sees in tawḥīd the heart 
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of Islam, and the spirit of its presence, ‘the essence of belief in Allah’.1  Tawḥīd 
contributes to the liberation of people; it helps build a balanced personality; it is a 
source for security of the soul and provides it with power; it is a source for 
brotherhood and equality, and frees people from servitude [‘ubūdiyya] to other people.   
Moreover, Qaraḍāwī sees tawḥīd as a message of the Islamic umma to the nations.   
Tawḥīd will be achieved by three things: sincerity in servitude (worshipping); 
disbelief in idols; and the avoidance of shirk.
2
 
(c) tajdīd 
One of the most important issues, which has prompted many to define the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a reformist or revivalist movement, is their longing for renewal 
[tajdīd] in religion.  This aspect is of particular interest to this study, as it should 
redefine the borders of innovations considered bid‘a.  The term tajdīd has already 
been discussed in a previous chapter.  However, the Muslim Brotherhood in particular 
have taken it a step further, and it could well be said that the movement has made 
tajdīd its raison d’être. 
 
Lapidus’s explanation of the uniqueness of this perception indicates that tajdīd 
assisted in transforming the Muslim Brotherhood into the global network it has 
become – as already illustrated.  Tajdīd, Lapidus says, is appropriate for network 
formation, integration of diverse populations, and political mobilisation; it provides a 
more universalistic and international form of Islam which could appeal to Qur’an and 
Sunna, as opposed to local, particularistic forms of veneration of saints and details of 
religious law.  In fragmented societies, tajdīd provided the basis of commitment to a 
common cause, and helped transcend fragmentation in favour of religious and 
ideological unity.
3
 
 
Most notable among the ‘ulamā’ who discuss the issue are Mawdūdī and Qaraḍāwī -- 
the latter on several occasions relying on the former.  However, both Quṭb and 
Ghannouchī mention it as well.  Quṭb refers several times to the urge for the revival 
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[tajaddud] of the necessities of life in our days;
1
 in his pamphlet dedicated to Quṭb, 
‘Abd Allah ‘Azzām also speaks of him as a reformer [mujaddid].2  Ghannouchī 
declares it is a necessity to have a tajdīd movement in order to restore Islamic 
societies.
3
 
 
Mawdūdī notes that many people do not distinguish between innovation and revival, 
and do not understand that not everyone who renews in religion is necessarily a 
revivalist.  He therefore delineates the various aspects of tajdīd: 
 
 The diagnosis of current ailments, so as to examine thoroughly the relevant 
circumstances and ascertain exactly where and to what extent ‘ignorance’ 
[jāhiliyya] has crept in;  
 A scheme for reformation, in order to determine exactly where to strike the 
blow so as to break the power of un-Islam;  
 An estimation of one’s limitations and resources in order to determine the 
course of action for bringing about reforms;  
 An intellectual revolution;  
 Practical reforms, including the eradication of evil customs, the cleansing of 
morals, the regeneration of the spirit of practising Shari‘a, and the preparation 
of men capable of assuming Islamic leadership;  
 ijtihād;  
 A defence of Islam by challenging political forces which seek to suppress and 
end Islam;  
 A revival of the Islamic system, by removing the authority of un-Islam and 
creating a government built on an Islamic system;  
 A universal revolution.4 
 
Mawdūdī also defines the stature of a mujaddid: although he is not a prophet, his 
spirit closely approximates prophethood.  He is characterised by:  
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 A clear mind;  
 A penetrating vision;   
 Unbiased straight-thinking;   
 A special ability to see the Right Path without extremes and to maintain 
balance;   
 The power to think independently of the contemporary and centuries-old 
social biases and other prejudices;   
 The courage to fight against the evils of the time;   
 An inherent ability to lead and guide;   
 An unusual competency to undertake ijtihād and the work of reconstruction.1  
 
In other words, as also explained by Voll, the mujaddid performs the role of a human 
agent in relation to the permanent message that was performed by the prophets in the 
age of ‘new revelation’.2 
 
Qaraḍāwī first explains why there should be no qualms about tajdīd in religion.   
While, he observes, some ‘ulamā’ condemn the use of tajdīd in religion out of fear 
that it will be used for deviations, tajdīd, unlike bid‘a for example, actually falls under 
the category of knowledge [‘ilm];3 this is because bid‘a refers only to such matters in 
which religious behaviour must be guided by tradition [ittiba‘], but other matters 
related to the mundane require invention and renewal.
4
  Furthermore, tajdīd does not 
mean change in religion, and renewal in religion is not a new phenomenon – rather, it 
constitutes a return to a pattern which existed in the time of the Prophet and the 
ṣaḥāba.  
  
It is true, Qaraḍāwī says, that tajdīd does not appear in the Qur’an itself; however, 
those with knowledge understand that the secret does not lie in the text and structure 
but in intentions and meanings; the Qur’an and the Sunna use the ‘words and structure 
of the [Arabic] language’, and therefore some words can have more than one meaning.   
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Others can be understood literally, figuratively or metaphorically.
1
  Tajdīd will 
establish the humanities and social studies within the correct Islamic framework, 
which derives from an overall Islamic philosophy.
2
 
 
Tajdīd in religion, Qaraḍāwī continues, can be proposed by a society, school or 
movement: it could be introduced in the theological, cultural or Jihadi fields, as long 
as its members act with truth and patience.  All the umma should take part in this 
process, and every Muslim should ask himself about his proper place in the movement 
of tajdīd.  As for the identity of the individual who can perform tajdīd in religion, 
Qaraḍāwī follows more or less the same course suggested by others --  saying that it 
was mostly understood that the individual has to have a high educational status -- 
either an ‘ālim or another leader from different fields (including those who fight 
against bid‘a).  Tajdīd in the Sunna is also definitely permitted, according to the 
Hadith which relates from the Prophet that:   
 
Allah will raise for this community at the end of every hundred years one who will 
renew its religion for it.
3
 
 
Qaraḍāwī refers to Mawdūdī, who, he says, explained that throughout history there 
were both full and partial reformers [al-mujaddid al-kāmil / mujaddidun juz’ī]; the 
latter only made changes in specific aspects.
4
  Qaraḍāwī upholds the view that al-
Bannā’s spirit of tajdīd was based on a balanced approach.  At the same time, al-
Bannā fought against shirkiyya and bida‘.5  As previously discussed, during the al-
Bannā era especially the leadership of the Brotherhood was much more representative 
of the young effendi mindset than of traditional ‘ulamā’.  It seems that al-Bannā tried 
to justify this tendency by saying that everyone should believe that the reformers do 
what they do for the sake of religion, and do not benefit from their reforms personally.     
They should therefore be respected and followed.
6
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Loyal to this path, Qaraḍāwī speaks about wasaṭiyya mujaddida and tajdīd wasaṭī. 
Those, he explains, who wish to change the Shari‘a or do not follow the Prophet and 
Qur’an are not among the mujaddidūn, but are, rather, revolutionaries and followers 
of the West.  On the other hand, as already mentioned, there are those ‘ulamā who 
oppose any renewal in religion, and think that the word tajdīd itself has in it a nucleus 
which might change religion from within; therefore the real tajdīd has to rely on 
tradition, must be derived from history, and must be connected to the past.  The real 
tajdīd rejects what Westernized people are trying to do in transforming religion and 
the identity of the umma; but, on the other hand, it also rejects those who wish 
religion to remain frozen and perform takfīr on others.  Tajdīd, Qaraḍāwī concludes, 
completes the wasaṭiyya: thus the wasaṭiyya is mujaddida and tajdīd is wasaṭī.1 
 
It seems that, for Muslim Brotherhood thinkers, various significant terms which have 
been examined in other chapters are bound to this necessity for renewal.  Qaraḍāwī, 
for example, maintains that fiqh is the key for tajdīd, an issue which was also in the 
background of his initiation of the concept of fiqh al-aqalliyyāt.2  Quṭb links the 
implementation of fiqh to the daily social order, adding that it needs to be developed 
according to the realities of our time.
3
  
 
Regarding this point, Tripp notes that Quṭb uses the term for political purposes.   
According to Tripp, since Quṭb concentrates on ‘dynamic’ fiqh and the privileged 
understanding of the ‘activist’, this can be and has been read as a revolutionary 
manifesto -- encouraging like-minded Muslims to overthrow the systems of power 
that prevent the establishment of a truly Islamic order.  However, Tripp adds, Quṭb 
makes it clear that the precondition for this is reconstruction of the Muslim self, if all 
other forms of imagination and reasoning are to be avoided from the outset.
4
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(d) ijtihād and ijmā‘ 
 
Carrie Wickham refers to the ‘quiet revolution of ideas’ in recent decades, 
characterised primarily by the call for ijtihād by certain circles of Islamist intellectuals, 
who use human reasoning to adapt enduring Islamic principles to modem times.  
While continuing to seek divine guidance in the Qur’an and the Sunna, these Islamists, 
she claims, have formulated new interpretations of Islam’s revealed texts that enable 
ideas of pluralism, representation, and human rights.  This trend, she observes, 
referred to by Western scholarship as ‘liberal’ or ‘modern’ Islam, is, as already 
mentioned, termed the new ‘Islamic centrism’ [al-wasaṭiyya al-Islāmiyya] in Arabic.1  
 
According to Tamīmī, Ghannouchī constantly seeks spaces [faraghāt] for ijtihād.   
Ghannouchī’s ijtihād, he explains, also derives from the explanation that there are 
answers to some questions in the original sources, but only guidelines for others.  In 
some cases there are misconceptions which need to be corrected.  Furthermore, not 
everything the Prophet did is to be considered on a religious [dīnī] basis.  Tamīmī 
notes that Ghannouchī explains how the khulafā’ al-rāshidūn acted with ijtihād.2  
 
As far as Quṭb is concerned, the revelation of Islam arose against the status quo of the 
jāhiliyya (to be investigated later) in all its unjust political, metaphysical and religious 
manifestations.  According to Shepard, he allows the use of ijtihād only in places 
which are unconnected with the revelation – for example, those which focus on social 
justice.
3
  
 
Qaraḍāwī states that ‘had He so desired, Allah could have given all religion the same 
formulation, unquestionable and needing no ijtihād, so that those who disobey would 
immediately make themselves unbelievers’.  However, Allah did not do so,  
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in order that the nature of religion would be consistent with the nature of language 
and of humanity in order to make things easier for those who believe.
1
 
 
Qaraḍāwī views the freezing and locking of the gates of ijtihād as a main barrier to 
implementing Shari‘a.  He aspires to reopen ijtihād – which has to be inclusive – and 
at the same time return to the Salaf and reject the madhāhib.  Ijtihād, Qaraḍāwī 
maintains, is one of the sources which revive Islam to match current circumstances.  It 
started in the era of the Prophet and continued with his companions.  Thus ijtihād 
does not hurt tradition, yet has to look first into the fiqhī tradition of all madhāhib in 
all times and pore over those which are most valuable – in order to achieve the goals 
of Shari‘a for the benefit of society in our era.2 
 
According to Qaraḍāwī, what is needed in our generation is ‘collective ijtihād 
[jamā‘ī]’ that will be universal in scope.  It needs to be made after study and proper 
discussion, and by those with the appropriate capacity, far from government pressure 
and influence or leverage from the masses, so that political considerations are 
excluded from the process.  Furthermore, after looking at the Mujaddidūn in the new 
era, especially Afghānī, Qaraḍāwī elevates ijtihād to the level of a religious duty, 
stating that in some cases it should be considered farḍ kifāya and in others farḍ ‘ayn.3   
There is a necessity, however, to make tajdīd in ijtihād.  Tajdīd must be 
comprehensive and profound, both culturally and intellectually.
4
 
III. Terms affiliated with bid‘a 
ḍalāla 
 
In his Risālat al-ta‘līm, al-Bannā affirms that every baseless bid‘a in religion, whether 
it means adding or removing anything, is regarded as ḍalāla.  According to al-Bannā, 
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there is a need to fight and eradicate it, using the best methods, in order to prevent it 
from introducing evil further than the bid‘a itself.1   
 
Quṭb, as in other cases, recruits history and politics to aid his explanations.  He refers 
to the long battle in Algeria which finally ended when the Islamic Movement adopted 
the decision to place the fools and muḍallilūn alongside the French and Crusaders, 
who, he says, know they are crusaders.  The enemies of Islam, he continues, work 
against it in various fields, including efforts to make believers go astray [taḍlīl].2  
 
Mawdūdī submits three main reasons for ḍalāla, which, he maintains, is the real shirk:  
 
• Love of one’s own desires (Qur’an 28:50): a self-worshipping individual who 
becomes a slave to his own desires can never become a true slave of Allah;  
• Social conformity or following blindly the customs and practices, beliefs and 
notions, rites and ceremonies of society and regarding them as superior to Allah’s 
guidance;  
• Obeying other human beings in preference to Allah, when we believe that a 
specific individual is a great thinker whose words must be true.
3
   
 
Mawdūdī also complains about the ḍalāla which took place during the pre-Islamic 
Hajj, with many idols installed in the ka‘ba (until they were destroyed); at the time, 
the Hajj took the form of an annual carnival.  According to Mawdūdī, even those who 
were sincere towards religion were led into strange, excessive ways by their 
ignorance.  Some people set out for Hajj without any provisions for the journey and 
lived by begging for food.  They considered this an act of piety, claiming that they 
had full trust in Allah and, while proceeding towards the House of Allah, had no need 
of worldly goods.  
 
Conducting business or working during the Hajj journey were generally considered 
unlawful.  Many people gave up food and water during the Hajj, and regarded this 
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abstention as worship.  Another act was keeping silent throughout the Hajj.  Mawdūdī 
rejects all these practices and says they no longer exist.
1
  
shirk 
 
Quṭb uses the term shirk to attack non-Muslims, as part of his perception of jāhilī 
societies.  All Jewish and Christian societies, he says, are also jāhilī.  In their case, 
this is because they committed shirk; they have distorted the original beliefs and 
ascribe certain attributes of Allah to other beings.  This association of other creatures 
with Allah has taken many forms.  Jews, for example, are repeating an old and false 
Christian claim, which attributes to ‘Uzair the sonship of God, and the Christians 
because of notions of the Holy Trinity.
2
  
 
These people, says Quṭb, did not consider their priests or rabbis as divine, nor did they 
worship them; but they gave them the authority to make laws – thus obeying laws 
which were made by man and not permitted by God.  If at that time the Qur’an called 
them ‘associaters of others with Allah’ and ‘rejectors of truth’, then today they are 
still the same, because now this authority is not in the hands of priests and rabbis but 
in the hands of individuals chosen from amongst themselves.  Quṭb states that any 
alliance with either Jews or Christians will never be successful.
3
  
 
Al-Turābī does not discuss the issue deeply, but he states that religion is a divine 
belief, free from shirk,
4
 which shows the importance he attributes to countering it.  
 
Mawdūdī analyses what he sees as the four metaphysical doctrines relevant to 
mankind: atheism, shirk, asceticism and Islam. Shirk, he says, is not supported by 
scientific proof, but is simply the creation of man’s own imagination. Next to atheism, 
‘ignorance’ based on shirk has been dominating men’s minds from the earliest times.  
Throughout the ages, shirk has been reinforcing atheism. 
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Mawdūdī says that purging Islam of evils and presenting it once again in its original 
pure form, was the heavy task for which the mujaddidīn were needed -- yet it would 
be wrong to assume that Islam at any time was completely overpowered by this 
onslaught of ‘ignorance’. As for having faith in the Prophet for guidance to the way of 
truth, Mawdūdī states that even if some mushrikīn may dislike it,1 the message is 
clear:  
 
We must fight until the sovereignty of all beings other than Allah is brought to an 
end, until only the law of God rules in the world, until the sovereignty of God alone 
is acknowledged, until we serve only Him.
2
  
 
Mawdūdī also refers to what he calls the  ‘duality of dīn’-- being faithful to the 
teaching of two religions at one time, which, he continues, is shirk and sheer 
falsehood.
3
  
 
Qaraḍāwī differentiates between the big and small shirks -- the big shirk being devoid 
of remorse, and the small being one of the gravest sins.  Examples of the small shirk 
are vows made in a name other than that of Allah, wearing amulets and silk, love 
charms, witchcraft, using astrology for witchcraft, fortune telling, and making a 
sacrifice that is not for Allah.
4
 
jāhiliyya 
 
The concept which connects society and a state of jāhiliyya has been raised in the 
previous chapter, in connection with Nadvi.  According to Shepard, Nadvi sees the 
jāhiliyya of ancient Greece and Rome resurrected in modern Europe, asserting that the 
Muslims in many places have become its allies and camp followers; yet they resisted 
being turned completely into a jāhilī community.  Mawdūdī defines jāhiliyya as:  
 
every such conduct which goes against Islamic culture, morality and the Islamic 
way of thinking and behaving. 
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Mawdūdī sees the Muslim world since the time of the khulafā’ al-rāshidūn as a 
mixture of jāhiliyya and Islam.1  This term seems to have affected many of the 
scholars examined in this study, each in his own direction, with Quṭb being probably 
the most far-reaching in his perception.  
 
For al-Turābī, for example, any system or sub-system must be grounded in the overall 
objective of tawḥīd.  Moussalli notes that he conceives of any methodological cut-off 
between the shūra and tawḥīd as an abruption to the divinely ordained formula: the 
severance of unity from freedom makes it tyranny, while the disengagement of 
freedom from unity turns it into licentiousness.  But liberation, or the balance of both, 
Moussalli adds, delivers the umma from jāhiliyya, ritualistic shirk and human tyranny 
[ṭāghūt].  It acts as a continuous process of both the sincere search for tawḥīd and 
constant transcendence of any ungodly authority.
2
  
 
Shepard also notes that in his latest writings, published from 1962 onwards, Quṭb 
shifted his focus from the moral to the theological, and started on his course of 
extreme dichotomising -- which excludes any mixture of Islam and jāhiliyya.3  Quṭb 
points out three forces that operate against faith: unbelief [kufr], apostasy [ridda] and 
paganism [jāhiliyya].4  Quṭb actually transformed jāhiliyya from a particular historical 
period into a ‘condition’ which both Western and Islamic societies have entered.   
Unlike the state of ignorance of ancient jāhiliyya, the modern one constitutes a 
conscious usurpation of Allah’s authority and tawḥīd; it is therefore necessary to 
separate from this world both spiritually and physically, and work towards the great 
Islamic revolution to replace governments with new Islamic theocracies – first in the 
Middle East, and then elsewhere.
5
 
 
Quṭb’s main weapon in fighting this jāhiliyya is the opening of a new ijtihād in fiqh, 
based on his belief that anyone who says that yesterday’s law cannot be implemented 
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today, claims to know man’s needs better than Allah.  For him, the same seems to 
apply to the concept of ijmā‘, which Quṭb maintains should also not be limited to the 
‘ulamā, but should be conducted by all people, who have equal rights in terms of 
formulating new concepts or political behaviour.
1
 
 
IV. Bid‘a – definition & types 
 
Speaking of ‘aqīdāt, al-Bannā maintains that the misunderstanding of Allah and his 
Prophet is the source of every bid‘a and ḍalāla that were established in Islam; it is the 
origin of all sins, whether badly intended or not.  Many historical trends like the 
qadariyya, murji‘a, khawārij, mu‘tazila, jahmiyya and rāfiḍa are branded by him as 
ahl al-bid‘a, with the explanation that they and others who do not understand Allah or 
his Prophet have left too many issues in the hands of uninformed people.
2
   
 
Al-Bannā wishes to differentiate these trends from the Brotherhood, whose thinkers, 
according to his own belief, do have enough knowledge and recognition of Allah and 
his Prophet -- which makes them qualified to perform ijtihād.  Al-Bannā further sees 
that, in the performance of different types of bid‘a, such as the bid‘a iḍāfiyya -- which 
here means adding to Shari‘a, the bid‘a of neglecting the Shari‘a [tarkiyya] and 
engaging in repudiated acts of worship [‘ibādāt muṭlaqa] -- there is a jurisprudential 
conflict. Everyone, he states, has his own view on them, and it is useless trying to test 
the truth by supplying evidence [either way].
3
   
 
According to Qaraḍāwī, bid‘a does not belong to religion as it was given by Allah, 
but rather to daily and earthly living [ḥayāt al-dunya]; bid‘a has corrupted all 
religions, and also brought about a reality in which Muslims were corrupted.
4
  Bid‘a is 
the real source of shirk which has crept into religion as a result, and idolatry and 
ghulūw also penetrated religion because of bid‘a. Qaraḍāwī quotes this Qur’anic 
verse:  
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Thus their partners have made it seem pleasing to many of the polytheists the killing 
of their children, in order to destroy them and to cover them with confusion in their 
religion.  And if Allah had willed, they would not have done so.  So leave them and 
that which they invent. [Qur’an 6:137] 
 
Qaraḍāwī says that the one who preaches for bid‘a comes under the definition of 
ḥarām,1 and preaching bid‘a is fasād (corruption).2  Both al-Turābī3 and 
Qaraḍāwī4 agree that Jews and Christians inserted inventions into their religions. 
Qaraḍāwī adds that invention in religion leads down a satanic path.5  Perhaps 
because of this, he also maintains that those Muslims who performed bid‘a at 
various times were always led back to their Sunna,
6
 again relying on the Hadith 
about a mujaddid sent by Allah towards the end of every century, leading it to a 
different direction, away from bid‘a. 
 
Qaraḍāwī goes on to explain bid‘a in shar‘ī terms.  He divides it into bid‘a i‘tiqādiyya 
(in belief or creed – also called bid‘at al-aqwāl) and bid‘a ‘amaliyya (in deeds – also 
called bid‘at al-af‘āl).  Bid‘a, he adds, is one of those prohibited elements which is 
different from the usual sins and wrongdoings; the most dangerous point here is that 
whoever performs it believes that he is actually coming closer to Allah.  According to 
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Qaraḍāwī continues, these two types are dependent on each 
other.  Yet, bid‘a is not always the same in terms of its severity; there are bid‘a 
mukhafafa (softened) and bid‘a mughalaṭa (erring).  
 
Bid‘a mukhafafa originates in a mistaken ijtihād or an ambiguity in reasoning.  Such a 
bid‘a corresponds with trivial factors which are categorised as sinful.  Within this 
category, there is the bid‘a that is agreed upon [mutafaq‘alayha], and a controversial 
bid‘a [mukhtalaf fīha]. Bid‘a mughalata is, of course, much more severe and has even 
brought some to the verge of kufr or the abandonment of religion, as in the case of the 
Nusayris, Druze, ‘radical Shi‘a’ and the Isma‘iliyya. Bid‘a i‘tiqādiyya is relevant here 
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as well: there are forms of thinking which do not consign their holders to kufr, yet do 
lead them to stray [fasq], like the khawārij, rāfiḍa, qadariyya, mu‘tazila and others.1   
 
In a different place, Qaraḍāwī also makes a connection between bid‘a and ridda 
(apostasy).  Qaraḍāwī suggests that ridda should be treated similarly to the separation 
that ‘ulamā’ have made between bid‘a mukhafafa and bid‘a mughalaṭa, and between 
those who preach to bid‘a and those who do not.  The example he provides for 
apostasy is the writer Salman Rushdie who, he states, preached to bid‘a in his words 
or writings.
2
 
 
In the opening of this chapter, a brief reference was made to Qaraḍāwī’s perception of 
wasaṭiyya.  Qaraḍāwī explains that even if it has a bit of innovation, wasaṭiyya cannot 
be placed between Sunna and bid‘a.3  The word wasat itself, he says, does not appear 
in the Sunna, but he draws it from intent [qaṣad], which according to him means 
maintaining balance.  
 
Wasaṭiyya is among the four basic elements Qaraḍāwī considers crucial for the umma, 
taking this from the Qur’an – the other three being monasticism [rahbaniyya] (that 
was traditionally not permitted in Islam), da‘wa (which is also the way that wasaṭiyya 
has to be promoted), and unity [waḥda]. Qaraḍāwī goes on to justify wasaṭiyya 
historically, referring to several aḥādīth which prove that the ṣaḥāba held on to it, 
including for example:  
 
 The qaṣad in Sunna is better than ijtihād in bid‘a.4 
 
Qaraḍāwī later turns to an examination of what Rashīd Riḍā (referred to as mujaddid) 
and Muḥammad ‘Abduh said about wasaṭiyya.  Qaraḍāwī refers to processes 
undergone in Europe throughout the 19
th
 century, whereby many lost their faith, and 
even more – they lost their belief in the Church itself, due to various problematic steps 
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it had taken in the name of religion.
1
  Wasaṭiyya points to balance between spirituality 
and substance, religion and mundane matters.  Qaraḍāwī cites examples of ghulūw 
from both Jews and Christians, from which Muslims need to learn; wasaṭiyya in 
Sunna refutes any aspects of ghulūw.  Qaraḍāwī also associates wasaṭiyya with tajdīd, 
saying it forms part of its ideology; the IUMS was established to spread its spirit, and 
part of the wasaṭiyya is an interest in Muslim minorities around the world. 
 
Shaykh Muḥammad al-Rāshid, a leading educator from the first generation of the 
Brotherhood in Iraq who can generally be seen as a follower of al-Bannā, adds two 
other categories to bid‘a.  During a discussion on the necessity of cultural da‘wa, al-
Rāshid says that if we outlaw the national connection, this will no longer justify the 
existence of different nations in the Nile Valley, as well as the sense of pride when 
people remember all the faults of others.  Bid‘a jāhiliyya, he says, is parallel to the 
bid‘a of boasting [tafakhkhur], and it gradually grows to become a repugnant bid‘a 
[bid‘a ghāliḍa] which has to be strongly repudiated.  If the Nile Valley consisted 
entirely of Arabs, it would have been said by historians to be a shu‘ūbī tendency that 
would have been seen negatively.  Arabs are the foundation stones, since the Prophet 
came from amongst them and the Qur’an was written in their language.2 
V. Bid‘a – what needs to be done to avoid it 
 
In general, it has to be said that Muslim Brotherhood thinkers do not examine the 
question of avoiding bid‘a thoroughly and theologically; instead, they prefer to warn 
against proximity to various sects within Islam that they do not accept.  This in spite 
of the fact that it actually contradicts the Brotherhood’s main objective of uniting the 
umma.  This issue is one of the inherent contradictions in the Brotherhood’s ideology 
and practice.  It could be, however, that, historically the fear of performing acts of 
bid‘a or identification with such sects was itself one of the reasons that led the 
Brotherhood to stay away from sectarian heresies.  At the same time, for many years 
this fear caused the Brotherhood to warn against actual involvement in politics and 
party affiliation [ḥizbiyya].  Fatḥī Yakan, founder of the Lebanese branch of the 
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Muslim Brotherhood, a follower of Mawdūdī and an important theorist of the 
Brotherhood, considers this to be a form of bid‘a.1  
 
Here we may turn again to al-Rāshid, who states that the Brotherhood should stay 
away from other sectarian Islamic trends and movements which belong to the ahl al-
bid‘a.  He says the Brotherhood has to focus on those whom they see as ahl al-sunna 
wa’l jamā‘a.  On this issue, al-Rāshid quotes Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī, the Egyptian 
Society’s second General Guide, who, faithful to his Preachers not Judges thesis, 
tried to object to the bid‘a of people who only accept as Muslims those who belong to 
the Brotherhood.  Al-Huḍaybī believed that those people should be notified of their 
bid‘a, and that the Brotherhood should explain to them the necessity of following the 
rightful path.  Such acts should be done before the Brotherhood refuses to receive 
them organizationally.
2
 
 
The weakness of sectarianism, al-Rāshid continues, is that the path it follows is based 
on bid‘a both in religious dogma and personal conduct, and the ‘ulamā’ who lead it 
do not raise their voice against it.  Nevertheless, he says, the Brotherhood does not 
advocate opening a front against the sectarian groups or neglecting all ties with them; 
they are Muslims, and socially it is an obligation to live with them.  Therefore, al-
Rāshid calls on Muslims to maintain connections with them and to leave politics aside.   
The main aspiration, according to him, should be to gradually correct their bid‘a and 
make them follow a good trend which adheres to the Sunna. 
 
A typically apologetic approach is taken by the Brotherhood to all those who claim 
that the Muslim Brothers themselves are practitioners of bid‘a.  To such a claim, al-
Rāshid answers by saying that the qadariyya is a form of bid‘a, unlike the 
Brotherhood.  The Brotherhood does not claim to be a feather blowing in the wind; 
rather, it takes the initiative for renewal.  Its people do not ask: ‘what do we have to 
do with the future?’3  rather, they go out and do it.  Referring to the issue of obedience 
to the leader and to the movement, one of the most important characteristics of the 
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Brotherhood, which may even engender accusations of shirk, al-Rāshid answers that 
obedience is not a bid‘a but an idea that matches a much earlier concept.1 
VI. Other types of bid‘a 
Visiting graves 
 
Such issues as visiting graves which have been widely discussed by others are barely 
referred to by the Brotherhood.  Al-Bannā says that visiting graves is allowed and it is 
a Sunna.  However, praying to those buried there, seeking help, vowing not in the 
name of Allah and other actions related to graves, are clearly bid‘a and there is a 
necessity to challenge such behaviour.
2
  
 
Qaraḍāwī refers to al-Bannā, adding that asking assistance from the dead is 
considered one of the most heinous sins, kab’āir, and kabā’ir have to be fought.  
Qaraḍāwī considers ‘ādāt like beseeching the dead and asking them to help women 
overcome infertility problems, or cure sick persons of whom doctors have despaired, 
and many similar requests, as one of the biggest bida‘ shirkiyya.3  He also considers 
any admiration of saints during their lives, or showering blessings on their graves 
after they die, to be kinds of ghulūw which open the gates to shirk.  
 
Qaraḍāwī points out that ‘ulamā’ have had disagreements regarding women visiting 
graves due to contradictory aḥādīth on the subject.  He himself believes that visiting 
graves is a duty for all.
4
  Interestingly, in spite of all his harsh words, he also refers 
back to the words of al-Bannā, who had been more lenient towards those performing 
‘ādāt like du‘a on graves.  According to Qaraḍāwī, for al-Bannā this sin is not 
included in the list of shirk akbar.  
 
Qaraḍāwī bases his justification of al-Bannā’s observation on three stipulations: that 
these people still say the shahāda; that they keep the obligations of prayer, fasting, 
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zakāt and Hajj and usually stay away from forbidden things; and that every possible 
effort is made to amend their ways.  Qaraḍāwī says these are not mushrikūn who 
should be fought against, nor should they be ousted from religion.
1
 
 
Qaraḍāwī’s approach, which differentiates between the ‘ādāt concerning the dead for 
their own sake, and what these customs might lead to, is recorded in response to a 
question addressed to his ECFR.  The question was connected to the dead rather than 
to graves, and refers to what is titled ‘obligatory prayers in absentia’ [al-ṣalāt ‘ala al-
ghāib]: if a person has died in another country, is it allowed to pray for him or should 
this be considered bid‘a since he has already had prayers recited in his own country?   
The ECFR, representing its universal approach and aspirations to unite the nation, 
rules out the possibility that this is a bid‘a, though it adds that historically such 
prayers were only said for those holding a high position in Islam.
2
 
 
Celebrating the Prophet’s Birthday 
 
The tendency to politicise ‘ibādāt is perhaps best reflected in the Brotherhood’s 
attitude to annual commemorations, among them the celebration of the Prophet’s 
birthday.  In one place, al-Bannā follows the traditional outlook on this celebration. 
He notes that some people say the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday is a bid‘a, 
because it was an innovation in religion and was celebrated neither in the days of the 
Prophet nor in the days of his followers.  Others, he continues, say that it is an 
obligatory event, meant to demonstrate love of the Prophet.  First of all, al-Bannā 
maintains, the justification of those celebrating the event should be taken into account.   
It is acceptable if this celebration emanates from one’s forefathers, and only such acts 
as the mixing of men and women are problematic.
3
  
 
Yet, in another place, his solution to this question is completely different.  After 20 
years of what he sees as a bloody Jihad over Palestine, al-Bannā wants to remember 
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the martyrs and the al-Aqsa Mosque which is under ‘colonialist occupation’, saying 
that:  
 
it is obligatory on all Muslims to turn the Prophet’s birthday into a day for 
Palestine, in it will they protest the unjust policy towards it [Palestine], pray for the 
martyrs in the mosques, have gatherings to assist them and collect monetary aid to 
ease their thousands of catastrophes.  This is part of the obligations of the Muslims 
towards Palestine in such a day, which its eternal memories are correlated with the 
history of the holy land and its glories.
1
 
 
Qaraḍāwī offers a slightly less political interpretation.  Concentrating on the issue 
itself, he does not treat it as bid‘a, but rather as a series of prohibited acts which take 
place during the celebration.  It is known, he says, that this celebration was not 
celebrated either by the ṣaḥāba or during the hijra or the battle of Badr.  People who 
lived in those eras, Qaraḍāwī explains, actually lived through the events, and the 
Prophet always remained in their hearts and minds; only in the following generations 
were these events forgotten, and therefore needed to be remembered.  In this regard, 
Qaraḍāwī cites a fatwā issued by Shaykh ‘Atiyya Saqr, former head of the Al-Azhar 
Fatwā Committee, in which he states the following:  
 
According to historians, the Fatimids were the first to celebrate the Prophet’s 
birthday.  Qalqashandi, in his book Subh Al-A‘sha, says that the Fatimids used to 
make a huge celebration in Egypt and distribute large amounts of sweets for the 
occasion.  Actually, the Fatimids used to celebrate the birthdays of other members 
of the Prophet’s family and they also celebrated Christ’s birthday. 
 
It is true, Qaraḍāwī continues, that some of these acts are bid‘a; all acts involving 
bid‘a should remain unacknowledged.  However, the Prophet’s birthday has to be 
celebrated, so the Qur’an and the Prophetic sīra are remembered.  When we celebrate 
the birthday of the messenger, he continues, we celebrate the birthday of the 
message.
2
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As to whether celebrating the Prophet’s birthday has any basis in the Qur’an and 
Sunna, or whether it is a bid‘a, Qaraḍāwī repeats his opinion -- saying that it is 
permissible to celebrate the Prophet’s birthday as an expression of love for the 
Prophet, provided the celebration does not involve any of the prohibited acts.   
Qaraḍāwī restates his opinion that celebrating such religious occasions is 
recommended especially in current times, since the youth, who have indulged in other 
celebrations, have become forgetful of the religious occasions and their significance.   
Celebrating such a great event, he continues, is actually intended to celebrate the birth 
of Islam.  Such an occasion is meant to remind people of how the Prophet lived; it 
should be marked by reading more about the Prophet’s Sunna and life, building 
mosques and religious institutions and performing other forms of charity work which 
remind people of the Prophet’s life and his struggle.  This is all true, he maintains, 
provided these celebrations do not involve anything that is prohibited.  Some 
prohibited actions are inappropriate, like the intermingling of men and women, 
behaving improperly at mosques, participating in innovations such as worshipping at 
tombs, and other acts that violate the teachings of Islam.  If such previously 
mentioned violations surpass the religious benefit realised from these celebrations, 
then, according to Qaraḍāwī, they should be stopped in order to prevent harm and 
wrongdoing as indicated in the Shari‘a.1 
 
Qaraḍāwī’s close associate, the Egyptian born Muḥammad Salīm al-‘Awā (former 
Secretary of Qaraḍāwī’s IUMS, who also supported his candidacy for the Egyptian 
Presidency in the 2011 elections) goes a step further and states that celebrating the 
Prophet’s birthday is ‘neither a Sunna nor a bid‘a’, and is unconnected with issues of 
‘ibāda,2 a subject that will be discussed later. 
 
Qaraḍāwī also refers to other celebrations intended to commemorate the Prophet and 
his life.  By celebrating the Prophet’s hijra, he says,  
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…we should teach people values such as sacrifice, the sacrifice of the Companions, 
the sacrifice of ‘Alī who slept in the Prophet’s place on the night of the hijra, the 
sacrifice of Asma’ as she ascended the Mountain of Thawr.  We should teach them 
to plan the way the Prophet planned for his hijra, and how to trust in Allah as the 
Prophet did when Abu Bakr told him: We could be seen so easily, the Prophet 
replied saying:’O Abu Bakr! What do you think of two when Allah is their third?’ 
(Have no fear, for Allah is with us.) (Al-Tawba, 9: 40).  We need all these lessons 
and such celebrations are a revival of these lessons and values.  I think, says 
Qaraḍāwī, that these celebrations- if done in the proper way- will serve a great 
purpose, getting Muslims closer to the teachings of Islam and to the Prophet’s 
sunna and life.
1
 
 
As for the controversy surrounding the celebration of ‘Ashūrā, Qaraḍāwī’s 
deep resentment of the Shi‘a is clear.  The Prophet, he says, celebrated this 
day by fasting only.  He asked the Jews why they fasted on that day and they 
told him that it was the day on which God saved Moses and the people of 
Israel.  The Prophet, says Qaraḍāwī, replied by saying: ‘We have more of a 
right to Moses than you’. So he fasted on that day and ordered the people to 
fast as well.  
 
Towards the end of his life, continues Qaraḍāwī, the Prophet also said: ‘By 
Allah, if I lived longer I would fast on the 9
th
 of Muḥarram’ -- meaning that he 
would fast on both the 9
th
 and the 10
th
, in order to be different from the Jews 
who fast on the 10
th
 only.  However, Qaraḍāwī continues, some Sunnis 
celebrate ‘Ashūrā as if it were a feast.  The Shi‘a consider it a day of sadness 
and mourning, but all such things are innovations and are completely un-
Islamic.
2
  
The celebration of al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj 
 
The celebration of al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj is also discussed in Brotherhood literature, 
although much less than the Prophet’s birthday.  In general, it may be said that this 
celebration is perceived in a positive way.  In his memoirs, Al-Bannā wrote about a 
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lecture he delivered on that night, stating that this is a celebration of the Prophet’s 
dignity and spirit.
1
  
 
Over the years, the celebration of al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj has been politicised, first 
commemorated by the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood after 1967, and the land of 
Palestine -- referred to as the ‘land of al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj’.  Like al-Bannā’s earlier 
suggestion to transform the Prophet’s birthday into a day for Palestine, it provides an 
example of the Brotherhood’s embracing of religious commemoration for political 
purposes.  In reply to a question sent to OnIslam, about the best way Muslims can 
celebrate the occasion, Dr. Sano Koutoub Moustapha, a professor of fiqh at the 
International Islamic University in Malaysia, and known to be close to the line of 
Qaraḍāwī, answers: 
 
As Muslims, we shall take this opportunity to pray for our fellow Muslims around 
the globe who are suffering from atrocities.  All Muslims should remember that the 
liberation of Al-Masjid Al-Aqsa isn’t an obligation upon Palestinians alone but 
upon every single able-bodied Muslim.  Each of us must do his or her best, at least 
through our prayers and supplications.  I hope to see Al-Israa’ and Al-Mi‘raj 
celebrated with the return of Al-Aqsa to the Muslims.
2
 
 
Shaykh Muḥammad al-Khatīb, a current member of the Brotherhood’s Guidance 
Bureau, even suggests that the commemoration of the event helped arouse the 
Palestinian intifāḍa in the late 1980s.3 
Tarāwīḥ prayers 
 
‘Azzām Tamīmī speaks about Ghannouchī’s father, Shaykh Muḥammad, who, he 
says, was one of the few literate people in his village.  Shaykh Muḥammad, Tamīmī 
continues, would not accept much local behaviour including the celebration of the 
mawālid of the Prophets or local awliyā’, which every family used to adopt, and 
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considered these acts shirk.  He would also lead the tarāwīḥ prayer in his house 
during the month of Ramaḍān.1 
 
Qaraḍāwī notes that ‘Umar referred to the tarāwīḥ prayers as a good bid‘a [ni‘mat].2   
Regarding al-Bannā’s opinion on the subject, Qaraḍāwī says that fighting against 
denounced issues [munkar] is good only if these do not lead to matters which are even 
more denounced; therefore, for example, al-Bannā used to perform eight rak‘as 
during Ramaḍān’s tarāwīḥ prayers, as narrated in a Hadith on behalf of ‘Ai’sha, but 
he did not condemn those who performed 20 rak‘as, since each side has its own 
sources.  Qaraḍāwī explains that al-Bannā acted like this because tarāwīḥ prayers are 
considered Sunna, and unity between Muslims is considered a duty [ farīḍa], therefore 
a duty is more important than a Sunna, and it is better to perform tarāwīḥ prayers in 
the mosque and to keep peace between brothers.  Qaraḍāwī states again that al-Bannā 
was a pure Salafi in the sense of observing tawḥīd.3  
‘Ibāda (ritual devotion) 
 
The term ‘ibāda, which defines the practical sides of worship, is of particular interest 
to Muslim Brotherhood thinkers, who look at using practical ways to unite the nation.   
This interest goes beyond the bid‘a connection usually referred to in this work, and 
many cases relate to the affiliated terms as well.  Al-Turābī, for example, says that 
‘ibāda is personal and the believer will not commit shirk in it.  Complete ‘ibāda has 
to do with tawḥīd khāliṣ.4  Mawdūdī includes under ‘ibāda a very wide scope of 
issues – which concern doing good or avoiding evil for fear of Allah, as well as 
abiding by the laws of the Shari‘a:  
 
If you free your speech from filth, falsehood, malice and abuse and speak the truth 
and talk goodly things and do all these only because God has so ordained to do, 
they constitute ‘ibādāt, however secular they may look in semblance. If you obey the 
law of God in letter and spirit in your commercial and economic affairs and abide 
                                                 
1
 Tamimi, pp. 4-5 
2
 Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī, Taysīr al-fiqh fi ḍaw al-Qur’an wa’l Sunna, Beirut, Mu’asasat al-Risāla, 1992, 
pp. 120-121 
3
 Qaraḍāwī, Al-tarbiya al-Islamiyya, pp. 81-82 
4
 Ḥasan al-Turābī, Al-Imān, p. 132 
127 
 
by it in your dealings with your parents relatives friends and all those who come in 
contact with you, verily all these activities of yours are ‘ibādāt. If you help the poor 
and the destitute, give food to the hungry and serve the ailing and the afflicted 
persons and do all this not for any personal gain of yours but only to seek the 
pleasure of God, they are nothing short of ‘ibādāt.  Even your economic activities, 
the activities you undertake to earn your living and to feed your dependants are 
‘ibādāt if you remain honest and truthful in them and observe the law of God. In 
short all your activities and your entire life are ‘ibādāt if they are in accordance 
with the law of God and your heart is filled with His fear and your ultimate 
objective in undertaking all these activities is to seek the pleasure of God.
1
  
 
To help achieve these aims, Mawdūdī concludes, a set of formal ‘ibādāt has been 
constituted which serves as a course of training.  The more assiduously we follow the 
training, the better we are equipped to practise.  The ‘ibādāt are thus the pillars on 
which the edifice of Islam rests. 
 
Calvert looks at the differences between Quṭb and the early Salafi thinkers, whom, he 
maintains, interpreted Islam’s textual sources in ways that accommodated an image of 
radical renewal.  Whereas Afghānī and ‘Abduh attempted to tie Islam’s renaissance to 
an accommodation with Western sciences, Quṭb put forward a discourse that 
eschewed the ‘un-Islamic’ practice of discerning truth by means of rationalist 
methods.  Furthermore, Quṭb upbraids those who would distinguish between the 
‘ibādāt and mu‘āmalāt.2 
 
For Qaraḍāwī, on the other hand, the call for ‘ibāda of one God is an important issue 
which involves tawḥīd as opposed to shirk, and the dissemination of bida‘ has ruined 
both belief and ‘ibāda.  The ‘ibādāt were filled with bid‘a and ḍalāla; these should be 
the same in all madhāhib: preserving the number of rak‘as in each prayer, the way the 
rak‘a is performed; fasting in the month of Ramaḍān from sunrise to sunset for 29 or 
30 days; zakāt and Hajj.  Qaraḍāwī refers to warnings not to add new ‘ibādas or add 
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to existing ones such various customs as practised next to the ka‘ba, since that will 
constitute bid‘a.1 
 
Qaraḍāwī notes that al-Bannā preferred to leave such issues, which concern al-iltizām 
fi’l-‘ibādāt with no direct answers, in order to unite various religious groups at the 
outset.
2
 
The use of bid‘a as part of an internal blame-game 
 
For Quṭb, since tawḥīd is the basis of the criteria of right and wrong, the lawful and 
the unlawful, and the legal and illegal -- governance, or ḥākimiyya, belongs only to 
Allah and not to the individual.
3
  Quṭb probably developed the perception of 
ḥākimiyya under the influence of Mawdūdī, who spoke of ‘divine government’.  The 
word ḥukm appears in the Qur’an in three verses (5: 44, 45, 47) dealing with 
judgement in light of the revelation.  Akhavi notes that Quṭb interpreted it in terms of 
sovereignty and rule.  Therefore, Quṭb was accused by his most significant opponent 
within the ranks of the Brotherhood, the second General Guide Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī, of 
promoting a bid‘a of a creedal background, which has been encountered in this work 
in relation to certain groups, but not individuals.  This, in a way, resembles takfīrī 
accusations that many Muslim Brotherhood scholars object to -- as will be seen later. 
 
Loyal to his main thesis that the Brotherhood should not act as judges,
4
 Al-Huḍaybī, 
according to Akhavi, objected to the idea that the principle of Allah’s absolute power 
means that human beings cannot make any laws for the regulation of society.  He 
could not accept that a self-appointed group can apply a litmus test to others with 
regards to their behavior, and whether this behavior increases or weakens the 
supremacy of Allah.
5
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Women’s head-coverings – the niqāb and ḥijāb as a cultural symbol 
 
In recent decades, the issue of women’s head-coverings has been gaining attention.  
This is a custom which reached Islam at a rather late stage and is now, especially in 
Western countries, at the heart of a cultural debate -- with Western figures describing 
it as a symbol of women’s oppression, while Muslims claim it represents an act of 
dignity towards women, and even a sign of their liberation.
1
  It seems that in most 
cases when the issue grabs the headlines, those leading the debate on the Muslim side 
are Islamists, with many following the line of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Thus, it 
should be interesting to see how they deal with the subject in the light of our 
discussion.  
 
According to Mawdūdī, a person who looks closely at the Qur’anic verses cannot 
deny that at the time of the Prophet women used to veil themselves, though the veil 
was not specified in the Qur’an, but is Qur’anic in spirit.  The niqāb (full face 
covering), he says, is a social practice established by the Prophet.  Mawdūdī’s 
discussion of the issue does not deal with the question of whether or not this is a bid‘a, 
but is rather a means of taunting Western culture for its lack of understanding of 
Islamic culture and its purposes.  Mawdūdī speaks against terms such as ‘civilisation’ 
or ‘progress’, and says Islam cannot be interpreted from a Western point of view.2 
 
Qaraḍāwī, on the other hand, needs to defend the covering of women’s faces in light 
of the more recent controversy in Western countries, answering a question as to 
whether this is an intrusive bid‘a [bid‘a dākhila] on Muslim society.  First of all, 
Qaraḍāwī says that the term bid‘a dākhila was invented by a journalist and he 
therefore rejects it.
3
  Qaraḍāwī says that covering the face in front of a strange, non-
mahram man has been accepted by all fuqahā’ since the days of the ṣaḥāba, though 
he stresses there was no such custom in the days of the Prophet.  The controversy, 
according to him, is more about the niqāb than the ḥijāb.  Qaraḍāwī’s conclusion 
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resembles his colleagues’ with regard to the Prophet’s birthday – that covering the 
face is neither a duty nor a bid‘a,1 thus dismantling a possible argument against this 
symbol from a religious point of view.  
 
Interestingly, a question which appeared on the official Arabic Muslim Brotherhood 
website (which traditionally reflects the opinion of the Egyptian/Middle Eastern 
Movement) a few months later seems to be representing a more conservative 
approach.  This question concerns a fiancé who arrives at the house of his future wife 
every week – whether he is allowed to see her with no cover for the duration of their 
engagement; the answer is that for the fiancé, his future wife is considered a non-
maḥram, even though the controversy about covering the face is referred to.2  
 
VII. The Muslim Brotherhood’s views on other political trends 
 
All the bida‘ in Islamic history started quietly and gradually grew bigger, adds 
Muhammad al-Rāshid, a leading educator from the first generation of the Brotherhood 
in Iraq,
3
 who seems close to the line of al-Bannā.  Al-Rāshid provides a historical 
account on the development of the bid‘a as he sees it, following a line similar to the 
one offered by al-Bannā, as previously discussed.  He mentions al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī as a 
creator of a trend which was itself bid‘a, as he led it by the power of the sword only.  
This, says al-Rāshid, is part of the shi‘ī over use of the sword, explaining that they 
used to shed more blood than needed.
4
 
 
As already mentioned, the Brotherhood tends to politicise religious terms while 
providing modern examples; this also applies to ‘aqīdāt, and even to non-Muslim 
ideologies.  Thus, we find al-Bannā speaking about the bid‘a of Communism as a 
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‘new fashion’ which started to strike Egypt, noting that Ṣidqī Pasha had also fought it; 
this discussion arises in connection with a teacher whom people complained about, 
saying he was working against the regime.
1
  
 
Quṭb goes a step further to include communist society as part of the wider ‘jāhilī 
society’: 
 
First because it denies the existence of God Most High and believes that the 
universe was created by ‘matter’ or by ‘nature’, while all man’s activities and his 
history has been created by ‘economics’ or ‘the means of production’; second, 
because the way of life it adopts is based on submission to the Communist Party and 
not to God. A proof of this is that in all communist countries the Communist Party 
has full control and leadership. Furthermore, the practical consequence of this 
ideology is that the basic needs of human beings are considered identical to those of 
animals, i.e. food and drink, clothing, shelter and sex. It deprives people of their 
spiritual needs, which differentiate human beings from animals. Foremost among 
these is belief in God and the freedom to adopt and to proclaim this faith. Similarly, 
it deprives people of their freedom to express individuality, which is a very special 
human characteristic. The individuality of a person is expressed in various ways, 
such as private property, the choice of work and the attainment of specialization in 
work, and expression in various art forms; and it distinguishes him from animals or 
from machines. The communist ideology and the communist system reduce the 
human being to the level of an animal or even to the level of a machine.
2
 
 
The rebellion of the jāhiliyya against the authority of Allah, according to Quṭb, 
resulted in the oppression of His creatures.  Thus, he concludes, both the humiliation 
of the common man under the Communist systems, and the exploitation of individuals 
and nations due to greed for wealth and imperialism under the capitalist systems, are 
but a corollary of the rebellion against Allah’s authority and the denial of the dignity 
of man given to him by Allah. 
 
Muslim Brotherhood leaders usually reject the Shi‘a; however, this rejection is not as 
clear as the rejection by Wahhābīs, as will be seen later.  This is connected with 
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political circumstances as well, especially due to the enthusiasm that the Iranian 
revolution aroused in the hearts of those striving for an Islamic revolution.   
Apparently, the most significant thinker among this group is Ghannouchī.  Relying on 
the Iranian revolution’s political success, he goes so far as to say that the Shi‘a are an 
accepted madhhab [the ja‘fariyya]; that Iran is in a strategic position which prevents 
Russian encroachment on the Middle East; and that the West continued its rule on 
Iran via the Pahlavi dynasty, and erased its ‘Islamic Personality’ by spreading its own 
culture through education and the arts.
1
  
 
Furthermore, Ghannouchī aspires for an organisation to work for the formation of an 
Islamic state, based on the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-e-Islami and 
the Imām Khomeinī.2 
 
Qaraḍāwī’s approach is more complicated, and seems to be related to political 
circumstances even more, as part of his support in various muqāwama (resistance) 
organisations.  As Polka points out, Qaraḍāwī says that the Shi‘a cannot be branded 
unbelievers, and that it will be wrong to excommunicate them from the Muslim milla, 
or community of believers.  In support of his assertion, he mentions a number of 
points, among them that Shi‘a do acknowledge the Sunna as a second source of law, 
although they derive the Sunna from their own traditions.  This is a far cry from 
nonbelieving; at the very worst, it constitutes a bid‘a.3 
 
On the other hand, in the past few years, especially following the involvement of Ḥizb 
Allah in the ongoing fighting in Syria, Qaraḍāwī has been using a much more harsh 
language, from time to time blaming the Shi‘a of being takfīrīs -- an issue he strongly 
objects to (see below), since it sparks sedition [fitna].
4
  He has, however, 
acknowledged Ḥizb Allah’s contribution to the muqāwama.  It seems that when 
speaking about the Shi‘a, Qaraḍāwī refers to the Iranian regime rather than to the 
Shi‘a theologically. 
 
                                                 
1
 Rāchid al-Ghannouchī, Maqālāt, p. 77 
2
 ibid, p. 91 
3
 Polka, p. 421 
4
 See for example: "Al-Qaraḍāwī bayna al-taḥriḍ ḍid al-Shi‘a wa’l fihm al-khati’ li’l tashayyu‘". 
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Qaraḍāwī says that Sufism must be adopted as a path to belief and tajdīd, but that bad 
Sufism brings with it a cancellation of the personality for the sake of the Shaykh of 
each order, creates a division between truth and Shari‘a, or creates legends, 
exaggerations or distortions in thinking.
1
  Qaraḍāwī is drawn into the debate about 
Sufism and bid‘a, saying that each relevant tarīqa has to be checked in order to verify 
that it is clear from bid‘a; that its Shaykh aspires to the implementation of the duty to 
command right and forbid wrong on all levels, and that he has dedicated himself to 
follow the Sunna and fight bid‘a.  Qaraḍāwī goes on to say that Ḥasan al-Bannā too 
was not satisfied with the many Sufis who permit bid‘a by visiting mausoleums and 
graves; al-Bannā, he says, maintains that bida‘ have no source and were approved by 
people on their own, either by taking off or adding elements, and that ḍalāla has to be 
fought by the best methods so it does not lead to evil.
2
  
 
Qaraḍāwī makes it clear that al-Bannā is a complete Salafi in his creed, believing in 
tawḥīd, while in his heart he is a Sufi.  The same approach, he continues, applies to 
‘ibāda, as discussed previously, in which al-Bannā is a follower and not an inventor 
[mubtadi‘], since of course every bid‘a is a ḍalāla and every ḍalāla belongs in 
hellfire.  Yet, al-Bannā makes sure not to turn every innovation into a bid‘a as others 
do.  Al-Bannā, Qaraḍāwī concludes, seems to be following a Sufi pattern – focusing 
on purification of the soul, healing the diseases of the heart and tahdhīb al-akhlāq (the 
refinement of morals).  This pattern is close to Ibn Taymiyya and his student Ibn 
Qayyim, who have taken from Sufism knowledge, learning and practice.
3
 
 
Being close to the Salafiyya in its earlier form, the Brotherhood is very positive about 
it.  Ghannouchī says that Salafiyya is what Islam obtains from its sources – the Qur’an, 
Sunna, and khulafā’ al-rāshidūn -- without becoming intolerant of what has been 
renewed since.
4
  Qaraḍāwī says that it looks as if al-Bannā started his way close to 
Sufism and ended up close to the Salafiyya, though the two were not in disagreement, 
with the result that he managed to combine them together.  Nonetheless, Qaraḍāwī 
rejects takfīrī trends and perceptions, stressing that this is a rather new phenomenon 
                                                 
1
 Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Wasaṭiyya, p. 206 
2
 ibid, pp. 162-163 
3
 Ibid, p. 164 
4
 Ghannouchī, ibid, p. 93 
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which started with some of those who spent time in prison, including Brotherhood 
members; such thinking in the past resulted in the creation of the khawārij.1  
 
Qaraḍāwī says that the Brotherhood in general opposes takfīr; instead, it offers 
progress, tajdīd and al-wasaṭiyya al-mujaddida.2  In addition, Qaraḍāwī’s social 
position regarding Jihad is the opposite to that of Quṭb, Mawdūdī and their followers.   
In his view, waging Jihad against internal corruption and injustice is far more 
important than waging it against outside non-belief.
3
 
 
In the chapter about modern Wahhābī thinking, it is apparent that not all ‘ulamā were 
satisfied with the Muslim Brotherhood.  It must of course be assumed that there were 
also political considerations involved in their fatāwā.  It is therefore interesting to see 
a major Muslim Brotherhood thinker, Fayṣal Mawlawī, who was head of the 
aforementioned Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.  When asked about the 
Wahhābiyya, Mawlawī, who was influenced by Mawdūdī and close to Qaraḍāwī, 
maintains that Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was a person of the Qur’an and 
Sunna, and states that his original thinking is Salafi.  There is no such thing as a 
Wahhābī trend in Islam, he continues, apart from occasional disputes based on 
scholarly knowledge, and it is a pity that this sometimes even leads to takfīr.4 
VIII. Muslim Brotherhood discourse over modern daily developments 
 
Originally, sports and body training were one of the most important elements in al-
Bannā’s characterisation of the Society of Muslim Brothers.  Al-Bannā explained the 
importance of having physically strong believers, as part of the new generation of 
Muslims whom he aspired to educate.  A strong body, he maintained, was a key to 
performing such Muslim obligations as prayer, fasting, Hajj and charity.
5
  Throughout 
the years, sports activities have been at the centre of the Brotherhood’s school systems, 
youth groups and camps.  It is therefore somewhat surprising to see the issue raised by 
                                                 
1
 Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, Ẓāhirat al-ghulūw fi’l takfīr, Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1990, p. 3,11 
2
 Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Wasaṭiyya, p. 166 
3
 Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, ‘Jihād al-ẓulm wa’l fasād fi’l dākhil muqaddam ‘ala jihād al-kufr fi’l-khārij’, 
http://iumsonline.org/ar/default.asp?word=ةعدب&contentID=4104&menuID=17 (Last accessed – 15 
June 2014) 
4
 Fayṣal Mawlawī, Al-Wahhābiyya, 13 June 2003, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20040902203132/http://www.mawlawi.net/fatwa.asp?fid=781  
5
 Ḥasan al-Bannā, Majmū‘at rasāil, ‘Risalat al-mu’tamar al-khāmis’, p. 149 
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current Brotherhood intellectuals next to the term bid‘a.  However, it has to be said 
that this only refers to a narrow problem.  Dr. Mas‘ūd Ṣabrī, a member of Qaraḍāwī’s 
IUMS from Egypt and a former senior editor on IslamOnline, maintains there are 
problems pertaining to sports which include ceremonies related to the sport’s country 
of origin.  This can be seen, he says, in bowing in karate and some other sports -- 
whose modern forms are different from their original.  
 
Ijtihād or juristic reasoning may reach different conclusions about the permissibility 
of such sports; one opinion may regard a given sport as allowable [halal] while 
another opinion may deem it prohibited [haram]. This is because some muftis may 
overlook the origin of a given sport and base their opinion on its present form, while 
others may regard it as unfeasible to overlook the origin and the primary rules of 
the sport. The situation is much the same for women as for men. Women have been 
practising sports since the earliest times. Islam never prohibited them from doing so 
but has only regulated how they engage in sports. However, the mania of gender 
equality has pushed women into wrestling, boxing, and other sports that entail being 
violent and exposing their bodies. This leads to the masculinization of women, 
which deprives them of the fairest things Allah Almighty bestowed on them: 
femininity and beauty.  
 
Unfortunately, many Muslim countries have adopted the call for complete equality, 
which disagrees with the nature of our Muslim society.  This is apart from the 
Shari‘a violations in many sports and the airing of matches such as football and 
swimming. Amidst all this comes the ijtihād that maintains that women have the 
right to practise sports within the regulations set out by the Shari‘a.  However, 
when one examines the jurisprudence of objectives and consequences, it becomes 
clear that juristic results vary from one issue to another, and from one sport to 
another.  Thus, for jurists to come up with a contemporary ijtihād, they need to 
study thoroughly in order to issue fatāwā applicable to the cases being judged.1 
 
                                                 
1
 Mas’oud Sabri, ‘Sports: past & present’, IslamOnline, 7 June 2006 
https://web.archive.org/web/20060722185343/http://www.islamonline.net/English/In_Depth/Religious/
sportsinislam/PlayingSports/articles/01.shtml (Last accessed - 15 June 2014) 
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In a different place, Ṣabri deals extensively with exercising through yoga.  His 
conclusion is that its spiritual aspect is forbidden, since it originates in Hindu 
teachings; however, as physical training it should be allowed.
1
 
 
Perhaps due to his Sufi tendencies, Ḥasan al-Bannā used to relate to the importance of 
the various parts of the day in a believer’s daily life.  Part of the social activities and 
group gatherings for prayers, reading the Qur’an and more, deliberately took place at 
night-time.  This was part of al-Bannā’s perception of ma‘rifat Allah (which, unlike 
the Sufi meaning, referred to becoming better acquainted with the Qur’an).  He also 
called upon his followers to devote an hour daily to self-examination.
2
  Qaraḍāwī, too, 
puts much emphasis on the Muslim’s commitment to the proper use of his time, 
which, he maintains, has to be efficiently divided between various obligations.  
 
A Muslim, he continues, is expected to start his day early in the morning, at least prior 
to sunrise, in order to meet a clean and fresh morning, and then pray.  The daily 
actions have to be performed using time planning.
3
  Muṣtafā al-Taḥān, a current 
leading Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood member, who is active in the field of 
educating students, adds that in the past, the issue of time planning, probably due to 
its Western source, had been considered bid‘a.  Now, however, the matter has been 
settled, and time planning, he concludes, has become a science in itself.
4
 
Conclusions 
 
Of the various modern trends covered in the course of this work, the Muslim 
Brotherhood is the most complicated group, especially today, in its global form.  Yet 
in many of the issues under discussion, Brotherhood intellectuals and scholars see 
more or less eye-to-eye.  This can be attributed to the historical developments which 
made it an internationally widespread ideology.  
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In spite of having branches across the world, many of its leaders and intellectuals 
share similar backgrounds, have been educated in institutions which were built on its 
doctrines like the University of Medina and others, tend to maintain the old custom of 
intermarriages between their sons and daughters, and pass on leadership roles to them.   
Several studies which looked at Muslim Brotherhood curricula at schools found that 
most of its substance relies on the literature of its own scholars;
1
 thus the Muslim 
Brotherhood remains a closed community after all.  
 
One of the most important designations of the Brotherhood is a wide re-opening of the 
gates of ijtihād, so that Islam can be re-interpreted and brought into the daily life 
today.  This concept, however, is perceived not as Quṭb saw it -- in an almost 
anarchistic way, with everyone having his own right to perform ijtihād.  Most figures 
still follow Al-Bannā, who believes that only the scholars (probably referring to 
Brotherhood scholars), have the right to perform ijtihād for the sake of the umma. 
 
This wide opening of the gates of ijtihād allows the Brotherhood to treat the subject of 
bid‘a in a rather lenient way, even though in theory they still believe that performing 
most acts of bid‘a is wrong.  This is mainly true of the commemoration of historical 
events relating to the Prophet, where the Brotherhood avoids becoming involved in 
the long debate which surrounds some of them, and simply suggests that the 
celebrations help modern day believers to be reconnected to the Prophet and his 
Sunna.  Sometimes commemorating the event itself is not even seen as bid‘a -- but 
rather problematic issues which derive from the commemoration sermons, such as the 
mixing of men and women, and other controversial matters which may occur during 
the celebrations. 
 
At the same time, with many religious terms, bid‘a included, the Brotherhood’s 
obvious political recruitment of religion to achieve its goals is apparent.  In many 
places, the essence of the religious term itself is not even analysed.  Thus, al-Bannā 
can suggest that the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday be dedicated to Palestine, 
and his followers commemorate the day of al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj to emphasise the 
importance of Jerusalem to the umma.  It thus often appears that the attitude towards 
                                                 
1
 See for example: Anne Sofie Roald, Tarbiya: Education and Politics in Islamic Movements in Jordan 
and Malaysia, Lund, Sweden, Religionshistoriska Avdelningen, Lunds Universitet, 1994 
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the Shi‘a is derived from the success of the Iranian revolution, and issues like the head 
covering of women, which has become a symbol of the cultural struggle between 
Islam and the West, can be discharged of not being a bid‘a. 
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Chapter three: The perception of bidʻa by  
early Wahhābī ʻulamā’ 
 
I. General Introduction 
 
The history of Islam is dotted with a series of dissident movements and trends which 
claim that orthodox doctrine and praxis deviate from the true faith.  Many of these 
movements objected to the acceptance by Sunni Muslims of pre-Islamic rituals, and 
their incorporation into the new religion.
1
  The Wahhābiyya is outstanding among 
these trends, in its aspiration to return to the purity of faith, and has been very active 
and influential in the Middle East and beyond for three centuries; the Wahhābiyya has 
succeeded in keeping its hold over three Saudi kingdoms until today. 
 
This chapter will examine the views of the Āl al-Shaykh — five generations of 
ʻulamā’, descendants of the founder of the Wahhābiyya – Shaykh Muḥammad bin 
ʻAbd al-Wahhāb al-Tamīmī.  These ʻulamā’ were chosen not only because they 
represented the mainstream of Wahhābī thought in their time, but also because each of 
them wrote several books which enable scholars to study their perception of key 
religious terms.  Most of the ʻulamā’ discussed here lived in the first and second 
Saudi states.  Unfortunately, this in itself poses a challenge to the researcher due to a 
lacuna in reliable sources regarding their biographies and developments after Ibn 
ʻAbd al-Wahhāb.  It is to be hoped that the present research into these ʻulamā’, their 
religious approaches and socio-political circumstances will help fill this gap. 
 
A large number of studies of the Wahhābiyya have identified a direct link between 
Ibn Ḥanbal, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb.2  Others speak of the 
considerable influence the Wahhābiyya exerted over its surroundings, as well as over 
groups and societies at later periods.  It is said that their influence reached distant 
places, including India, Indonesia, Morocco, Libya, Sudan and elsewhere.  
                                                 
1
 Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand, London, Ithaca Press, 1978, p. 10 
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 See for example ‘Abd al- Ḥalīm al-Jundī, al-Imām Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhāb aw intishār al-
manhaj al-salafī, Cairo, Dār al-Maʻārif, 1976, p. 70 
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The Salafi movement, to which a separate chapter is dedicated in this study, is also 
considered by some scholars to have borrowed certain of its ideas from the 
Wahhābīs.1 
 
The clerical dynasty begins in the mid to late eighteenth century, with Shaykh 
Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb himself, continues with one of his sons – ʻAbd 
Allah — one of his grandsons – ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan — his most famous great 
grandchild – Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf bin ʻAbd al-Raḥman — and concludes in the 
twentieth century during the third Saudi state with Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-
Laṭīf bin ʻAbd al-Raḥman.  
 
The study of this consecutive chain of ʻulamā’ from the same dynasty — the Āl al-
Shaykh —  helps understand the evolution of the term bidʻa and other affiliated terms 
within the Wahhābī trend, and to show links between these changes, the frequency of 
the use of the term and historical social and political developments in the three Saudi 
states.  Relying on these parameters, the power of the religious establishment in the 
three Saudi states vis-à-vis the ruling political elite will also be evaluated.  
Biographies of the relevant ʻulamā’ 
Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb (1703-1792), the founder of the Wahhābī 
movement, was born in the small village of ʻUyaynah in Najd to a family of ʻulamā’ 
belonging to the Ḥanbalī madhhab.  He engaged in religious studies as a child and 
was later influenced by the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya.  At an early age, Ibn ʻAbd al-
Wahhāb began to travel to the main Islamic centres in the Arabian Peninsula, and was 
influenced by ʻulamā’ who taught him issues related to tawḥīd.  As part of his travels, 
he also spent four years in Basra – out of which he was driven after preaching against 
bidaʻ.2 Upon returning to ʻUyayna around 1740, he began preaching and putting his 
ideas into practice, specially emphasising the centrality of tawḥīd in faith, alongside 
the prohibition of shirk and grave worship.  It is worth noting here that in this spirit, 
Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb and his followers referred to themselves as muwāḥidūn; the title 
                                                 
1 Aḥmad Amīn, Zu‘amā’ al-iṣlāḥ fi’l ‘aṣr al-ḥadīth, Cairo, Maktabat al-Nahda al-Miṣriyya, 1948, pp. 
23-24 
2
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Wahhābiyya was originally attributed to them by their opponents, who intended to 
portray them as followers of Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb rather than Islam itself. 
 
In the early 1740s Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb was already well known throughout the region 
of Najd, but his dogmatic and uncompromising beliefs and actions caused the rulers 
of ʻUyayna to persecute him and he was forced to leave that town and move to the 
nearby town of Dirʻiya, where he was welcomed by the city’s ruler, Muḥammad bin 
Saʻūd.  The alliance forged between the two brought about the foundation for the 
creation and huge territorial expansion of the first Saudi state, as well as the 
implementation of the idea of ‘Rulers and the learned’ [umarā’ wa ʻulamā’] which 
was presented in the writings of Ibn Taymiyya; this idea means that the political rulers 
of an Islamic state must follow the religious guidance of the ʻulamā’ while the ʻulamā’ 
must obey the political instructions of the rulers and refrain from intervening in 
political affairs.  
 
Protected and sponsored by the powerful Saudi dynasty, Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-
Wahhāb and the other Wahhābī ʻulamā’ introduced the Wahhābī message to all 
territories taken by the Saudis.  By the time of the Shaykh’s death the Wahhābī creed 
was well known and enforced across almost the entire Arabian Peninsula, the Fertile 
Crescent and Syria.  His numerous theological books were cited by many people.
1
  
 
Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb (1751/2-1826/7) was the 
fourth son of Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, and is considered the most prominent 
Wahhābī scholar in the period after his father’s death and the collapse of the first 
Saudi state in 1818, when he was captured by the Ottomans and sent to Egypt.   
During this period, ʻAbd Allah and other Wahhābī ʻulamā’ (especially his brothers) 
were able to consolidate Wahhābīya as a unique school of jurisprudence, 
distinguished not only from the Ḥanafī, Malikī and Shafiʻī schools but also from the 
mainstream Ḥanbalī school.  
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The fact that Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad and his brothers gained reputations 
not only among Wahhābī ʻulamā’ but also among the general Najdī population played 
a crucial part in protecting the Wahhābiyya at times of crisis after the Saudi state 
collapsed.   This was one of the reasons for the survival of the Wahhābiyya and the 
ongoing role played by the dynasty of Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb in the second and third 
Saudi states.  As will be demonstrated, Shaykh ʻAbd Allah’s views and focuses 
differed from his father’s in several aspects, especially on the subject of unbelief 
[kufr].
1
 
 
The Egyptian-Ottoman occupation of Najd in 1818 not only brought an end to the first 
Saudi state but also broke the consecutive chain of descendants of Ibn ʻAbd al-
Wahhāb.  Three of his six sons – ʻAli, Ibrāhīm and ʻAbd Allah died in exile in Egypt, 
where their own sons also remained.  During the 1820s there was a short period of 
vacuum in Wahhābī leadership until one of the Wahhābiyya founder’s grandsons – 
Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan bin Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1868), 
also known as Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman Āl al-Shaykh, revived the Wahhābī 
movement, together with his son ʻAbd al-Laṭīf.  ʻAbd al-Raḥman returned from Egypt 
to Najd in 1825 or 1826 and became the spiritual leader of the Wahhābī movement in 
the second Saudi state until his death.  
 
The second Saudi state was much weaker than the first and often suffered from 
political instability, mainly due to the frequent struggles within the Āl Saʻūd family.   
As a result, the power of the ʻulamā’ vis-à-vis the rulers and the population increased 
significantly and Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman became a very powerful figure.  He was the 
chief qāḍī and the person who appointed all quḍā’ and teachers in the Najd region.   
 
Equipped with the religious knowledge he gained during his years of exile in Egypt, 
when he was also close to the circles of ʻulamā’ from Al-Azhar, ʻAbd al-Raḥman was 
now better able to defend the Wahhābiyya against its opponents.  He wrote no less 
than six books, the most important of which was Fatḥ al majīd – Sharḥ kitāb al 
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tawḥīd, which dealt with the most famous book of Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb.  
In general it would seem that since the political and military capabilities of the second 
Saudi state were much more limited than those of the first, Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman 
focused in his religious message much less on Jihad against the kuffār and much more 
about enforcing the rules of tawḥīd on the Najdī society and warning against all sorts 
of shirk.
1
  
 
Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf bin ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan bin Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-
Wahhāb (1810-1876), also known as Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf Āl al-Shaykh, was born in 
Dirʻiya but went into exile in Egypt with his family following the collapse of the first 
Saudi state.  He lived and studied in Egypt until 1848, when he returned to Najd and 
resided in the capital of the second Saudi state, Riyāḍ. Both ʻAbd al-Laṭīf and his 
father played an important religious role in the country.  Despite the fact that he 
outlived his father only by eight years, ʻAbd al-Laṭīf became one of the most 
prominent and most influential Wahhābī ʻulamā’ of the second state.  His most 
influential years were between 1865 and his death in 1876.  During this period, 
political conditions in the second Saudi state deteriorated significantly and the state 
was practically torn apart due to fierce political struggles between various segments of 
the ruling family, following the death of Fayṣal bin Turkī in 1865. 
 
ʻAbd al-Laṭīf put an emphasis on takfīr, fitna and shirk, and considered as mushrikūn 
not only all non-Muslims, but also all Muslims living outside of the politically-
controlled territories of the Wahhābī state; this meant that many Najdis were 
considered by him as mushrikūn.2  
 
Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf Āl al-Shaykh (1848-1921) was the most 
prominent religious figure of the second Saudi state after his father’s death in 1876.   
He acted as the religious tutor of King ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz bin Saʻūd when the latter was a 
young child.  Upon the collapse of the state in 1891 at the hands of the Rashīdī 
dynasty, the Shaykh was not exiled with the rest of the Saudi family who found its 
way to the then semi-independent chiefdoms of Kuwait and Qatar, but rather moved 
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ila Allah fi’l dawla al-Saʻūdiyya al-thāniya, 1240-1309H (undated), pp. 196-209; Firro, pp. 85-101 
2
 al-Farīḥ, pp. 210-220; Firro, pp. 138, 165-170 
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to Hā’il – the capital of the Rashīdī chiefdom.  When Riyāḍ was recaptured by the 
Saudis in 1902, ʻAbd Allah rejoined the Saudi family and remained the most 
prominent religious figure of the third, newly born Saudi state until his death in 1921.  
 
In 1902, ʻAbd Allah’s daughter Tarfa married ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz and gave birth to Prince 
Fayṣal bin ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz, who in 1924 became Viceroy of the Ḥijaz and later the heir 
apparent to his brother Saʻūd and finally – King of Saudi Arabia.  These connections 
by marriage strengthened the position of the Āl al-Shaykh family as the leading clan 
of the Wahhābī elite in the third Saudi state.1  From the establishment of the third 
Saudi state in 1902, Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf resided in a very different 
atmosphere to that surrounding his father.  From the early days of the state, the 
political and military elite led by the ruler, Ibn Saʻūd, was stronger than the religious 
elite, and as a result the ʻulamā’ could not issue fatāwā or hold public opinions which 
contradicted Ibn Saʻūd’s political needs.  
 
This means, for example, that under the third Saudi state, the religious elite could not 
declare Jihad or declare takfīr on anyone without Ibn Saʻūd’s permission; such 
permission was never given due to Ibn Saʻūd’s decision to achieve and secure Saudi 
interests (particularly territorial expansion in the Arabian Peninsula) by using 
sophisticated and gradual manoeuvres, either internally with regard to other 
communities in the Arabian Peninsula or externally, vis-à-vis Britain and the Ottoman 
Empire.
2
  
  
                                                 
1
 Khayr al-Dīn al-Zirkilī, Shibh al-Jazīra al-ʻArabiyya fi ʻahd al-Malik ʻAbd al-ʻAziz, Beirut, published 
by the author, 1970, vol. 1, pp 57-76; David Dean Commins, The Wahhābī mission and Saudi Arabia, 
London, I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2006, p. 210; Alexander Bligh, "The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulama) as 
Participant in the Political System of the Kingdom" in Peter von Sivers, ed. International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, vol. 17, 1985, pp. 37-50 
2
 Jacob Goldberg, The foreign policy of Saudi Arabia – the formative years 1902-1918, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1978, pp.  30-34, 48-65; Aharon Layish, "Ulama and Politics 
in Saudi Arabia" in M. Heper and R. Israeli, eds., Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East, 
London, Croom Helm, 1984, pp. 29-63 
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II. The Sources of authority 
(a) Qur’an and Sunna 
 
Sunna — the Prophetic Sunna to be precise — is, according to Shaykh Muḥammad 
bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, the second of the only two fundamental sources of Shariʻa after 
the Qur’an.  In most cases, he says that the believer should follow both.  Furthermore, 
the Qur’an and Sunna are not just the only two legitimate sources of Shariʻa, but also 
the two most effective weapons that should be used by the believer in his struggle 
against the unbelievers, the demons and devils who try to disrupt the believer’s efforts 
to worship Allah correctly.
1
  From his writings, it should be concluded that Ibn ʻAbd 
al-Wahhāb sees Sunna as the direct opposite of bidʻa, which means that a person can 
either be Sunni or bidʻī, either a member of ahl al-sunna or of ahl al-bidʻa.  
 
Like his father, and as a devoted Wahhābī scholar, Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin 
Muḥammad considers the prophetic Sunna as one of the only two fundamental 
sources of Shariʻa.  For him as well, any deviation from the Sunna constitutes a bidʻa; 
thus, whoever wishes to follow and to revive the Sunna must fight and counter bidʻa 
as his father did.
2
 An important aspect to raise here is the Shaykh’s political use of 
Sunna.  A whole book of his is dedicated to attacks on those he considers to be 
enemies of the pure Sunnis like the Shiʻa, khawārij, Zaydis and various other groups 
which, according to him, have been challenging Islam from its early days.
3
  
Furthermore, a large proportion of the Shaykh’s work is devoted to the issue of Sunna 
in general.  In another book, for example, he argues that any person who converted his 
religion to Islam agreed in his conversion to follow the prophetic Sunna, and 
following the Sunna automatically meant a commitment by the new Muslim to refrain 
from any act of shirk or ghulūw.  
 
                                                 
1
 Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Kashf al-shubbuhāt, Riyāḍ, Ministry of Islamic Affairs, 1419 H, 
pp. 13-14; Al-Rasā’il al-shakhsiyya li’l-Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, pp. 1-6, 15, 20-21, 
34, 39, 46, 115-117 
2
 ʻAbd  Allah bin Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Al-Kalimāt al-nāfiʻa fi’l mukafarāt al-wāqiʻa, 
Saudi Arabia, ʻAbd al- Aziz and Muḥammad al ʻAbd Allah al Jamiḥ, 2000, pp. 340-348  
3
 ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Jawāb ahl al-sunna al-nabawiyya fi naqḍ kalām al-
Shiʻa wa’l Zaydiyya, pp. 50-227 
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Only the Prophetic Sunna, the Shaykh continues, is the correct and explicit one [al-
sunna al ṣaḥīḥa wa’l sarīḥa]; he adds some quotes from the khulafā’ al-rāshidūn 
saying that if there was anything in their traditions or actions a little different from the 
Prophet’s traditions and actions, these should be ignored, and only the Prophetic way 
should be followed.  The same, he argues, applies to a political ruler, who must follow 
the Qur’an and the Prophetic Sunna, or otherwise be considered a tyrant [ṭāghūt].1   
This may reflect the reality that prevailed in the second Saudi state that has already 
been highlighted – the power of the Āl al-Shaykh family and the religious elite over 
the political elite led by the Āl-Saʻūd dynasty, and the frequent religious intervention 
in the state’s political affairs.  
 
Naturally, Sunna is important to Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf too.  The Shaykh follows his 
predecessors’ line of thinking by insisting that the Qur’an and Sunna encompass all 
aspects of life and provide a proper solution for any questions or problems, including 
in day-to-day issues which have little to do with religion.  He argues that a person 
who does not acknowledge this should be considered as one of ‘the worst among the 
ignorant and among the most deviant of those who have deviated’ [min ajhal al-
jāhilīn wa-aḍal al-ḍallīn].  Any deviation from the Qur’an and the prophetic Sunna is 
considered a satanic action.  
 
ʻAbd al-Laṭīf sees bidʻa as the direct opposite of Sunna, and he says that whoever 
supports bidʻa automatically declares war against the Sunna and should be punished 
accordingly.  Being a Muslim or having faith or knowledge is not enough, according 
to Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf.  He further says that among the Muslim believers [ahl al-
Islām], the best group is the people of faith [ahl al-imān]; the best among those are 
the people of knowledge [ahl al-ʻilm], and among these the best are the ahl al-sunna.2  
This indicates that he has effectively constructed a virtual religious ‘pyramid’, in 
which the ahl al-sunna are the vanguard of the believers.  
 
                                                 
1
 ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan, Fatḥ al-majīd – sharḥ kitāb al-tawḥīd, pp. 33, 100, 139-144, 169, 253-
255. 
2
 ʻAbd al-Laṭīf bin ʻAbd al-Raḥman Āl al-Shaykh, Al-Barāhin al-Islamiyya fi radd al-shubha al-
Fārisiyya, Riyāḍ, Maktabat al-Hidāya, 1989, pp. 7, 74, 101; ʻAbd al-Laṭīf bin ʻAbd al-Raḥman Āl al-
Shaykh, Miṣbāḥ al-ẓalām fi’l radd ‘ala man kadhaba ‘ala al-Shaykh al-imām, Riyaḍ, Dar al-Hidāya 
(undated), pp. 67-72 
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Such a division into groups according to the quality of their belief reflects the position 
in the last years of the second Saudi state after 1865, in which the religious elite led 
by Shaykh ʻAbd Aal-Laṭīf, considered many subjects as unbelievers or as bad 
believers.  
 
A thorough reading of Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf’s book dedicated to the 
issue of bidʻa suggests that he respects the Sunna, but in his fatāwā relies more on the 
Qur’an.  However, he does quote many times the greatest Ḥanbalī or Wahhābī ʻulamā’ 
– Ibn Taymiyya and Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, who relied heavily on 
the prophetic traditions.
1
  
(b) ijmāʻ 
 
Despite claims by some ʻulamā’, Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb does not 
reject the principle of ijmāʻ completely.  He considers ijmāʻ as one of the sources of 
the Shariʻa, by saying that it was not possible for the entire nation to agree or to have 
a consensus over something which would make it go astray.  However, bin ʻAbd al-
Wahhāb distinguishes between a ‘correct’ [ṣaḥīḥ] and ‘incorrect’ ijmāʻ; the only 
correct one possible is over the content of the only two fundamental sources of the 
Shariʻa – the Qur’an and Sunna.  
 
The Shaykh further adds that if a majority of opinion exists among Muslims about an 
issue which contradicts the Qur’an and Sunna, such a majority cannot be considered 
as ijmāʻ, surely not as a correct one.  In other words, ijmāʻ applies but is not 
considered as the third fundamental source of Shariʻa; rather, it is some kind of a 
logical branch of the first two fundamental sources – the Qur’an and the Sunna.2  
 
In his books, Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad does not elaborate so much about 
ijmāʻ, but on the occasions when he does refer to the subject it can be understood that 
he considers the  ijmāʻ of the ṣaḥāba as some kind of a third fundamental source of 
the Shariʻa.  For example, upon describing the wrongdoings committed by ahl al-
                                                 
1
 ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf Āl al-Shaykh, Masā’il fi’l munakarāt wa’l bidaʻ, pp. 18-46 
2
 Al-ʻUthaymin, Al-Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, pp. 132-133; Al-Rasā’il al-shakhsiyya 
li’l-Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, p. 54 
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bidʻa, especially those involved in grave worshipping, he says that this bidʻa 
contradicts the Qur’an, the Sunna and the ijmāʻ of the ṣaḥāba.  This approach, it has 
to be understood, does not contradict the Wahhābī general attitude which only accepts 
Qur’an and the Sunna, because it is obvious that any ijmāʻ of the ṣaḥāba could be 
based only on the Qur’an and the Prophetic Sunna.1   
 
Another aspect in Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad’s doctrine is the necessity of 
obtaining an ijmāʻ upon declaring someone a mushrik or a kāfir (unbeliever).  At this 
point he differs from his father, who, upon detecting an act of shirk rushes not only to 
declare the perpetrator a mushrik, but also stresses he should be punished 
immediately.
2
 
 
Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan argues, either directly or indirectly, that ijmāʻ is 
one of the fundamental sources of Shariʻa.  However, he limits it to include only the 
consensus reached or agreed by the ʻulamā’ from the early generations of Islam [ijmāʻ 
salaf al-umma] – which goes up to the generation of the followers of the followers 
[tābiʻu al-tabiʻīn].  The best believers, according to him, are those he refers to as ʻThe 
People of the Sunna and Consensus’ [ahl al-sunna wa’l ijmāʻ]; these, according to the 
Shaykh, are the only people who could preserve and protect the tawḥīd from all the 
damages and disasters caused by shirk and bidʻa.3  Like other issues which have 
already been examined, attributing importance to ijmāʻ may reflect a necessity for 
better social and political cohesion in the second Saudi state. 
 
In Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf’s writings, ijmāʻ appears very often side by side with the 
Qur’an and the Sunna, when discussing the legitimate ways of making religious ruling 
or indeed issues related to those who violate correct fatāwā.  For example, a sinner 
who also violates the guidelines of tawḥīd is said to have actually violated the Qur’an, 
the Sunna and the ijmāʻ.  However, a deeper insight into the Shaykh’s writings gives 
the impression that for him ijmāʻ is a not a fundamental source for Shariʻa by itself, 
but rather a by-product of the contents of the Qur’an and the Sunna.  Like some of his 
predecessors, Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf agrees to have an ijmāʻ which has been 
                                                 
1
 ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, pp. 344, 368 
2
 ibid, pp. 332-333.  
3
 ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan, Fatḥ al-majīd, pp. 35, 71, 219, 263  
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determined up to the days of the followers of the ṣaḥāba [al-tābiʻūn]; he also supplies 
a new definition of such a consensus – al-ijmāʻ al-maʻṣūm (an impeccable consensus), 
a consensus which cannot and must not be challenged or questioned.
1
   
 
Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf refers very briefly to the issue of ijmāʻ.  He does 
not say directly whether ijmāʻ should be considered a fundamental source of Shariʻa, 
but rather states that, upon deciding whether a person or a group should be considered 
guilty of acts of kufr or ghulūw, a consensus should exist among those who decide -- 
namely, the ʻulamā’.  The Shaykh mentioned two terms: The consensus of the People 
[ijmāʻ al-nās] and the consensus of the ʻulamā’ from the early generations of Islam 
[ijmāʻ al-salaf].2  By so doing he follows more or less the perceptions held by his 
predecessors regarding ijmāʻ.  
(c) ijtihād 
 
Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb’s approach vis-à-vis ijtihād is unique.  The Shaykh does not rule 
out the use of ijtihād altogether, but distinguishes between two types – the first being 
the absolute [al-ijtihād al-muṭlaq] which had been carried out by the ʻulamā’ from the 
first generations, including the ṣaḥāba and the four imāms (the founders of the four 
madhāhib), who had been trusted ʻulamā’ and ruled only according to the Qur’an and 
the Sunna.  The second type is partial or limited [ijtihād juz’ī / maḥdūd], which was 
performed by later ʻulamā’ with vast and profound knowledge about the issue 
addressed to them; in any case, their rulings must also rely only on the Qur’an and the 
Sunna. 
 
Generally, by limiting the legitimacy of ijtihād, the Shaykh expresses his fear that by 
applying it too often, the Qur’an would no longer be the guiding authority for the 
entire nation, turning instead into a guiding authority only for a handful of ʻulamā’.  It 
is quite obvious that like ijmāʻ, ijtihād for Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb is not a fundamental 
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 ʻAbd al-Laṭīf bin ʻAbd al-Raḥman Āl al-Shaykh, Al-Barāhin al-Islamiyya, p. 61; ʻAbd al-Laṭīf bin 
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source of Shariʻa but a tool for the implementation of the only two sources of Shariʻa 
permitted by the Wahhābiyya – the Qur’an and Sunna.1  
 
Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad follows his father’s path, distinguishing between 
absolute and partial ijtihād and stating that no scholar among his or his father’s 
generation could claim to be an absolute mujtahid or act like one.  The Shaykh argues 
that for experienced ʻulamā’, performing partial ijtihād is legitimate, but only in cases 
where such ijtihād is based on a clear and unquestioned text from the Qur’an or the 
Prophetic traditions.  Upon performing partial ijtihād, he continues, a mujtahid is not 
necessarily obligated to follow the Ḥanbalī school, as long as he rules according to the 
Qur’an or the Sunna or both, and as long as his ruling is based on a judgment of one 
of the four imāms.2 
 
Like his predecessors in the Āl al-Shaykh family, Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan 
is very reluctant to speak about ijtihād, claiming that, as time passes, the likelihood 
increases for deviation from the Qur’an and Sunna while making religious rulings.   
The Shaykh does not condemn ijtihād, and even quotes Ibn Ḥanbal, who said that 
ijtihād is still legitimate within the right boundaries.  Nevertheless, he emphasises that 
a mujtahid must be extremely careful in applying ijtihād in his rulings.  This again 
means that he must verify that such ijtihād relies strongly on the Qur’an or Sunna or 
both.
3
 
 
In a related manner, Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf does not elaborate much in his writings 
about ijtihād.  He looks at strict limitations on those ʻulamā’ entitled to perform 
ijtihād, especially the issues it may cover.  The whole issue of tawḥīd is beyond 
question, as well as the duty of prayers, the pillars of Islam and the fundamentals of 
belief.  All other issues are open to ijtihād, as long as the process does not contradict 
the Qur’an and Sunna.  Performing a wrongful ijtihād, the Shaykh concludes, might 
                                                 
1
 Al-ʻUthaymin, Al-Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, pp. 133-135; Al-Rasā’il al-shakhsiyya 
li’l-Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, p. 17, 29  
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 Al-ʻUthaymin, ibid 
3
 ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan, Fatḥ al-majīd, pp 251, 282; ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan, Qurat ‘uyūn al-
muwāḥidīn, Taif, Maktabat al Muayyad, pp 29, 191 
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lead to shirk and ghulūw, as happened to Christians, the Shiʻa, philosophers and other 
groups.
1
 
 
Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf hardly refers at all, in his previously-mentioned 
book, to the whole issue of ijtihād.  However, it is quite clear that he is not in favour 
of it.  He warns that by broadening the scope of ijtihād and performing it carelessly, 
believers might find themselves out of Islam, committing sins and wrongdoings while 
thinking that they are actually obeying Allah.  He cites the example of the khawārij as 
a group of believers who overused ijtihād, and, as a result, regressed to performing 
ghulūw until they were finally excluded from Islam.  In addition, some students of the 
ṣaḥāba [talāmīdh al-ṣaḥāba] made a wrongful ijtihād which caused them to deviate 
from the right path and as a result were executed.
2
 
III. Terms affiliated with bidʻa 
ḍalāla 
 
In his writings, Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb frequently refers to the issue 
of ḍalāla.  In most cases, his discussion of the term is tied to bidʻa, and he repeatedly 
quotes some familiar Hadith and links the two through the version which results in 
hellfire.  The Shaykh tends to bond the affiliated terms directly, writing about ahl al-
bidʻa wa’l ḍalāl or ahl al-shirk wa’l ḍalāl. For the Shaykh, it looks as if ḍalāla is the 
opposite of truth [al-ḥaqq].3 
 
Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad also refers several times to the ‘triangle’ of bidʻa, 
ḍalāla and shirk.  The Shaykh quotes the Hadith regarding the first two much less 
than his father does.  His main emphasis lies on the issues of grave worshiping and 
asking assistance from the dead; he attacks very firmly people who do these things, 
saying that whoever looks for assistance from the dead actually commits an act of 
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shirk, and should, therefore, be seen as belonging to the ahl al-bidʻa and the ahl al-
ḍalāl.1  
 
Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman deals with the issue of ḍalāla much more often than his 
predecessors, a fact which once again may be attributed to the political crises and 
internal disintegration which prevailed in the second Saudi state.  The Shaykh looks at 
ḍalāla as the opposite of going in the right path.  While Allah, he says, paved the right 
path for the believers, Satan paved the way which leads to ḍalāla.  Ḍalāla occurs 
alongside terms like bidʻa, kufr, shirk and sharr [evil], especially when they involve 
acts of worshipping anyone or anything but Allah.  On the other hand, if a believer 
performs an act of worship correctly, according to the rules and guidelines of tawḥīd, 
he is protected from bidʻa and ḍalāla.  The Shaykh also warns believers against false 
imāms who try to make them go astray, referring to them as al-ā’ima al muḍallilūn.2 
 
For Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf bin ʻAbd al-Raḥman, ḍalāla generally accompanies shirk; 
the basis for both is violation of the strict rules of tawḥīd, especially sinful grave 
worship and the sin of invoking assistance and salvation from the dead.  In some cases, 
the Shaykh refers to the ignorance which brings men to deviation, speaking of such 
people as ahl al-jahl wa’l ḍalāla, who distort the contents of the Qur’an and of the 
sound Hadith.  Several groups are named in this way, among them the Sufis.
3
 
 
Interestingly, Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf does not refer to ḍalāla at all.   
Unlike the others, he deals more extensively with bidʻa, as well as with shirk. 
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shirk  
Since Wahhābiyya was based by Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb on the importance 
and centrality of tawḥīd, dealing with the issue of shirk would be a key topic for him,1 
his followers and the Wahhābī ʻulamā’.  ‘Aziz ‘Azmeh, a Wahhābī historian who 
wrote his main book in the days of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, stresses more than once that 
the unbelief of the mushrikūn in his time was much more prevalent than those in the 
days of the ancestors, who were killed by the Prophet.
2
  ‘Azmeh further reminds his 
readers that the first to practise the bidʻa of shirk in Islamic history was ‘Amr bin 
Luḥay, 3 who according to tradition introduced to the city of Mecca the Goddess 
Manāt, one of the three daughters of Allah.  And indeed it seems that Ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhāb believed that shirk was the most severe bidʻa, and there was a direct path 
leading from bidʻa to shirk.4 
 
For Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, shirk means anything which deviates from the strict 
guidelines of tawḥīd, which makes its perpetrator a mushrik.  In more practical terms 
he was particularly zealous in his fight against worshipping holy men (like the Sufi 
shaykhs) and the common habit of conducting prayers at graves and tombstones.  The 
Shaykh emphasises in many of his writings that any such mushrik should face the 
consequences of his actions, whereby he would be subjected to takfīr, and executed 
by the true believers.  
 
A well-known story told about him suggests that he used to personally hunt down 
those he considered mushrikūn and kill them, sometimes with his bare hands.  In his 
writings, the Shaykh repeats many times the claim that the Prophet used to kill the 
unbelievers who did not follow the Sunna,
5
 which, as already explained, is another 
main pillar of Wahhābiyya.  Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb and his followers also began 
demolishing graves visited by the people, and stoned to death people who had 
committed acts of adultery or shirk. 
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 Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, Majmūʻat al-fatāwā wa’l-rasā’il, Beirut, Dār al-Jīl, 1987, p.69   
5
 Al-Rasā’il al-shakhsiyya li’l-Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, pp 1-13, 43-73, 92-125; 
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Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd Allah’s approach is very similar to his father’s; 
according to him, a mushrik is a person who violates the strict rules and guidelines of 
tawḥīd.  Shirk is a sin which cannot be forgiven by Allah and all mushrikūn are 
sentenced to spend an eternal afterlife in hellfire.  Like his father, Shaykh ʻAbd Allah 
elaborated on the whole issue of grave worship as the main source of shirk, but he 
also refers to ghulūw as behaviour which turns a believer into a mushrik and muḍallil.  
 
Ghulūw, the Shaykh maintains, means attributing divine characters to important 
people like ʻAli, Jesus and all the Prophets -- including Muḥammad -- and performing 
acts of worship to them in person.  As mentioned earlier, Shaykh Muḥammad 
correlates between shirk and bidʻa, and on many occasions uses the term ahl al-shirk 
wa’l bidʻa; these are defined as unbelievers, who also deserve the greatest punishment 
for their actions and face death.
1
  
 
Shirk is definitely the most important axis of Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan’s 
writings.  All chapters of his main book Fatḥ al-majīd – sharḥ kitāb al-tawḥīd which 
has already been referred to several times in this chapter, deal in one way or another 
with different aspects of shirk.  His discussion of the subject runs through his other 
books as well, and is much wider and more thorough than those of his predecessors, 
going back as far as the pre-Islamic mushrikūn.  The Shaykh quotes a wide range of 
relevant verses and aḥādīth, which create the impression that shirk for him is the 
ultimate evil.  He says that whoever does not implement and practise the harshest 
rules of tawḥīd must be considered a mushrik and punished accordingly.  This applies 
even to a strict believer for whom Allah is the creator, but who makes the slightest 
deviation from the rules of tawḥīd.  
 
Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf bin ʻAbd al-Raḥman also deals extensively with the issue of 
shirk, alongside takfīr.  In his writings he covers various aspects of shirk and 
describes in full detail any case and any question related to it.  All sorts of violation of 
tawḥīd, as well as cases in which Muslims convert to other religions are, in the 
Shaykh’s opinion, acts of shirk, which oblige the true believers to declare takfīr of the 
                                                 
1
 ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al- Wahhāb, Al-Kalimāt al-nāfiʻa fi’l mukafarāt al-wāqiʻa, pp. 
330-341 
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perpetrator and to kill him.  Killing the mushrikūn wherever they are is a duty which 
will prevail and exist permanently, until the day of resurrection.  Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf 
developed the discussion of shirk and mushrikūn, and reached a very high level of 
argument in describing many kinds of behaviour as shirk.  For example, he argues that 
a person who dislikes another person who has accepted the rules of tawḥīd for himself, 
should be considered a mushrik, even if the hostility between the two does not 
originate in religious issues. 
 
The quick political, social and military deterioration of the second Saudi state during 
the last decade of Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf’s life influenced his religious writings and is 
clearly reflected in his discussions of shirk.  After 1865, when the second Saudi state 
lost many territories and populations, the Shaykh had to deal with a new question 
which his predecessors did not have to face – how to consider a believer who finds 
himself living in an area controlled or occupied by mushrikūn, and who is forced to 
join their military in fighting the people of unity [al-muwāḥḥidūn].  The Shaykh 
issued a fatwā saying that such a person actually becomes a mushrik and should, 
therefore, be killed as a kāfir.  
 
Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf continues the wide discussion of shirk and kufr.   
He describes in his book several situations of shirk, and it seems obvious that he 
considers it the most horrible sin, which leads to a declaration of takfīr against those 
who perform such acts, which in turn will lead to their execution.  However, in his 
discussion of the sentence that mushrikūn deserve, the Shaykh differs from his 
predecessors.  
 
First, he argues, if a person commits an act of shirk or kufr, he should not be punished 
immediately, but sometimes be given the benefit of the doubt.  The punishment 
should be imposed only if the perpetrator was well aware of the duties, rules and 
guidelines of tawḥīd.  The Shaykh stresses that if this person was not fully aware of 
his duties, he should first be taught them and receive a fair warning before moving to 
the stage where he must be executed as a kāfir.  Secondly, he responds to a question 
sent to him by a believer, asking whether everyone is entitled to kill or execute a 
mushrik; or whether the potential executioner should consult with an imām (in this 
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sense, a political leader) first in order to obtain permission.  His answer is that there is 
a debate among the most prominent ʻulamā’ about this question.1  
 
The fact that Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf conditions the execution of 
mushrikūn and recognises that the imāms play a role in the matter reflects the 
significant change that the third Saudi state brought to the relations between the 
religious and the ruling political elites. 
  
The ruling elite of the third Saudi state, led by ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz bin Saʻūd, was much 
stronger than the religious elite; this meant that the ʻulamā’ were restricted and could 
not act without first obtaining the political ruler’s permission.  The ʻulamā’ in this era, 
led by Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf, had to soften their religious message to 
some extent, and adjust it to the political needs dictated by the ruling elite. 
 
It should be mentioned that Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf was not only the 
most prominent religious figure of his time, but was also connected via marriage to 
the Ibn Saʻūd family – we already mentioned his daughter Tarfa, who married Ibn 
Saʻūd and gave birth to Prince Fayṣal bin ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz; Fayṣal later became the 
viceroy of the Ḥijāz (1924-1953), the Crown Prince (1953-1964) and finally – King of 
Saudi Arabia (1964-1975).
2
  These connections via marriage must have made him 
more attentive to the political necessities of his son-in-law, King ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz bin 
Saʻūd, which led him to soften his religious approach.  
commanding right and forbidding wrong  
For Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, the issue of commanding right and 
forbidding wrong [al-amr bi’l-maʿrūf wa’l-nahy ʿan al-munkar] occupies an 
important position in his discourse.  Following Ibn Taymiyya, the Shaykh claims that 
there are three necessary conditions for the correct implementation of this doctrine.   
First, the believer should have a vast knowledge about what is right and what is wrong; 
secondly, the believer must be very accurate and sensitive concerning right and wrong; 
                                                 
1
 ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf Aal al-Shaykh, Masā’il fi’l munakarāt wa’l bidaʻ, pp. 18-46 
2
 Al-Zirkilī, vol. 3-4, pp. 953-960; Alexander Bligh, ‘The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulama) as Participant 
in the Political System of the Kingdom’, International journal of Middle East studies, vol. 17, no. 1, 
1985, pp. 44-45. 
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and thirdly, whoever commands right and forbids wrong should be patient and strong 
in order to be able to cope with the challenges this brings.  
 
One of the factors which led the Shaykh to establish a political alliance with 
Muḥammad Ibn Saʻūd in the mid-eighteenth century was his understanding that 
without the consolidation of an alliance between the political power of the Saudi 
family and the religious prestige of himself and his followers, it would not be possible 
to implement correctly and comprehensively the ideas of commanding right and 
forbidding wrong.  His conclusion seems to match Ibn Taymiyya’s ideas concerning 
the symbiotic relations which should exist between umarā’ wa ʻulamā’.1  
 
Unlike his father, Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad barely refers to the issue.  On 
the single occasion he does refer to it, he presents a case in which a believer notices 
an instance of wrongdoing but does not know if he may use force to counter it, and 
punish or kill the perpetrator, in the absence of permission from his legitimate ruler, 
the emir. Shaykh ʻAbd Allah does not provide a decisive answer, but rather quotes 
several correct aḥādīth representing both opinions – in part stating that the believer 
must perform the command to do what is right and prohibit whatever is wrong 
passively, by heart and words only, while others argue that he must take action and 
kill the perpetrator, even if this means disobeying the emir.
2
 
   
As seen earlier, Shaykh ʻAbd Allah tries to be very careful politically.  On the one 
hand, as a prominent religious scholar and the son of the founder of the Wahhābī 
movement, he cannot ignore the requirements of commanding right and forbidding 
wrong; however, he refrains from expressing a direct opinion that would recommend 
disobedience to the ruler, mainly due to the strength of the emirs of the first Saudi 
state -- who were not tolerant towards interference in the state’s political affairs by the 
ʻulamā’, especially if it could also be interpreted as a call to disobedience in general.    
 
Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan, however, considers the issue to be very important 
religiously, socially and politically.  The Shaykh argues that the guidelines of 
                                                 
1
 Al-ʻUthaymin, Al-Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, pp. 137-139; Al-Rasā’il al-shakhsiyya 
li’l-Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, pp. 114-123 
2
 ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Jawāb ahl al-sunna al-nabawiyya fi naqḍ kalām al-
Shiʻa wa’l Zaydiyya, pp. 70-74 
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commanding right and forbidding wrong must be applied and even enforced; 
otherwise it will not be possible to carry out any religious or political rulings or 
decisions.  He says that all monotheistic Prophets -- even those who lived prior to the 
era of Muḥammad – used to apply these guidelines as a guarantee for the preservation 
of tawḥīd, with an emphasis on avoiding all sorts of shirk.  Perhaps to continue with 
this line, the Shaykh also argues that Jihad for the sake of Allah is an integral part of 
the concept of commanding right.
1
  
 
The importance and centrality of commanding right and forbidding wrong continues 
to be reflected in the writings of Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf  bin ʻAbd al-Raḥman, although 
he writes about it less than his father did.  As already mentioned, most of his writings 
focus on shirk and takfīr.  In writing on this issue, the Shaykh adopts most of his 
father’s opinions and especially the argument about Jihad being part of this concept.   
He also adds that a believer who follows the guidelines properly will not find himself 
in a situation of ḍalāla.2 
  
Finally, Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf looks at the importance of the concept, 
but his emphasis lies much more on its second dimension – forbidding wrong.  Most 
of the discussions in his book are dedicated to bidaʻ and wrongdoings [munkarāt], and 
to many of them he attributes shirk and kufr.
3
  
IV. Bid‘a – definitions & types 
 
According to Jundī,4  bidʻa for the Wahhābiyya can be defined as something which is 
claimed to be part of the religion but in fact is not -- appearing either as an abstract or 
concrete form, or as a general concept.  Bidʻa, he says, is forbidden and disgraceful 
because it is a confusion, and it is extremely incompatible with the fundamentals [uṣūl] 
of religion.  According to Ḥusayn ibn Ghannām, a Wahhābī historian from the days of 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, ahl al-bidʻa are considered by the Wahhābiyya to be the worst 
of all people.
5
  
                                                 
1
 Al-ʻUthaymin, Al-Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, p. 138 
2
 ibid; ʻAbd al-Laṭīf bin ʻAbd al-Raḥman Āl al-Shaykh, Miṣbāḥ al-ẓalām, p. 85  
3
 ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf Aal al-Shaykh, Masāil fi’l munakarāt wa’l bidaʻ, pp. 18-46 
4
 ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Jundī, Al-Imām Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb aw intiṣār al-manhaj al-salafī, Cairo, 
Dār al-Maʻārif, 1976., p. 31 
5
 Ḥusayn ibn Ghannām, Ta’rīkh Najd, Beirut, Dār al-Shurūk, 1985, p. 49 
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As already cited, Wahhābī ʻulamā’, especially in the time frame under discussion, 
tended to focus their attention on issues involving worshipping the living or dead, or 
the widespread practice of turning graves into mosques and building over them.
1
  
Hence, many examples will be drawn from this form of bid‘a of ‘ibādāt.  Ibn 
Ghannām, for example, is quoted by Zaharaddin2 as saying that in general their period 
was full of un-Islamic practices such as worshipping the dead and saints.  Zaharaddin 
continues and conveys an outstanding example of a sixty-cubit long grave in Jeddah 
which the Arab tribes worshipped, claiming that it was the grave of Eve.  Although 
the ʻulamā’ quoted in this study do not discuss in depth the status of annual 
commemorations which have been examined in other chapters, the Wahhābīs fought 
very hard against worship at any tombstones.  Between the years 1803-1808, for 
example, they attacked and destroyed the domes which mark the birthplaces of the 
Prophet, Abu-Bakr, ‘Alī, Khadīja and others, and also caused the Hajj convoys from 
across the region to stop for three years.
3
  Such acts, it should be noted, have been 
continued by the modern Saudi state. 
 
As will be seen later in this chapter, a strong characteristic of the earliest Wahhābī 
ʻulamā’ is the way they associate bidʻa with unbelief [kufr].  This tendency, it has to 
be said, goes completely against the rulings of Ibn Taymiyya who stated that takfīr 
itself is the first bidʻa in Islam.  For Ibn Taymiyya, the difference between the 
believer and the unbeliever lies in the way that belief in Allah and the Prophet are 
professed, and with a full recognition of the tawḥīd of Allah and the Prophet as his 
messenger [shahāda], however this supersedes the power of the Imām4 who cannot 
determine who is a true believer and who is not.   
                                                 
1
 ‘Abd Allah al-Sāliḥ al-‘Uthaymin, Ta’rīkh al-mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya al-Sa‘ūdiyya, 1984, p. 53 
2
 M. S. Zaharaddin, “Wahhābism and its Influence Outside Arabia” Islamic Quarterly 23, 1979, 
p. 147 
3
 Muḥsin al-Amīn, Kashf al-irtiyāb fi itibāʻ Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, Iran, Qum, Mu’asasat 
Ansariyan li’l Tabāʻa wa’l Nashr, [199-], pp. 23, 33 
4
 As‘ad AbuKhalil, "The incoherence of Islamic fundamentalism: Arab Islamic thought at the end of 
the 20
th
 century", Middle East Journal, vol. 48, no. 4 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 678-679, 687 
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In any case, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, for example, says: 
 
When you ought to fight unbelief, among the things you have to know are the 
reasons for accepting bidaʻ and the ways to fight them.1 
  
On the issue of tomb worship, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, for example, states (without any 
explanation or discussion) that among the people who worship graves, the worst are 
those who go around [ṭāfa] the graves.2  Regarding the custom of building mosques 
on top of graves, he quotes a Hadith in which the Prophet warns against doing so, 
assuming that the Prophet himself will be worshipped:  
 
Do not use my tomb to call for prayer, and your houses as graves; worship 
me from wherever you are, and your prayers will reach me.
3
 
 
In general, when referring to bidʻa, Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb usually quotes the Hadith 
which links bidʻa and ḍalāla, in the version which says this leads to hellfire.4   
However, sometimes he quotes the Hadith with the opposite intention, which looks at 
the reward given to anyone who revives a Sunna.
5
  Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb rejects the 
perception that there exists a bidʻa ḥasana, emphasizing instead the Prophet’s 
rejection of the notion.
6
  On the other hand, he refers at least once in his writings to 
what he calls bidʻa which is rooted in the shariʻa [bidʻa lahā aṣl fi’l shirʻ], like the act 
of gathering all Suras into one divine book – the Qur’an – after the death of the 
Prophet, or the extra prayers performed by ʻUmar (which, as has been shown above, 
are usually the main source to justify the perception of bidʻa ḥasana). 7  The two 
elements that he says distinguish between the believers and the ahl al-bidʻa are 
hypocrisy [nifāq] and apostasy [ridda].8 
 
                                                 
1
 Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Kitāb al-tawḥīd alladhi huwa ḥaqq Allah ‘ala ‘ibādihi, Beirut, Dār 
al-Qur’an al-Karīm, [19--], p. 42 
2
 ibid, p. 47 
3
 ibid, p. 368  
4
 See for example: Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Kitāb al-kabā’ir, pp. 2, 9; Al-Rasā’il al-
shakhsiyya li’l-Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, p. 20 
5
 See for example: Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Kitāb uṣūl al-īmān, p. 51 
6
 Al-‘Uthaymin, Al-Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, p. 129-131 
7
 Al-Rasā’il al-shakhsiyya li’l-Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, p. 51, 108-109.  
8
 Ibn Ghannām, p. 384 
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During the early days of the Wahhābiyya at least, it appears that ʻulamā’ dealt with 
issues related to bidʻa with some measure of mercy.  Bidʻa is presented as a result of 
utter confusion or even ignorance [jahl].  In a large number of instances phrases can 
be found such as mubtadi‘ jāhil or jāhil wa mubtadi‘.1  Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb explains 
that no matter how good the original intention of its generator has been, bidʻa leads to 
terrible things.
2
  Ignorance, he says, could lead to shirk when it comes to matters of 
tawḥīd.  Such ignorance also leads the mubtadiūn to cope with many more elements 
of unbelief than other believers.
3
  
 
It is also worth noting two types of bidʻa that do not appear to have been referred to in 
the writings of other ʻulamā’.  These are mentioned by Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb himself.   
The first represents what looks like any slight deviation from Sunna in interpersonal 
relationships, such as a person who wishes to split his assets and lands in a manner 
contrary to the guidelines of inheritance set by the Qur’an and shariʻa.  Such an act is 
called a ‘cursed bidʻa’ [bidʻa malʻūna]. 4  Another example of this kind is wasting 
one’s money or evicting one’s daughter;5 another concerns the divorce ceremony, 
which should be performed according to the Sunna, meaning the actual declaration of 
ṭalāq on three separate occasions, without adding anything such as curses.  Any 
change from this formula can also be considered bid‘a.6  
 
The second type of bid‘a established by Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb concerns politics in 
relation to the aforementioned model of umarā’ wa ʻulamā’, where he says that a 
legitimate political ruler should be recognised and respected as such, but only if he is 
stern about two key issues which are actually one: a strict following of the Qur’an and 
Sunna on the one hand, and avoiding bidaʻ and khurāfāt on the other.7 
 
                                                 
1
 See for example: Ibn Ghannām, p. 280; Aḥmad bin Ḥajr Abū Tāmī, Al-Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd 
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 Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Kitāb al-tawḥīd, p. 43 
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 Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Majmūʻat al-fatāwā wa’l rasā’il, p. 149 
4
 Al-Rasā’il al-shakhsiyya li’l-Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, p. 37, 51 
5
 Ibn Ghannām, p. 290 
6
 Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Mu’allafāt al-Shaykh al-Imām 
Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, Riyaḍ, Al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya al-Sa‘ūdiyya, Imām Muhammad 
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Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad does not offer a precise definition of bidʻa, but it 
seems that, in general, he follows his father’s line, positioning it as the opposite of 
Sunna.  Since his main emphasis is on commanding right and forbidding wrong, he 
correlates these affiliated terms by saying that whenever someone transforms 
commanding right or Sunna into bidʻa, it leads to unbelief [kufr] and empties tawḥīd 
of its content.  Many times he speaks about ahl al-shirk wa’l bidaʻ, reflecting his 
father’s view that shirk is the worst bidʻa.  
 
Shaykh ʻAbd Allah was not as ready to demolish graves as his father, but the 
Shaykh’s point of view on bidʻa is reflected in the way he approaches the topic.  If a 
person, he maintains, comes to visit a grave in order to think about the next world [al-
ākhira] or to pray to Allah and ask for his forgiveness, there is nothing wrong with it 
according to the Sunna.  However, if his purpose is to worship the dead or ask for 
their assistance, this becomes a violation of the Sunna and an act of shirk which he 
calls bidʻa shirkiyya; the Shaykh adds that his father was the one who quashed and 
suppressed such behaviour.
1
 
 
Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan continues more or less in a similar vein, not 
providing an exact definition, but citing examples, again mainly related to tomb 
worship, which give the impression that bidʻa is the opposite of Sunna.  The Shaykh 
quotes various ʻulamā’, including Ibn Ḥanbal and Ibn Taymiyya, who said that tomb 
worship and the conversion of graves into mosques are considered acts of ghulūw and 
bidʻa, which, when combined, add up to shirk.  
 
Like his uncle, he distinguishes between two types of visits (ziyāratān), the one which 
is allowed, or the other in which the visitor performs any act of worship, considered 
as a ‘visit of innovation’ or a ‘visit of unbelief’ [ziyāra bidʻiyya / ziyāra shirkiyya]; 
once again, the tight conflation of the two terms can be noted.  With regard to the 
latter, he also looks at kufr, stating that bidʻa which leads to unbelief is liked by Satan 
even more than regular sins; while there is a way back from a sin, there is no return 
from bidʻa.2  
                                                 
1
 ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al- Wahhāb, Al-Kalimāt al-nāfiʻa fi’l mukafarāt al-wāqiʻa, pp. 
340-342, 347-352, 368 
2
 ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan, Fatḥ al-majīd, pp. 252-253 
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As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf focused his writings on the 
issues of takfīr and shirk; naturally, therefore, the other affiliated terms, including 
bidʻa, acquire less attention.  Basically, his approach appears harsher than the others – 
stating that a person could either be a follower of Sunna [sunnī] or of bidʻa [bidʻī] but 
not both.  The Shaykh further mentioned that Allah must be worshipped according to 
the rules of the Shariʻa and not by performing any acts of bidʻa -- otherwise this 
would imply that the true meaning of the shahāda was not made a reality.  
 
Interestingly, Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf quotes not only Wahhābī but also non-Wahhābī 
ʻulamā’, who, according to him, contributed to the struggle against bidʻa.  These 
include, for example, Abu ʻAbd Allah Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī – founder of 
the madhhab which bears his name, as a scholar whose work in preventing worship at 
the Prophet’s grave helped in promoting Sunna and preventing bidʻa, since he 
convinced the believers to pray to Allah alone.  Unlike his predecessors in the Āl al-
Shaykh dynasty, Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf, upon discussing bidʻa, also refers from time to 
time to other issues, which are less severe than tomb worship -- for example, invoking 
the Prophet’s name after the adhān, as already noted.  This custom, he upholds, was 
first performed by Muslim warriors in fortifications [amṣār] in the fifth and sixth 
centuries.   According to him, this was ʻinvented’ by Egyptians and is a bidʻa which 
has no source in the Sunna.
1
  
 
Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf was the first of his family to compose a book 
dedicated specifically to the subject of bidʻa, comprising a series of questions 
addressed to him, together with his answers.  The numerous direct correlations made 
between bidʻa and kufr can be seen clearly here.  
 
One of the questions in this compilation, for example, is what should be done with a 
person who knows and reads the Qur’an but still does not understand that asking for 
assistance from anyone but Allah is wrong.  The Shaykh answers that such an act of 
bidʻa constitutes kufr, and this person should be considered an unbeliever.  Another 
                                                 
1
 ʻAbd al-Laṭīf bin ʻAbd al-Raḥman Āl al-Shaykh, Miṣbāḥ al-ẓalām, pp. 39-42, 65-69, 145, 171-2, 299-
313; ʻAbd al-Laṭīf bin ʻAbd al-Raḥman Āl al-Shaykh, Al-Itḥāf fi’l radd ‘ala al-ṣahāf, online version on  
http://ar.wikisource.org/wiki/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81_
%D9%81%D9%89_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%AF_%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89_%D8%A7
%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81 (Last accessed – 21 August 2014); ʻAbd al-Laṭīf bin 
ʻAbd al-Raḥman Āl al-Shaykh, Al-Barāhīn al-Islamiyya, pp. 8, 101 
164 
 
question concerns a believer who would like to be friendly with both the preservers of 
tawḥīd and the mushrikūn, but fails to denounce or condemn the wrongdoings 
committed by the latter.  Shaykh ʻAbd Allāh answers that whoever fails to denounce 
such wrongdoings should be considered an unbeliever and be punished accordingly, 
by death.
1
 
V. Bid‘a – what needs to be done to avoid it 
Altogether, most of the ʻulamā’ studied in this chapter focus on attacking shirk, kufr 
and bidʻa; they do not tend to offer practical ways to avoid bidʻa, and most of the time 
simply speak about the need to adhere to the Sunna and to command right and forbid 
wrong.  Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, for example, emphasises the prohibition of worshipping 
Allah by means of bidʻa or in any way not permitted by Him, as it is said: 
  
whoever wishes to meet his Lord shall worship him the right way, and not 
commit any shirk while serving him.
2
 
 
He states that Allah has ordered Muslims not to argue about His Sunna,
3
 which should 
be preserved with the tradition of the first three generations.  In order to keep the 
Sunna, one should refrain from three things – committing acts of bidʻa, causing or 
upholding separation [tafarruq] or disagreement [ikhtilāf] within the ranks of the 
umma.
4
  This is where the term salaf first appears in relation to Wahhābī doctrine. 
Salaf means working to return to the fundamentals which prevailed in the first three 
generations of Islam, and in modern times is often confused with the Wahhābiyya. 
Interestingly, even Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s brother Sulaymān, who dedicated a whole 
book to attacking the Shaykh, agrees that bidʻa is opposed to al-salaf al-ṣaliḥ.5 
                                                 
1
 ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf Āl al-Shaykh, Masā’il fi’l munakarāt wa’l bidaʻ, Riyaḍ, Maktabat al-
Rushd, 2008, pp 18-22, 29-30 
2
 Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Majmūʻat al-fatāwa wa’l rasā’il, Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1987, p. 69 
3
 Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Mu’allafāt al-Shaykh al-Imām Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, 
vol. III, p. 11  
4
 Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Kitāb uṣūl al īmān, pp. 47-53 
5 Sulaymān bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb al-Najdī, Al-Ṣawā’iq al-ilāhiyya fi’l-radd ʻala al-Wahhābiyya, 
Istanbul, Isik Bookstore, 1975, p. 21 
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VI. Other types of bidʻa 
 
Early Wahhābī approaches towards other sects  
 
As with other issues discussed more widely in earlier chapters, the material which 
exists in Wahhābī writings on the more profound philosophical and sociological types 
of bidʻa (which fall under the category of ʻaqīdāt) is quite limited.  It seems that Ibn 
‘Abd al-Wahhāb was either very careful when using philosophy, for fear of making 
mistakes in his application of it, or chose to ignore it deliberately.  There are a few 
condemnations of the possible misuse of kalām (scholastic theology) and mantiq 
(logic), and also some statements by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb such as ʻilm and fiqh can 
lead to bidʻa and ḍalālāt’,1 explaining that, inter alia, false prophets change what is 
written in the Qur’an and Sunna in matters of knowledge or issues related to fiqh.2  
In this sense, there is a big difference between the significant place philosophic ideas 
and moral arguments occupy in the writings of Ibn Ḥanbal or Ibn Taymiyya, and the 
place they hold in Wahhābī writings.  This approach continues when Wahhābīs deal 
with various philosophical sects like the jahmiyya, mu‘tazila or ʻashā’ira, which were 
generally despised by Ibn Taymiyya.  Such views are rejected because they 
misunderstand or misrepresent the right meaning of tawḥīd.3   
 
Under the title ahl al-bidʻa, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb also includes other groups which 
were excluded from the community of believers for their use of philosophy like the 
qadariyya and the khawārij, of whom the Prophet said: ‘if you find them kill them’.4   
He refers to the jahmiyya and ahl al-bidʻa in the same breath, accusing both schools 
of thought of denying men knowledge of the truth [al-ḥaqq], due to their scorn of it 
and of trying to persuade others that their own truth is the right one.
5
  
 
                                                 
1
 Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Majmūʻat al-fatāwā wa’l rasā’il, p. 128 
2
 ibid, p. 135 
3
 Al-‘Azmeh, p. 141 
4
 Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Mu’allafāt al-Shaykh al-Imām 
Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, vol. I, p. 215 
5
 Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, Majmūʻat al-tawḥīd al-Najdiyya, p. 150 
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Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad focuses many of his attacks on bidʻa on the 
Zaydis, the khawārij and the mu‘tazila, saying that they violated the principles of the 
Sunna and tried to mislead the believers by claiming that they belonged to ahl al-
sunna or the People of Justice [‘adl] and tawḥīd, while being, in reality, among ahl al-
bidʻa and ahl al-shirk.  Their most severe sin, according to the Shaykh, was in 
misinterpreting [in terms of ta’wīl] the Qur’an in a way which contradicted the way it 
had been interpreted by the Prophet, the ṣaḥāba and the tābi‘ūn.  Like Jews and 
Christians, he adds, they also distorted verses from the Qur’an.  
 
Shaykh ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad claims that one of the worst acts of bidʻa which 
they also committed was the misinterpretation of the characteristics and capabilities of 
Allah [ṣiffāt Allah].  He argues that by the late years of the Umayyad Caliphate, the 
Zaydis and the mu‘tazila had related the capabilities, descriptions and titles of Allah 
to human beings; therefore they should be brought to death.  As an example he relates 
the story of a person named Jaʻd bin Dirham, who performed such bidaʻ and was 
consequently captured by ahl al-ʻilm and executed.1 
 
Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan was the first in his family, and probably the 
earliest of the Wahhābī ʻulamā’, to use the term bidʻa in order to attack Jews and 
Christians.  While also quoting other ʻulamā’, he writes that Jews and Christians are 
among those who turned rights into wrongs and Sunna into bidʻa, and that by doing so 
they actually committed the wrongdoings which caused Allah to dislike and punish 
them.  When dealing with other sects in Islam, he includes under the title of al-rāfiḍa 
the khawārij, mu‘tazila and Shiʻa, and names them all ahl al-bidʻa.  The rāfiḍa, 
according to him, are actually the source of bidʻa, and were the first to worship graves 
and build mosques on tombs -- hence committing acts of shirk.  The Shiʻa and other 
sects which derived from them, such as the Alawites, are considered the worst [sharr 
ahl al-bidʻa]. 
 
Like his uncle, Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan refers to the misinterpretation of 
Qur’anic verses as bidʻa, and explains that this had its origin in improper knowledge 
of the Shariʻa by those who made the false interpretation, and who neglected to 
                                                 
1
 See: ʻAbd Allah bin Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Jawāb ahl al-sunna al-nabawiyya fi naqḍ 
kalām al-Shiʻa wa’l Zaydiyya, chapters 14, 25 and 30 
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consult with the proper ʻulamā’ or ahl al-sunna whenever and wherever they could 
have done so.
1
  It is worth noting that this approach is somewhat merciful, and unlike 
the early Salafis, for example, does not blame the ʻulamā’ themselves for not having 
sufficient knowledge. 
 
As already explained, Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf’s conditions were different, and he was 
influenced by his opinion about the Muslim communities living outside the realm of 
Wahhābī control.  Therefore he categorises many as ahl al-bidʻa, including the 
qadariyya, jahmiyya, khawārij and Shiʻa, whom he categorically names rāfiḍa.  To 
him, the true believers are only those Muslims living in the territories under the 
political control of the Saudi state; on other lands in which bidʻa is widespread, living 
or even travelling there may encourage sedition [fitna].  Like some of his predecessors, 
the Shaykh speaks very firmly against those who performed acts of religious worship 
at graves or who asked anyone but Allah for help and salvation.  As people who 
perform bidʻa, he claimed, they cause ahl al-sunna and ahl al-tawḥīd to deviate from 
the right path, and perform the same bidaʻ performed by the khawārij.  
 
The view of Sufis by the Wahhābī ʻulamā’ is examined more closely in the next 
chapter, but it is still worth mentioning Muhammad Al-Atawneh’s comment that they 
lived ‘under the radar’ in the first Wahhābī state.  He says that they were forbidden to 
possess Sufi literature and to practise their mystical meditation rituals, both crucial to 
the Sufi orders.
2
  Evans-Pritchard adds that when the Wahhābīs overran the Ḥijaz in 
I924-1925, they forbade all Sufi practices and orders; but later, when King Ibn Saʻūd 
made friends with the self-exiled Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf, he permitted the Sanūsīs to 
retain their lodges on condition that they did not practise their da‘wa, a compromise 
which seems to have lasted till the present time.  The Sanūsiyya is said to have 
received preferential treatment because the Wahhābīs found no bida‘ in its teachings 
or, at any rate, that it erred less in this respect than the other Sufi orders.
3
  
 
                                                 
1
 ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan, Fatḥ al-majīd, pp 251, 282; ʻAbd al-Raḥman bin Ḥasan, Qurat ‘uyūn al-
muwaḥidīn, pp. 10-16, 28-30, 58-67, 82, 110-116, 133, 229.   
2
 Muhammad Al-Atawneh, "Wahhābi Self-Examination Post-9/11: Rethinking the ‘Other’, ‘Otherness’ 
and Tolerance", Middle Eastern Studies, 47:2 (2011), p. 267 
3
 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "The Distribution of Sanusi Lodges", Africa: Journal of the International 
African Institute, vol. 15, no. 4 (Oct., 1945), p. 187 
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Between bidʻa and local babits – tea, coffee and tobacco in the Arabian 
Peninsula – a case study in modernity 
 
In many cases, when referring to the Wahhābiyya and its attitude towards the whole 
subject of bidʻa, its policy of fighting against a streak of decadence which was, or so 
it seems, prevalent in Arabia, is encountered. Such descriptions are seldom found in 
Wahhābī literature but often raised and discussed in the diaries of Western travellers 
to Arabia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In many cases, these 
descriptions are used to create a bad impression of the Wahhābiyya in general, and 
maybe to illustrate a sense of the primitive specific to them. For example, the strict 
restrictions on the building of Wahhābī mosques, which were to be built exactly as 
they were at the time of the Prophet -- without minarets, mosaics or gilding --
1
 fall 
under this category. 
 
The most notable of these subjects is the ban against smoking tobacco and drinking 
coffee.
2
  One of these travellers, Charles Montagu Doughty, who visited Arabia as 
late as the end of the nineteenth century, devoted much space to descriptions of the 
huge amounts of tobacco and coffee consumed by Arabian Bedouin, to the habit of 
sitting together and having coffee-drinking sessions [majālis] and to the large number 
of coffee houses which could be found along the road to the Hajj, especially from 
Jeddah to Mecca. He says that many of them cannot remember when they last started 
the morning without drinking coffee and getting ʻdrunk’ upon a qalyān (shisha) of 
tobacco. 
  
According to Doughty, the Badū love to ʻdrink’ the fumes of a strong leaf till the 
world turns around.  Some people, he says, were even known to be totally addicted to 
smoking and to drinking coffee.  Doughty stresses the fact that the ʻevil use’ is 
tolerated in the entire Najd, except the Wahhābī state, where the believers would say 
that ʻTobacco is baul Iblīs, the devil’s water’.3  
                                                 
1
 Kenneth Williams, Ibn Sa’ud: The Puritan King of Arabia, London, Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1933, p. 189 
2
 Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies vol. Ii, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1971, p. 34 
3
 C.M. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd. & The Medici Society 
Limited, 1926), p. 247; also Lewis Pelly, Report on a Journey to Riyadh in Central Arabia, 1865, 
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Doughty, who speaks a lot about ʻWahhābī fanaticism’, including what he describes 
as their disgust with Christian travellers, and who repeatedly uses the phrase 
ʻWahhābī malice’ as some kind of misery inflicted upon the good people of the Banī 
‘Aniza, goes on to say that some of those ʻfanatics’ stopped smoking at once 
following the demands of the Wahhābī doctrine.  He says that the ones who ban 
smoking and drinking think it weakens their bodies.
1
  Other bans mentioned in these 
books are the use of silk in any part of the attire, as well as ornaments of gold, silver 
and gems,
2
 fine food, soft clothes and also dancing and music, ‘lest they might detract 
from contemplation of the true God’.3  In religious terms it is noted that they banned 
the use of the subḥa (rosary), and that their shrines are described as very simple and 
without decorations. 
 
During the last decade of the nineteenth century, after the second Saudi state 
collapsed and before the third was established, an Arab scholar and traveller named 
Shaykh Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī al-Dimashqī wandered through the Arabian Peninsula, 
met with several communities and their ʻulamā’, and observed their eating, drinking 
and smoking habits.  Following his tour in the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere, he 
wrote a whole book dedicated to the issues of tea, coffee and smoking.  The book 
provides very elaborate descriptions of tea, coffee and tobacco, with an emphasis on 
their history and on the different ways in which they reached the Arabian Peninsula. 
 
Most of al-Dimashqī’s descriptions deal with the agricultural and medical 
characteristics of these items, with a relatively light religious reference.  The chapter 
on tea, for example, specifies the different types of tea which reached the Arabian 
Peninsula.  The chapter emphasizes the fact that tea was perceived as a very good 
drink with many medical advantages and without any objection from religious ʻulamā’ 
or other people.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Cambridge, Eng.; New-York: Oleander, 1978, p. 9, where the writer refers several times to the free 
circulation of coffee and Turkish pipe among the tribesmen. 
1
 Doughty , pp. 384, 452, 395, 538 
2
 Zaharaddin, p. 148 
3
 Robert Lacey, The Kingdom, London, Hutchinson & Co., 1981, p. 57 
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His attitude towards coffee, however, is slightly different. After describing the routes 
and ways from which coffee arrived to the Arabian Peninsula, the author cites 
contradictory opinions about whether or not drinking coffee is permitted.  He quotes 
various opinions, including those of ʻulamā’ who were opposed to the drinking of 
coffee and claimed it was addictive, its effects being similar to those of alcoholic 
drinks which harm the human body.  However, others praise the advantages of 
drinking coffee and emphasize that it actually has many health-giving qualities which 
have a positive effect on the body and spirit.  They were quoted as saying that all the 
great writers, teachers, poets and scientists used to drink coffee.  The author even 
quotes several non-Wahhābī Shaykhs who say that drinking coffee should be 
permitted like other drinks such as milk.  It should be stated that none of those quoted 
from either side of the argument mention the issue of bidʻa in connection to the 
drinking of coffee. 
 
The attitude towards smoking tobacco, however, is different.  Throughout the whole 
relevant chapter, the author quotes the opinions of many people, including mashā’ikh, 
against smoking.  Most of the criticism is based on medical reasons, with the claim 
that smoking exposes the entire body to many health risks – the mouth, lungs, heart, 
nerve-system, eyes, kidneys, blood system, etc.  Here, a special chapter is dedicated to 
the religious objection to smoking. In this chapter, the author quotes many ʻulamā’ 
who claim that smoking tobacco by using any smoking utensil, beginning with a 
cigarette and ending with a hookah, was a bidʻa and hence forbidden.  None of the 
Shaykhs quoted in this chapter is Wahhābī.1  
 
Thus, these three issues were widely dealt with in previous generations, by a wide 
variety of ʻulamā’ and other relevant figures, and are not specifically restricted to the 
Wahhābiyya.  In addition, most of those who rejected them did not do so on a 
religious basis, but rather on health or social grounds.  This is verified by the similar 
debate in the chapter on the early salafi reformers, where the term bidʻa is not referred 
to at all. Furthermore, it seems that even if labelling smoking or drinking coffee as 
bidʻa has been discussed by the later Wahhābī generations, this was made on socio-
political principles as well, in order for the state to be able to recruit the tribesmen to 
                                                 
1
 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī, Risāla fi’l shāy wal qahwa wa’l dukhān, 1322H, pp 1-56 
171 
 
work for its benefit and to stop wasting their time, as described with some 
exaggeration by Western travelers.  
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has dealt with the writings of five generations of ʻulamā’ from the family 
of the founder of the Wahhābīya, Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb. In general, 
they identified bidʻa as the first stage in the deterioration of a believer to the status of 
mushrik and unbeliever.  Nonetheless, relying on the different geo-political and social 
circumstances in which each of them lived, it was shown how these factors influenced 
their outlook on the issue of bidʻa as well as other related terms.  Whenever the 
ʻulamā’ and the rulers possessed more or less the same power and prestige, or when 
the ‘ulamā had more power than the rulers, they tended to look less at bidʻa and more 
at severe terms like shirk, unbelief and takfīr and openly speak about a death penalty. 
 
In the early years of the third Saudi state, when it was already evident that the 
political elite was stronger than the ʻulamā’ and would not tolerate any political 
disobedience, the ʻulamā’ preferred to ‘lower the flames’ and – in other words – shift 
the discussion from shirk and takfīr to bidʻa.  Furthermore, in the writings of Shaykh 
ʻAbd Allah bin ʻAbd al-Laṭīf in the third Saudi state, it is obvious that the religious 
elite felt quite insecure about the measures that should be taken against people who 
were suspected of shirk.  Acknowledging that the final word belonged to the ruler, 
they preferred to give a second chance to people suspected of being mushrikūn and 
recognized that even when a death penalty should be imposed on anyone, they should 
first ask the ruler’s permission to carry it out.  
 
If the attitude of the first generations of Wahhābī ʻulamā’ is compared to the opinions 
of those who were active from the middle to the late twentieth century and even from 
the first decade of the twenty-first century (which will be discussed in the next 
chapter), it is possible to discern that the early Wahhābī ʻulamā’ placed much more 
emphasis on the greater sins, and were very firm about imposing the death penalty on 
the mushrikūn and unbelievers, sometimes without hesitation. At the same time, their 
discussions and examples are very limited, mostly focusing on tomb-worship, which 
172 
 
seems to have been a real problem for tribespeople of those times, and possibly to an 
even greater extent than in later times.  
 
It looks as if Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and his successors actually used religion to fight 
what would seem to have been an outstanding aspect of tribal life in the Arabian 
Peninsula at that period.  Trying to unite the tribes under a common cause, they felt 
obliged on the one hand to encourage them to rely on themselves and their flesh and 
blood leaders (instead of saints and tombstones), and on the other hand to eradicate 
their decadent tendencies so they might become more modest in their behaviour and 
more closely attached to the Wahhābī community and its leaders.  In other words – 
bidʻa serves here as a tool for social change. 
 
In the third Saudi state, especially after King Ibn Saʻūd quashed the revolt by the 
Ikhwān of Najd, it was obvious that the royal family was stronger than the religious 
elite.  King ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz bin Saud and the other kings, especially Fayṣal, Khālid, 
Fahd and ʻAbd Allāh significantly limited the powers, authority and influence of the 
religious elite and created a situation in which the clergy became totally dependent on 
the ruling classes.  As a result, Wahhābī ʻulamā’ from the middle to late twentieth 
century
 
had to be very careful, choose their definitions wisely and not incite against 
non-Wahhābī communities, either in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere. 
  
The third Saudi state is also a technologically modern country which grants the 
religious establishment very powerful and effective tools with which to control the 
religious behaviour of the population.  As a result, fewer people perform acts of shirk, 
and, when appropriate, the ʻulamā’ can speak about different communities and their 
bidaʻ. 
 
Since the Ikhwān have just been mentioned, this may be an appropriate place to 
mention  an issue that will also be looked at in the general conclusions – a possible 
difference between interpretations of ʻbidʻa’, on the one hand as a figure of speech, 
and on the other the way it is dealt with in religious writings.  Mark Sedgwick refers 
to the telegraph stations that ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz inherited from the Hashemite regime in 
the Ḥijāz.  He says that ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz needed and wanted more of them to administer 
his new domains, adding that his attitude seems to have been purely pragmatic. 
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Sedgwick states that while the Wahhābī ʻulamā’ took a middle line and neither 
condemned nor endorsed the telegraph, the Ikhwān fiercely and inflexibly opposed it 
as bidʻa.1  Such discussions are not to be found in the sources used here: they took 
place either orally or through other outlets.  Of course, the lack of written Ikhwānī 
sources also contributes to the difficulty. 
  
                                                 
1
 Mark J. R. Sedgwick, "Saudi Sufis: Compromise in the Hijaz, 1925-40", Die Welt des Islams, New 
Series, vol. 37, issue 3, Shiites and Sufis in Saudi Arabia (Nov., 1997), p. 355 
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Chapter four: The perception of bid‘a by current  
Wahhābī ʻulamā’ 
I. General Introduction 
 
Throughout Saudi history, in spite of the variable tensions in various times between 
the relationships of umarā’ wa ʻulamā’ which were highlighted in the previous 
chapter, the Wahhābī ‘ulamā’ generally played an important role within the state. 
Their opinions on all aspects of life were important, especially with regard to various 
aspects of day-to-day life in the kingdom.  In addition, they played an important part 
in shaping the political, religious and social map in Saudi Arabia.  
 
Until the late 1980s, the official religious establishment was the only player in the 
religious arena within the kingdom.  The prosperity derived from huge oil revenues 
enabled the royal family to educate, foster, nominate and promote tens of thousands 
of people to religious positions within the state apparatus; in return, the ‘ulamā’ 
obeyed the royal family, issued fatāwā according to the rulers’ wishes, and almost 
completely abstained from expressing any independent opinions.
1
 
 
However, due to several geo-political, economic, demographic and social 
developments, changes have occurred. Since the beginning of the 1990s the Saudi 
regime not only lost part of its credibility in the eyes of the ‘ulamā’, but also was no 
longer able to provide them with the many social and economic benefits they had 
hitherto enjoyed.
2
  As a result, the present religious map in Saudi Arabia is much 
broader and more complicated than before.
3
  In modern Saudi Arabia, a distinction 
can be made between ‘official’ ‘ulamā’, who hold key positions in the Saudi official 
religious establishment, and ‘unofficial’ ones. The second group can further be 
divided into sub-groups: from Shaykhs who were previously in the opposition in the 
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1990s but are now much more affiliated with the government and even help the 
government to combat radical approaches, to shaykhs affiliated with al-Qā‘ida.  
 
All these developments in the religious map of the country open a window to current 
developments in Wahhābiyya in general, and especially in Saudi Arabia, during the 
last two decades.  In this regard, it could be said that two contradicting trends are 
developing simultaneously.  One, which began after the 1991 Gulf War, created a 
process of turning against the existing religious-political order; the other turning to 
violence on its way to topple the regime. 
 
The first trend started with petitions and pamphlets sent by unofficial Wahhābī ‘ulamā’ 
to the King, in which they expressed criticism of the political and religious leadership 
of the kingdom, continued with street demonstrations against the government, and 
ended with an increasing number of Wahhābī ‘ulamā’ openly calling on the public to 
topple the political and religious leadership of the country which, according to them, 
did not govern the country according to the Shari‘a.  They referred specifically to the 
corruption of many members of the royal family, and to the military cooperation 
between Saudi Arabia and the United States. The second, opposing trend followed the 
calls to topple the regime, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and other attacks committeed by 
al-Qā‘ida in Saudi Arabia itself.   
 
The leadership, especially King ‘Abd Allah, made many efforts to promote a new line 
of Wahhābī thinking -- the Wasaṭī trend which greatly respects the Shari‘a and the 
‘ulamā’, but at the same time rejects any kind of violence and promotes moderation, 
dialogue and understanding between different religious groups.  As a result, the Saudi 
authorities launched a programme aimed at introducing changes in the schools’ 
curricula and also enabled non-Wahhābī scholars to become members of religious 
establishments such as the Supreme Committee of the ‘ulamā’ [Hai’at kibār al-
‘ulamā’]. 
 
The most important official religious position in Saudi Arabia is that of the Grand 
Mufti.  For many years this post was held by Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ibn Bāz; at 
present it is held by Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn ‘Abd Allah Āl al-Shaykh, who also 
chairs the above-mentioned Supreme Committee of the ‘ulamā’.  
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Other important official ‘ulamā’  are the Minister for Islamic Affairs and 
Endowments [Wazīr al-shu’ūn al-Islamiyya wa’l-awqāf], currently Shaykh Sāliḥ ibn 
‘Abd al-‘Azīz Āl al-Shaykh; the Chairman of the Supreme Judiciary Council [Majlis 
al-Qadā’ al-A‘la], currently Dr. Sāliḥ ibn ‘Abd Allah ibn Ḥumayd; and the chairman 
of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice [Hai’at al-
amr bi’l-ma‘rūf wa’l-nahy ‘ala al-munkar], currently Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-
Humayn. 
 
The ‘unofficial’ ‘ulamā’ and shaykhs do not, in most cases, hold important official 
religious positions in the state apparatus, and are or were at odds with the Saudi 
regime.  As already mentioned, this group can be divided into several sub-groups, the 
most relevant of which is the ‘Shaykhs of the Awakening Movement’ [shuyūkh al-
ṣaḥwa].  This movement views the true Islamic government as one based on an equal 
partnership between the religious establishment and the state, and the Muslim law as 
derived solely from the Qur’an and Sunna.  This group started to gain popularity 
during the 1970s, and its ‘ulamā’  were also influenced by the Salafi ideas imported 
into Saudi Arabia by members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had fled from Egypt.  
 
In the past, many ‘ulamā’ affiliated with this group were considered an opposition to 
the regime; and in the light of their fatāwā and activities, the Saudi regime also 
deemed them a threat. However, as time went by, the regime endeavoured to co-opt 
them into the mainstream and the consensus of the Saudi religious life, and they 
themselves moderated their language when speaking about the regime.  The most 
prominent figures in this group are the Shaykhs Safar al-Ḥawālī and Salmān al-‘Awda. 
The main reason for the regime’s rapprochement with this group was the emergence 
of the most extremist religious trends in the kingdom, starting in the late 1990s. 
‘Ulamā’ like Shaykh Yūsuf al-‘Uyayrī, Shaykh ‘Alī bin Khuḍayr al-Khuḍayr, Shaykh 
Nāsir al-Fahd and Shaykh Aḥmad al-Khālidī, issued calls to topple the Saudi regime. 
Some, like al-Rashūd, were affiliated with al-Qā‘ida. 
  
This chapter will focus mainly on the thinking of three shaykhs -- ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ibn 
Bāz, ‘Abd Allah Ibn Jibrīn and Safar al-Ḥawālī. The three shaykhs have been chosen 
not only because they represent different trends in the kingdom (Ibn Bāz served in 
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every possible position in the state religious apparatus; Ibn Jibrīn was a prominent 
Wahhābī theologian who held no major official position; and Safar al-Ḥawālī 
belonged to the Awakening Movement), but also because they have spoken, taught, 
lectured and issued fatāwā on on a wide range of concerns.  In some instances, the 
rigid views of Shaykh Sāliḥ al-Fawzān, a member of the religious establishment, will 
be examined. 
 
‘Ulamā’ of the third group tend to concentrate most of their scholarship on issues of 
Jihad, and in general their writings are theologically very superficial -- hence no 
appropriate scholar belonging to this group has been located.  Since the chapter 
represents sub-divisions within the current Wahhābī state, it is somewhat differently 
structured from the other chapters. Many references in this chapter are extracted from 
the internet -- in particular, the personal websites of the ‘ulamā’ under discussion, 
which offer databases and excellent search possibilities to allow the most 
comprehensive picture of their views on the subject. But first, each figure will be 
introduced, and their viewpoints on related terms will be presented. 
Biographies of the relevant ‘ulamā’  
 
‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn ‘Abd Allah Ibn Bāz (1910-1999) was one of the most important 
Wahhābī scholars in modern Saudi Arabia. Born in Riyāḍ, he lost his sight at the age 
of twenty. Nonetheless, he thoroughly studied all fields of Islamic theology and 
Sharī‘a law with many instructors, including the then Grand Mufti, Shaykh 
Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ‘Abd al-Latīf Āl al-Shaykh.  Ibn Bāz served in many official 
positions -- Chief qāḍī of the al-Kharj Province (1938-1951); a teacher in the Riyāḍ 
Institute of Science and Thought (1951-1961); Vice President and President of the 
Islamic University of al-Madina (1961-1975); and Chairman of the Department of 
Scientific Research and Judgment, with the rank of Minister.  In 1992 he was 
appointed Grand Mufti and Head of the Committee of Supreme ‘ulamā’. 
 
Ibn Bāz was also the President of the Constituent Assembly of the Muslim World 
League, President of the Higher World League Council, and President of the Islamic 
Fiqh Assembly.  During his career, he authored many books in all fields of Islamic 
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Studies. During the first Gulf War, he issued a fatwā permitting the deployment of 
non-Muslim troops on Saudi soil to defend the kingdom from the Iraqi army.  In 
addition, as Grand Mufti, Ibn Bāz attempted both to legitimise the reign of the royal 
family and to support calls for the reform of Islam in line with Salafi ideals.  Many 
criticised him for supporting the Saudi government when, after the war, it muzzled or 
imprisoned some Quṭbist ‘ulamā’ such as Safar al-Ḥawālī and Salmān al-‘Awda -- 
both of whom were regarded as too critical of the royal family.  
 
When Ibn Bāz died in 1999, the loss of ‘his erudition and reputation for intransigence’ 
was so great that the Saudi government was said to have ‘found itself staring into a 
vacuum’, unable to find a figure capable of ‘filling Ibn Bāz’s shoes’. His influence on 
the Salafi movement was very significant, and most of the prominent judges and 
‘ulamā’ of Saudi Arabia today are his former students.  
   
Ibn Bāz engaged himself with Cosmological issues for many years, and some of his 
controversial claims aroused wider discussions around the world. For several decades, 
for example, he maintained that the sun orbits Earth. I addition, a  fatwā in which he 
explained that the earth appears flat for the people so they do not fall was later taken 
out of context, and Ibn Bāz is mocked today for having issued a fatwā that the ‘Earth 
is flat’. It should be noted that Ibn Bāz’s discussions on these subjects usually 
involved questions regarding takfīr.  
  
‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān Ibn Jibrīn (1933 - 2009), born in the Najdī village of 
al-Quway’iya, is another prominent Wahhābī scholar in Saudi Arabia.  He studied and 
memorised the Qur’an and Hadith, subsequently completing his secondary studies in a 
religious institute in Riyāḍ by the age of 15.  Ibn Jibrīn then turned to academic 
religious studies, and spent approximately 25 years until he concluded his doctoral 
thesis in Shari‘a studies.  During his years of study, he had many teachers -- each for 
every aspect of Islam and the Shari‘a; one of his important mentors was Ibn Bāz.  
In the early 1960s, Ibn Jibrīn was sent by King Sa‘ud to teach Islam and Shari‘a and 
perform da‘wa work in several peripheral cities and villages.  He then became a 
teacher and taught in several religious institutions, including the Shari‘a College in 
Riyāḍ.  By the early 1990s, Ibn Jibrīn had been appointed Chairman of the 
Department of Scientific Research and Judgment and was already a well-known Mufti. 
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At the same time, he worked as an imām in an important mosque in Riyāḍ and a 
teacher at all levels of Islamic education.  He also gave weekly lessons in all the 
major mosques in Riyāḍ.  In addition, Ibn Jibrīn was a member of the Council of 
Senior ‘ulamā’.1 
 
Safar ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Ḥawālī (1950- ), born in al-Baha’ Province, was 
awarded a PhD in Islamic theology from the Umm al-Qurā University in Mecca in 
1986. In his earlier MA thesis at the same university, al-Ḥawālī traced the origins and 
consequences of secular thought spreading throughout the Arab and Muslim world.  
In his PhD research, which was conducted under the supervision of Sayyid Quṭb’s 
brother Muḥammad, he analysed the concept of irjā’ [a separation between the claims 
of faith and deeds of worship].
2
 
 
Along with Shaykh Salmān al-‘Awda, al-Ḥawālī is known to have led the 
‘Awakening Movement’ in the kingdom.  During the 1990s, he was detained for a 
period by the Saudi authorities for his criticism and incitement to overthrow the 
government in sermons which were distributed as audio cassettes throughout the 
kingdom.  However, following the emergence of more extremist trends in those years, 
al-Ḥawālī was released from prison and became closer to the mainstream and the 
consensus of Saudi religious life (although he did not go as far as Salmān al-‘Awda in 
his criticism).
3
  
 
Shaykh Sāliḥ al-Fawzān ibn ‘Abd Allah ibn Fawzān (1933- ), born to a family of the 
al-Dawasir tribe, graduated from the elementary and secondary religious schools in 
the city of Burayda, North of Riyāḍ.  Al-Fawzān completed his academic studies at 
the Shari‘a college of Riyāḍ, taught in several religious institutions in the capital and 
finally joined the government apparatus.  He was appointed to senior positions, such 
as a membership in the Supreme Committee of the ‘ulamā’ and the Permanent 
Committee for Islamic Research and Fatāwā [al-Lajna al-Dā’ima li’l-Buḥūth al-
‘Ilmiyya wa’l-Iftā’].4 
                                                 
1 Daryl Champion, The paradoxical Kingdom, New-York: Columbia University Press, 2003. P. 240 
2 Jarret Brachman, Global jihadism: theory and practice, Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge, 2009, p. 54; 
http://muntada.islamtoday.net/t25816.html (Last accessed - 1 May 2014) 
3 "Safar al-Ḥawālī: al-faqīh al-siyyāsī am al-siyyāsī al-faqīh?", Al-Sharq al-Awsat 12/05/2005 
4  http://www.sohari.com/nawader_v/fatawe/fozan.html (Last accessed - 1 May 2014) 
180 
 
II. The sources of authority 
(a) Qur’an and Sunna 
 
Ibn Bāz cites the Qur’an, the Sunna and ijmā‘ as the three main sources of authority. 
With regard to a fourth source, qiyās, he maintains that the people of knowledge were 
split.  The Muslim umma as a whole, he believes, should follow the Prophetic Sunna. 
Whoever claimed that Sunna should be disregarded and that the believers should be 
satisfied with the Qur’an alone was actually misleading and should be considered a 
non-believer [kāfir] and apostate [murtadd].  This is because, by saying such things, a 
person denies [the existence of] Allah and the Prophet, ignores what has been said by 
them and disregards the ijmā‘ of the people of knowledge.  
 
For example, Ibn Bāz refers to the khawārij, who, due to their bad relations with the 
ṣaḥāba, decided to rely only on the Qur’an. By doing so, they actually became non-
believers.  Ibn Bāz even refers to 20th century leaders, like the Libyan president 
Mu‘ammar Gadhafi, who disregarded the Sunna and claimed that only the Qur’an was 
valid.  If those people were really obeying the Qur’an, he says, they would have 
followed the Sunna, since the Qur’an commands its believers to follow the Sunna. 
The importance of the Sunna, according to Ibn Bāz, is that it provides guidance in 
areas and realms to which the Qur’an did not refer, in all aspects of life, such as the 
way the five obligatory prayers [ṣalāt] should be conducted, in addition to issues 
related to crime, money, fasting and Hajj.
1
   
 
Following the Sunna of the Prophet, Ibn Bāz maintains, should not only be applied to 
people who lived or events that took place during the time of the Prophet, but to all 
people in all times until the day of resurrection; the Prophet should be regarded as the 
messenger of Allah for demons and human beings, for Arabs and for non-Arabs, for 
the rich and the poor, for rulers and subjects and for men and women, as it is said in 
the Qur’an: 
                                                 
1 ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘al-Sunna wa-makānatiha fi’l-Islām wa-fi uṣūl al-tashri‘’, 
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/8632 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014)  
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We have not sent thee but as a universal [Messenger] to men, giving them glad 
tidings, and warning them [against sin].    [Qur’an 53: 1-4] 
Ibn Jibrīn follows a similar route. He emphasises the importance of the Sunna by 
saying that it came to the world in the same way as the Qur’an -- namely, by the 
divine inspiration of Allah, which was bestowed on the Prophet and enabled him to 
act and speak in the way he did.  However, Ibn Jibrīn further points out the 
differences between the Qur’an and the Sunna: the Sunna is not being quoted and 
repeated by people with the same frequency that people use Qur’anic verses, and the 
most important factor is that, in religious rituals, the Qur’anic verses speak for 
themselves.  Thus, there is no need to refer to any traditions, such as aḥādīth, upon 
quoting a verse, while those traditions cannot stand by themselves but rather have to 
be strengthened by a verse.
1
  
Al-Ḥawālī defines the Sunna as following the Prophetic path in every aspect, starting 
with the issue of divine unity [tawḥīd] and ending with the smallest acts that the 
believers are obliged to do and refrain from doing.
2
 He says that the Sunna is the very 
straight way to which the Qur’an refers in the following verses: 
 Show us the straight way. The way of those on whom Thou hast bestowed Thy 
Grace. [Qur’an 1: 6-7] 
This is my way, leading straight. Follow it. Do not follow [other] paths. They will 
scatter you about from his path. [Qur’an 6: 153] 
(b) ijmā‘ 
 
Ibn Bāz discusses the ‘positive consensus’ [al-ijmā‘ al-yaqīnī], saying that not only is 
it a strict necessity, but it is also among the three sources of authority that should not 
be violated: the Qur’an, the reliable Sunna and the consensus. This consensus, he 
                                                 
1 ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, ‘Sharḥ muqadamat al-tafsīr li-ibn Taymiyya’, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=7&book=214&page=7376 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
2
 Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Itibā’ al-Sunna wa-tark al-bid‘a’,   
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=1096&keywords=ةنسلا  
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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emphasises, was limited to the time of the ṣaḥāba, and following them there was no 
further consensus.
1
  
 
Ibn Jibrīn refers to ijmā‘ as a consensus reached by the Muslim Nation, in instances 
where neither the Qur’an nor the Sunna provide an answer to a specific question.  For 
Ibn Jibrīn, the term ‘Nation’ refers to the ‘ulamā’ of a given generation.  However, 
this was only relevant with regard to the ṣaḥāba, their followers [tābi‘ūn] and the 
followers of these followers [tābi‘ū’l-tābi‘īn] up to the third hijrī century; ijmā‘ of 
these generations is binding,2 and in order to emphasise its importance Ibn Jibrīn 
quotes the Prophetic Hadith: 
 
My nation will never reach a consensus in something which has to do with ḍalāla.3 
 
Ibn Jibrīn divides ijmā‘ into two types: ijmā‘ via the spoken word [qawlī], and 
ijmā‘ by an action [fi‘lī]. The first type relates to sayings of the ṣaḥāba (and up to the 
third hijrī century) when answering questions which are neither in the Qur’an nor in 
the Sunna; after that, people followed these sayings and actually accepted them as 
fatāwā.  This kind of ijmā‘, continues Ibn Jibrīn, was also called an ‘unchallenged 
ijmā‘ [sukūtī].  
 
It refers to a situation in which these people reached a resolution which others 
followed, and no one resisted.  The second type of ijmā‘ deals with a situation in 
which the ṣaḥāba performed a certain act when there was confusion about the correct 
reaction, and no answer was found in the Qur’an or the Sunna.  For example, when 
people did not know how many times a person should kneel during the noon prayer, 
the ṣaḥāba knelt four times.4  Nowadays, according to Ibn Jibrīn, it is much easier for 
a believer to know what an issue of consensus is.  Thanks to the modern and 
                                                 
1 ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Hal al-ijmā‘ ḥujja qat’iyya am dīniyya?’, http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/2049 
(Last accessed - 1 May 2014)  
2  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, ‘Sharḥ al-waraqāt’, p. 25, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=7&book=216&page=7472 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
3
 Quoted from Al-Tirmidhī, Al-Jāmiʻ al- ṣaḥīḥ, vol. 1, p. 2093 
4  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, ibid, p. 28  
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sophisticated worldwide media, a believer does not have to wander around the world 
in order to find this consensus.
1
 
 
Al-Ḥawālī does not define the term ijmā‘ literally.  However, from one of his lectures 
it is apparent that he sees ijmā‘ as an important source of authority, in instances where 
an answer to certain questions has either been reached by the ṣaḥāba or their 
followers.
2
  However, in one of his lessons al-Ḥawālī speaks about the philosophers, 
stating that all of them – the Greek as well as the Arabs – should be considered as 
non-believers [kuffār].  Al-Ḥawālī adds that there was a consensus [ijmā‘] among all 
Muslims that these people were non-believers.  It should also be noted that some of 
the Arab philosophers he mentions, such as Ibn Sina, al-Farrābī and al-Kindī, lived 
and acted during the third, fourth and fifth hijrī centuries, after the generations which 
he considers fit to set an act of ijmā‘.3 
 
An example provided by al-Ḥawālī for legitimate ijmā‘ is the consensus reached by 
the early ‘ulamā with regard to the celebrations of non-believers [kuffār].  According 
to this consensus, these days a Muslim should totally refrain from acting or speaking 
in a way that might be understood as participation in such a celebration.  For instance, 
when Noruz (the first day of the spring and the New Year for all Iranians, including 
Zoroastrians and Baha’is) is being celebrated, a Muslim should not give someone else 
an egg, because this is what the non-believers do.  Al-Ḥawālī emphasises that ‘ulamā’ 
of all madhāhib of Sunni Islam, not just Ḥanbalīs, have agreed on this point.4  
 
It seems that al-Ḥawālī’s approach is accepted by official Saudi institutions such as 
the aforementioned Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Fatāwā; Al-
Atawneh notes that the Committee follows in the footsteps of Ibn Taymiyya, who 
recognises only the ijmā‘ of the salafī predecessors.  According to Ibn Taymiyya, a 
                                                 
1  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, Fatāwā, online version, p. 124, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=6&book=49&page=2092 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
2 Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Naql ijmā’ al-salaf ‘ala an al-imān qawl wa-‘amal’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=1760&keywords=عامجا  
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
3  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Ijmā’ al-firaq al-Islamiyya ‘ala takfīr al-falāsifa’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=4762&keywords=عامجا 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
4
 Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Ijmā’ al- fuqahā’ ‘ala taḥrīm mushabahāt al-kuffār wa-dukhūl ayādihim’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=1137&keywords=عامجا 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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valid ijmā‘ has not been established since early Islam, because later ‘ulamā’ are 
numerous and widely dispersed, making it difficult to ascertain the existence of one. 
The Committee, al-Atawneh adds, only acknowledges ijmā‘ established by the 
ṣaḥāba.1  
(c) ijtihād 
 
Ibn Bāz relates to the issue of ijtihād by saying that there was no place for it in any 
religious issues having a reference or a basis in the Qur’an, Sunna or ijmā‘ of the 
scholars from the first generations.  Ijtihād, he says, could be used in disputed issues 
when there was no reference or no basis in the Qur’an or the Sunna.  In such a case, a 
person considered among the people of knowledge, who is qualified to exercise 
ijtihād, is allowed to do it out of his sincere quest for the truth, and will be rewarded 
for it; he will be rewarded twice if his ijtihād is right, and rewarded once if it turns out 
to be wrong.
2
  
 
Ibn Jibrīn defines ijtihād as an attempt to reach a religious solution with the utmost 
effort.  According to him, a person could be considered a mujtahid if, upon dealing 
with a problem or a question, he sought the solution in the Qur’an and the traditions 
and finally found the answer.  A mujtāhid is a person who also uses his skills to 
conduct research, understand the problem, and the language and grammatical tools 
which can help him reach a solution. If a person does his best and finds the right 
answer, he will be rewarded twice; and if he did his best but nevertheless makes a 
mistake, he will be rewarded once for his efforts.
3
 
 
Ibn Jibrīn also deals with the link between ijtihād and the issuing of fatāwā.  Not 
everyone, he maintains, is entitled to issue fatāwā.  A person who issues fatāwā 
should be qualified for the task, and should have a wide-ranging knowledge of all the 
relevant issues.  He has to be able to understand the texts and the meanings behind 
                                                 
1 Muhammad al-Atawneh, "Wahhābī legal theory as Reflected in Modern Official Saudi fatwās: 
Ijtihād, Taqlīd, Sources, and Methodology", Islamic Law and Society 18 (2011), pp. 347-348 
2  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Hal yasiḥ al-ijtihād fi’l-umūr al-ma‘lūma min al-din bi’l-ḍarūra?’, 
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/164 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014)  
3  ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Jibrīn, Sharḥ al-waraqāt, p. 41, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=7&book=216&page=7488 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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them; he has to have knowledge of all aspects of religion; he should know where to 
look for answers; and he should be familiar with the interpretations and with the 
opinions of the ‘ulamā’  and fuqahā’.  But even  if he had all these qualifications, Ibn 
Jibrīn stresses, he should not rush to issue a fatwā; rather, he should check and double 
check what he is about to say. Only after meeting these conditions, is his ijtihād good 
and welcome.
1
 
 
Regarding the use of ijtihād, al-Ḥawāli claims that there exists a ‘permitted 
independent reasoning’ [al-ijtihād al-saigh] which should not cause splits and 
quarrels among the believers.
2
  There have been occasions, he continues, in which 
people of ahl al-sunna made an incorrect ijtihād, but this was forgivable, because they 
had intended to act for the sake of truth.
3
 
 
Probably influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood’s approach, al-Ḥawālī claims that 
ijtihād is especially needed due to the current challenges facing the Muslim nations, 
such as the hostile Western media -- which he regards as one of the ways in which the 
'crusades' against the Muslims take place, and which need to be confronted by new 
means and new methods.
4
  Al-Ḥawālī says he was once asked whether the Palestinian 
uprising [intifāḍa] against Israel should be regarded as a mistaken ijtihād.  
 
His answer is that even if this were the case, it is a positive thing, not only because it 
symbolises the beginning of a holy war [Jihad], but also because the alternative is 
worse-- a Muslim who opposes the intifāḍa, saying that it is a wrongful ijtihād, 
actually puts himself on the same side with Jews and Christians, secularists, and other 
                                                 
1  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, al-Lu’lu al-mukīn min fatāwā al-shaykh ibn Jibrīn, online version, p. 81, 
http://ibn-jebreen.com/book.php?cat=6&book=67&page=3621 (Lst accessed – 1 May 2014)  
2
 Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘al-Baghī fi’l-ijtihād’,   
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=3120&keywords=داهتجلاا  
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
3  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘al-Khat fi’l-ijtihād’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=3122&keywords=داهتجلاا 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
4 Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Laqad ḥadhara Allah min arājif al-yahūd al-I‘lāmiyya, wa-‘ala al-mumin al-ijtihād 
fi muqāwamat al-bātil’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=177&keywords=داهتجلاا 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
186 
 
enemies of Allah against an unfortunate [other] Muslim like the children of the 
intifāḍa. 1 
 
Al-Fawzān seems to be more open for modern changes in this field.  According to al-
Atawneh, he divides jurists into four major categories: 
  
 The mujtahid muṭlaq, who is independent, is neither affiliated with any 
madhhab nor bound by the methodology of any other scholar; according to al-
Fawzān, this type of mujtahid no longer exists.  
 A mujtahid in his imām’s madhhab or in that of another school, which further 
divides into several subgroups.  
 A mujtahid who is an expert in a specific body of knowledge; such a mujtahid 
is authorised to conduct ijtihād and to issue fatāwā within his particular area 
of expertise, using a specific methodology.  
 Mujtahids who are experts in specific issues from one or more areas of 
knowledge; they may issue fatāwā only on those particular issues within the 
purview of their expertise.
2
 
 
Al-Atawneh asserts that the drawing of legal inspiration not only from Ḥanbalī 
‘ulamā’, but rather from a wide array of non-Ḥanbalī as well -- has been motivated by 
the desire to foster the religious authority of the official religious establishment, and 
to further develop legal mechanisms to accommodate the challenges of modernity.
3
   
Perhaps this also accords with the spirit said to have been promoted by King Fahd, 
whereby ‘ulamā’ ought to reconsider the practice of ijtihād as a useful approach in 
"reconciling Islamic Law with modern life".
4
 
                                                 
1  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Kayfiyyat al-ta‘āmul ma‘a min akhtaa fi’l-ijtihād’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=2200&keywords=داهتجلاا 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
2 Al-Atawneh, Islamic Law and Society, pp. 333-335 
3 ibid, pp. 354-355 
4 Joseph A. Kechichian, "The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi 
Arabia", International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Feb., 1986), p. 65 
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III. Terms affliated with bid‘a 
ḍalāla 
 
Ibn Bāz does not explain literally what ḍalāla is, but ties it to his definition of bid‘a 
by quoting the Prophetic Hadith (referred to many times in this work), which states 
that every bid‘a is ḍalāla.1  This Hadith is quoted in many of his fatāwā; for example, 
when asked whether it is necessary to sacrifice an animal (such as a cow or a sheep) 
when the construction of a mosque is completed, prior to holding a Friday sermon or 
prayers within it, Ibn Bāz rules that no such custom should be applied, because it was 
nothing more than a bid‘a which would lead to going astray.2 
 
Unlike Ibn Bāz, Ibn Jibrīn examines the issue of ḍalāla thoroughly, regarding it as the 
loss of the rightful religious path.  Ibn Jibrīn also refers to certain people or 
communities whom he states should be considered to have gone astray.  First of all, 
Christians are referred to as the ones who ‘go astray’ in the following Qur’anic verse:  
 
The way of those on whom Thou hast bestowed Thy Grace, not those whose (portion) 
is wrath, nor those who go astray.
 
  [Qur’an 1: 7] 
 
He then cites further examples of people to whom the term ḍalāla applies: people who 
leave in the middle of a prayer [ṣalāt], people who do not participate in collective 
prayers [ṣalāt], people whose acts challenge Allah but who are still proud of what 
they do, people who object to what the ṣaḥāba have said or done, people who prefer 
to hear music rather than the words of Allah, people involved in prostitution, or who 
drink alcohol or use drugs.  According to Ibn Jibrīn, the term ḍalāla applies to social 
behaviour as well – for example, if a Muslim steals from a fellow believer or cheats 
him or even mocks him.
3
 
                                                 
1
 ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Wujūb luzūm al-Sunna wa’l-ḥadhr min al-bid‘a’, 
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/8159 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014)  
2 ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Ḥukm dhabḥ al-Abqār aw al-aghnām ‘ind intihā’ bin ā’ al-masjid’, 
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/8328 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014) 
3
 ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, Tawjihāt salāh al-ḥudūd, online version, p. 3  http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=8&book=159&page=6865 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014); ‘Abd Allah ibn 
Jibrīn, al-‘Aqīda, online version, p. 6, http://ibn-jebreen.com/book.php?cat=1&book=11&page=401 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
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According to Ibn Jibrīn, Allah is the one who decides whether to guide or misguide 
anyone, depending on the person’s belief: in order to receive the guidance of Allah 
one must open oneself to a deep and devoted belief.
1
 
 
Like Ibn Bāz, al-Ḥawālī provides examples rather than explaining the actual term.  He 
says that some believe that not every bid‘a is necessarily a ḍalāla, but, he continues, 
these people are wrong, because whoever accepts that there are ‘good’ 
bida‘ [bida‘ ḥasana] is mistaken and misleading.2  
 
Al-Ḥawālī refers to several groups and communities as ‘misguided groups’, who have 
lost their way, like the khawārij, the Ibadis (who currently constitute the dominant 
form of Islam in Oman], the mu‘tazila and the Sufis.3  He specifically refers to Jews 
as an example of a community which has lost its way; in spite of the miracles that 
Allah performed for them when they left Egypt, and despite the commands that Allah 
gave Moses, they chose the wrong way, by producing the Golden Calf.  According to 
al-Ḥawālī, Jews thus committed shirk, challenged Allah and disobeyed him. To 
reinforce his point, al-Ḥawālī refers to an old saying which states that:  
 
 A misguided Muslim scholar has a part of the Jews inside him and a misguided 
servant [of Allah] has a part of the Christians inside him.
4
 
shirk  
Shirk, according to Ibn Bāz, means “worshiping anyone else alongside Allah” – 
‘anyone else’ meaning idols or other items on which a person calls for help, prays to, 
                                                 
1 ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, Sharḥ lum‘at al-i‘tiqād, online version, p. 59, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=7&book=88&page=5535 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
2  http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=1550&keywords=ةللاض  
(Last accessed 23 February 2009)  
3  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Bayān ḍalāl man ya‘bud al-malāika’,  
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=4955&keywords=للاض 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014);  
Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Ḍalāl al-Ṣūfiyya fi fihm al-tawakul ‘ala Allah’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=5895&keywords=للاض  
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
4  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Suwār min ḍalāl al-yahūd’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=3548&keywords=للاض  
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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fasts for or sacrifices for.  Ibn Bāz provides examples: if a person makes sacrifice to 
jāhilī idols such as Idrīs, prays to someone, asks the Prophet for salvation or calls to 
the stars or the demons; the worst manner of shirk is performed when a person 
worships items or people and forgets Allah altogether.  In such a case he becomes a 
non-believer.  The same applies to those who do not even acknowledge the existence 
of Allah, like communists and atheists and they are considered the worst non-
believers.  
 
Ibn Bāz refers to those who believe that by beseeching people or stars, they are using 
them as a means [wasīla] to get closer to Allah.  They are definitely committing shirk 
–  because a true believer could become closer to Allah by obeying him, praying to 
him, making a sacrifice for him, following the rightful path, fasting, performing Jihad 
and giving alms.
1
  
In his fatāwā, Ibn Bāz placed special emphasis on defining calls to the Prophet for 
help as shirk.  According to Ibn Bāz, calling upon the dead for help, guidance or cure, 
or even to help the Muslim nation, means worshipping the dead -- which makes this a 
shirk, as all calls and pleas for help should be directed to Allah only.
2
 
 
Contrary to the majority of the ‘ulamā’ whose writings are analysed in this chapter, 
Ibn Bāz perceives the act of building a mosque on a grave not as bid‘a but as shirk.   
This is a ruling that he made after a Muslim organisation in Jordan called The League 
of Islamic Sciences [Rābitat al-‘ulūm al-Islāmiyya] announced that it intended to 
build a mosque on top of a cave in which a grave had been found.
3
  
 
Ibn Jibrīn defines shirk in a more inclusive way, saying that it includes calling for the 
worship of anyone else alongside Allah, calling to worship anyone else [without or 
instead of Allah], fearing anyone else, begging anyone else for [divine] help or 
trusting anyone else like trusting Allah, or indeed anything which resembles these acts. 
According to Ibn Jibrīn, a person who does one or more of these things is a mushrik, 
                                                 
1
 ‘Abd Allah Ibn Bāz, ‘Tawḥīd ma‘na al-shirk bi-Allah’,   http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/28 (Last 
accessed - 1 May 2014)  
2  ‘Abd Allah Ibn Bāz, ‘Man dā‘a al-Nabi ṣallā Allah ‘alayhi  wa-salam wa-huwa mayyit faqad 
ashraka’, http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/1672 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014)  
3  ‘Abd Allah Ibn Bāz, ‘al-Taḥrīr min binā’ al-masājid ‘ala al-qubūr’, 
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/8216 (last accessed - 1 May 2014)  
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is considered an ally of Satan and is not a follower of Allah.  Ibn Jibrīn specifically 
says that shirk is the polar opposite of unity [tawḥīd], and that committing shirk is the 
worst offence in Islam.
1
 
 
The same authority attaches importance to semantics with regard to shirk, and argues 
that words mean everything in this matter.  If a person curses another person by 
saying ‘take him’, ‘burn him’ or ‘kill him’, it is exactly like asking for the help of a 
demon [jinn] or Satan.  In addition, if someone thinks that by swearing in the name of 
his honour or in the name of the Prophet he adds emphasis to his words, he should 
beware of crossing the line and committing shirk.  People should also avoid saying 
things which could be interpreted as referring to the Creator and his creatures as 
equals, by employing such formulations as: ‘I have only you and Allah’, or ‘you are 
for me on earth and Allah is for me in heaven’.2 
 
Ibn Jibreen warns especially against episodes in which tawḥīd and shirk may be 
combined, as, for example, during the Hajj.  Performing any rituals during the Hajj 
which do not follow the Prophetic path constitutes shirk or at least may lead to it -- for 
example, if people focus their rituals and their minds on the holy stone or the fence 
which surrounds it.  Ibn Jibrīn further maintains that the Shi‘a who come to perform 
the Hajj, and call on the names of ‘Alī and his sons during their stay on Mount Arafat, 
should be considered mushrikūn.3 
 
Another issue which Ibn Jibrīn warns against is crossing the line between decent 
behaviour and shirk while visiting graves.  
 
He claims that if a person visits a relative’s grave and tells him things like ‘rest in 
peace’, that is harmless; but when a person visits a grave in order to ask for the help 
of the dead man’s spirit, this is shirk.  If a Muslim goes to the city of Medina, his 
purpose should be to pray in the Prophet’s mosque and not to visit the Prophet’s 
                                                 
1  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, ‘Majmū‘at mukhaḍarāt wa-durūs ‘an al-ḥajj’. http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=8&book=224&page=7745 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
2  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, ‘Mukhāḍara bi-‘unwān man yurīdu Allah bihi khayran yufqihihi fi’l-dīn’, 
http://ibn-jebreen.com/book.php?cat=8&book=218&page=7524 (Last Accessed – 1 May 2014)  
3  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, ‘Majmū ‘at mukhaḍarāt wa-durūs ‘an al-ḥajj’, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=8&book=224&page=7716 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
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tomb.
1
  And indeed, it should be noted, many buildings and graves in Mecca and 
Medina were demolished by the authorities, in order to avoid this kind of shirk. 
 
Al-Ḥawālī deals with the issue of shirk at length.  His definition is quite similar to that 
of Ibn Bāz.  Like other scholars adhering to the Wahhābī tradition, al-Ḥawālī defines 
shirk as the opposite of tawḥīd and claims that the sources and basics of wisdom are 
to follow tawḥīd and avoid shirk.2  He even says that if the believers abandon the 
principle of tawḥīd, they will find themselves ruled and governed by non-believers.3    
However, al-Ḥawālī elaborates on many sub-items related to shirk.  For example, he 
refers to the two types of shirk, and defines the ‘smaller shirk’ [al-shirk al-asghar] as 
an act of hypocrisy [riya], when a person is worshipping Allah not for the sake of it 
but rather for a different purpose.  This kind of act is worse than committing a mere 
sin, but still does not exclude the perpetrator from the ranks of the umma.  In contrast, 
the ‘bigger shirk’ [al-shirk al-akbar] is worshipping Allah together with other idols, 
people or objects, even if the perpetrator means to place Allah as ‘first among equals’; 
this type of shirk excludes the one who commits it from the umma.
4
 
  
Similarly to his approach towards ḍalāla, al-Ḥawālī brands certain religious groups or 
communities as mushrikūn: Christians, who consider Allah to be one of three divine 
entities; Zoroastrians, who attribute goodness to light and evil to darkness; in addition 
to the qadariyya and Sufis.
5
  He further describes the Nobel Prize-winning Egyptian 
writer Naguib Mahfuz as an example of modern shirk, probably under the influence of 
Sayyid Quṭb’s argument with the latter, or the Muslim Brotherhood’s general 
displeasure with his works.  Mahfuz’s Cairo Trilogy, al-Ḥawālī says, for which he 
                                                 
1
 ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, ‘Sharḥ silm al-wusūl wa-abwāb min kitāb al-tawḥīd’  http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=7&book=198&page=7220 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
2  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Aṣl al-ḥikma wa-asāsuha huwa al-tawḥīd wa’l-nāhī ‘an al-shirk’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=6100&keywords=كرشلا 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
3  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘al-Shirk wa-‘awaqibahu ‘ala al-insān’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=889&keywords=كرشلا 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
4  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘al-Farq bayna’l-shirk al-akbar wa’l-asghar’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=5707&keywords=كرشلا  
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
5
 Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘al-Ṣūfiyya al-mawjūda shirk wa-zandaqa’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=2131&keywords=كرش 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014); Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Shirk man ja‘ala ma‘a Allah illahan ākhir’,   
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=891&keywords=كرش 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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also received a ‘Zionist prize’,1 tells the story of an ancient Egyptian goddess,2 and in 
it there are sentences such as ‘the goddess became angry’ or ‘the goddess was 
satisfied’; this is definitely a shirk, as in Islam there is no God but Allah.3 
commanding right and forbidding wrong  
 
According to Ibn Bāz, commanding right and forbidding wrong is one of the most 
important duties in Islam, and one of Islam’s greatest commandments.  In societies 
whose people have knowledge and who are believers, this duty is one of the most 
important reasons for success and for avoiding punishment by Allah, both in the long 
and the short term.  To underline his opinion, Ibn Bāz quoted a verse:  
 
You are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding 
what is wrong, and believing in Allah. [Qur’an 3: 110] 
 
Ibn Bāz emphasises that every believer has to work to command right and forbid 
wrong according to his or her abilities, and to ensure that it is done with wisdom, 
modesty and politeness -- and not with violence and extremism.
4
 
 
Like Ibn Bāz, Ibn Jibrīn quotes the aforementioned Qur’anic verse.  Ibn Jibrīn says 
that commanding right meant doing everything that has been said and referred to by 
Allah, and has been considered by the peaceful and ordinary people as ‘good’.  On the 
other hand, forbidding wrong means abstaining from things that Allah disliked and 
which have been considered by the peaceful and ordinary people as ‘bad’.  When a 
believer is about to act or not act in a way which promotes commanding right and 
forbidding wrong, he should first have a strong belief, for without it the whole issue is 
meaningless.
5
  
 
                                                 
1 Al-Ḥawālī is probably referring to the the Nobel Prize Maḥfuz received in 1988 
2 It is likely that al-Ḥawālī is mistaken, and actually refers to Maḥfuz’s 1983 book, Amām al-‘arsh 
3  Al-Ḥawālī, ibid  
4
 ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Kayfiyyat al-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf wa’l-nāhī ‘an al-munkar wa’l- ḥikma al-
maqṣūda fīhī’, http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/214 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014)  
5  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, ‘Khutbat al-Jum‘a ajwibat al-asīla’, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=10&book=209&page=7285 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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Not only does Ibn Jibrīn say that commanding right is a great deed for the believer,1 
he also believes it is an important duty.  A believer who abandons this commandment 
opens the way to allowing bid‘a, committing sins and challenging religious 
commands; he will be severely punished for all these things.
2
   
 
Ibn Jibrīn recalls that commanding right and forbidding wrong was not only an 
individual duty but a collective one.  This he learns from the verse:  
 
And fear tumult or oppression, which affect not in particular [only] those of 
you who do wrong.  [Qur’an 8: 25] 
 
In addition, people who do nothing when others violate the codes of commanding 
right and forbidding wrong are guilty as well.  The concept of commanding right and 
forbidding wrong, Ibn Jibrīn says, was important even before the birth of Islam.  As 
an example, God warned the Prophets of Banu Isra’īl (the Children of Israel) that he 
would kill 40,000 ‘good’ and 60,000 ‘bad’ people; when asked why good people 
should perish as well, he said that these allegedly good people did nothing when they 
saw the bad ones challenging Him.
3
 
 
Ibn Jibrīn further explains the difference between da‘wa and the concept of 
commanding right and forbidding wrong: while da‘wa means providing advice, 
guiding and urging people to perform good deeds and abstain from the bad, 
commanding right and forbidding wrong means ordering and forcing people to obey 
Allah and abstain from religious wrongdoings, or isolating those people from the rest 
of the believers.
4
 
 
Al-Ḥawālī considers commanding right and forbidding wrong to be a religious duty 
that should be adopted by the believers under all circumstances -- in weakness as well 
                                                 
1  ibid 
2  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, ‘Kalima fi riasat al-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf’, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=9&book=199&page=7237 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
3  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, ‘Kalima fi’l-ḥayāt’, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=9&book=164&page=6923 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
4  ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Jibrīn, ‘Qaḍāya da‘wiyya: ḥājat al-bashr ila al-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf 
wa’l-nāhī ‘ala al-munkar’, http://ibn-jebreen.com/book.php?cat=5&book=27&page=1115 (Last 
accessed – 1 May 2014) 
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as in strength.  This duty, he says, is so important that one of the Qur’anic verses even 
prioritises it over the duty to believe in Allah:   
 
You are the best of all people to have appeared among mankind. You command 
what is good and forbid what is evil, and you believe in Allah.  [Qur’an 3:110] 
   
Al-Ḥawālī promotes commanding right and forbidding wrong to the level of an 
individual duty [farḍ ‘ayn],1 which is also relevant for states and communities.  A 
state or community which does not promote commanding good or forbidding wrong, 
and is corrupt, will eventually collapse and vanish.  Such an entity will experience 
economic crisis, lose wars and suffer earthquakes and other forms of punishments by 
Allah, as the Qur’an says:  
 
Nor would thy Lord be the One to destroy communities for a single wrongdoing if its 
members were likely to mend.
2
  [Qur’an 11: 117] 
 
Al-Ḥawālī warns against attempts to overlook this commandment, saying that if such 
a thing is to happen, there will be no difference between the Muslim society and the 
non-believing societies; all kinds of ḍalāla, bid‘a and shirk will spread, and the 
Muslim society will turn into a society of mushrikūn.  Gradually, he continues, total 
chaos will take over: the atheists and the ahl al-bid‘a will interact and talk freely, 
Muslims will convert to Christianity or Judaism, and people will worship idols.  He 
notes that historically, whenever Muslims abandoned this commandment, they lost 
power and control within their own countries to Jews and Christians.
3
 
 
Finally, Al-Ḥawālī also links the concept of commanding right and forbidding wrong 
to Jihad.  He sees Jihad as ‘the highest rank of sacrifice’.  We have to make sure, he 
says, that people worship Allah only, and this is needed for the promotion of 
                                                 
1 ibid  
2  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘‘Alāqat al-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf wa’l-nāhi ‘an al-munkar bi-ḥuqūq al-duwal’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=1886&keywords=رملاا 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
3  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Ahmiyyat al-amr bi’l -maruf wa-al-nāhi bi’l-munkar’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=2898&keywords=رملاا 
 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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commanding right and forbidding wrong.  To emphasise the issue, al-Ḥawālī quotes a 
Qur’anic verse:  
 
To those against whom war is made, permission is given [to fight] because they 
are wronged and verily, Allah is most powerful for their aid.
1
   [Qur’an 22: 39] 
IV. Bid‘a – definitions & types 
 
According to the Shari‘a, Ibn Bāz maintains, a bid‘a is every act of worship innovated 
by people, which does not have any reference or any root in either the Qur’an or the 
Sunna, or in the actions of khulafā’ al-rāshidūn.  He quotes two aḥādīth regarding this 
issue, which define the innovator as executing an apostasy [radd]: 
 
1) He who innovates something in this matter of ours that is not of it, will have it 
rejected. 
2) Whoever does an act which is not in agreement with our matter, will have it 
rejected.  
 
In addition, he quotes the famous hadīth which stated that every renewal was a bid‘a, 
and every bid‘a was a ḍalāla.2  
Although Ibn Bāz does not actually say so, a reading of his fatāwā and articles 
indicates clearly that he considered Sunna the direct opposite of bid‘a.  For example, 
in one of his articles, titled ‘The duty to follow the Sunna and avoid bid‘a’, he cites 
several examples in which the bid‘a committed by people contradicted the Sunna.  He 
mainly focuses on one issue -- the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday.  According to 
him, this issue is causing divisions between those who follow the Sunna and so do not 
celebrate the event, and those who commit bid‘a by celebrating it.3  Furthermore, in a 
                                                 
1 Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Qawā’id wa-ḍawābit fi’l-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf wa-al-nāhī ‘an al-munkar’    
2  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Ma‘na al-bid‘a wa-itlāqiha fi abwāb al-‘ibādāt’, 
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/307 (Last Accessed - 1 May 2014)  
3 Abdul Aziz bin Bāz, “The duty to follow the Sunna and to Avoid bid‘a”, 
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/8159 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014) 
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different quotation from Ibn Bāz, he urges the people of the Sunna to fight and to 
counter everything related to bid‘a.1 
Although Ibn Bāz condemns all kinds of bid‘a, he distinguishes between two ‘groups’. 
One is related to creed and belief [bid‘a i‘tiqādiyya] -- and includes calling for the 
help of the dead, the angels or demons, as well as building mosques over tombs.  This 
type of bid‘a, he says, is the worst of the two and leads to shirk.  The second group, 
bida‘ related to acts [bida‘ ‘amaliyya] -- includes acts like celebrating the Prophet’s 
birthday, commemorating the night of al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj, and more.   
 
These bida‘ are bad, but cannot be compared to the first group.2  Ibn Bāz rejects any 
other type of division regarding bid‘a.  He especially objects to the division into 
‘good’ [bid‘a ḥasana] and ‘bad’ [to which he refers as bid‘a ghayr ḥasana], saying 
this is misleading: all bida‘ are bad and should be considered as misguidance.   
Therefore, Ibn Bāz further rejects the division into five sections, according to which at 
least some bida‘ are perceived as permitted.3 
 
Ibn Bāz also deals with the question of who should be considered a mubtadi‘, 
committing an act of bid‘a.  Basically, he says, every person who performs a bid‘a 
deserves the negative title of mubtadi‘; however, if a person unknowingly commits a 
bid‘a and then expresses his regret, he should not be considered as one.  Only if this 
person knowingly commits a bid‘a – such as celebrating the Prophet’s birthday, 
praying near graves, or building mosques on graves, and insists on continuing with 
such practices – should he be classified as a mubtadi‘.4 
On many occasions, Ibn Jibrīn stresses the importance of adhering completely to the 
Prophetic Sunna as the way to preserve and protect the perception of unity [tawḥīd].   
According to him, the Sunna is the polar opposite of bid‘a, because the latter damages 
                                                 
1  Abdul Aziz bin Bāz, “Islamic Unity, Sufi Groups, Propagating bid‘a and going astray and what the 
people of the Sunna must do to counter it” http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/8561 (Last accessed 28 Feb 
2010).  
2  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Ma hiyya al-bid‘a al-i‘tiqādiyya, wa-ma hiyya’l-bid‘a al-‘amaliyya?’, 
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/9945 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014)  
3  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Ḥaqīqat al-bid‘a al-ḥasana wa’l-ghayr ḥasana’, 
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/9997 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014)  
4
 ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Mata yuṭlaq ‘ala al-shakhṣ innahu mubtadi‘an?’,  
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/10701 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014) 
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tawḥīd;1 furthermore, bid‘a harms or damages the Muslim creed and contradicts the 
Prophet’s path.  In a similar way to Ibn Bāz, Ibn Jibrīn claims that it does not matter 
whether the bid‘a itself is related to bid‘a i‘tiqādiyya or ‘amaliyya.2  
Ibn Jibrīn further discusses various kinds of bida‘ and says that celebrating events and 
holidays which do not originate in the Sunna constitutes bid‘a, because anyone 
celebrating such events is effectively claiming that the Islamic religion was not 
complete and needs additions.  Like Ibn Bāz, Ibn Jibrīn makes it clear that whoever 
commits such an act violates or ignores the Qur’anic verse:  
 
This day are (all) things good and pure made lawful unto you. 
 
[Qur’an 3: 5] 
 
as well as the Hadith: 
 
He who innovates something in this matter of ours that is not of it is executing an 
apostasy [radd].
3
 
 
Ibn Jibrīn categorises bida‘ according to their severity, and divides them into two 
grouops.  He distinguishes between a bid‘a that leads to a sin [bid‘a mufsaqa] but not 
to unbelief [bida‘ ghayr mukfira], which includes conducts such as celebrating the 
Prophet’s birthday or performing irregular prayers; and a bid‘a  which leads to 
unbelief [bid‘a mukfira], such as the one resulting from the behaviour of certain sects 
like the rāfiḍa (in this context meaning the Shi‘a), who celebrate events related to ‘Alī 
and his family, including ‘Āshūra and the events of Ghadir Khumm (in which, they 
believe, he was appointed as successor to the Prophet).
4
  Ibn Jibrīn elaborates further 
about the sub-groups which introduced the most severe acts of bid‘a -- the jahmiyya, 
the rāfiḍa and the khawārij.  Nowadays, he continues, the descendants of these 
khawārij are the Ibādis living in Oman.5  
                                                 
1  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, ‘Majmu‘at mukhāḍarāt wa-durūs ‘an al-ḥajj’, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=8&book=224&page=7638 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
2  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, Qawādih fi’l-‘aqīda, online version, p. 3 http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=8&book=110&page=6368 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
3  Ibn Jibrīn, ibid, p. 11 http://ibn-jebreen.com/book.php?cat=8&book=110&page=6376 (Last accessed 
– 1 May 2014) (the Hadith is quoted from Al-Bukhāri, Kitāb al-i‘tiṣām, p. 20) 
4  Ibn Jibrīn, al-Lu’lu al-mukīn fi fatāwā al-shaykh ibn Jibrīn, p. 29 http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=6&book=67&page=3569 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
5  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, ‘al-Salaf al-ṣalīḥ bayna al-‘ilm wa’l -imān’,  http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=8&book=109&page=6359 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014);  ‘Abd Allah ibn 
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Under bid‘a mukfira he includes acts such as calling upon the names of holy persons 
and / or beseeching them for a cure or salvation; fasting and praying [du‘a] while 
visiting their tombs; exaggerations of the kind which Sufis make when they consider 
their wālis as outranking the Prophet; and what the Shi‘a did in a similar fashion with 
their twelve imāms while, he continues, disregarding Allah.  All of these acts are shirk, 
and hence mean unbelief.
1
   
The second group includes acts which those who commited them believed were made 
in accordance with the Shari‘a.  This group generally refers to the performance of 
rituals such as celebrating the Prophet’s birthday, marking the night of Mid-Sha‘bān 
or the night of al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj, and performing religious rituals in inappropriate 
locations.
2
  Thus, here we see a different division than the usual three categories 
referred to in this work, as various acts which fall under the category of ‘ibādāt are 
placed under different categories not according to their type rather their level of 
severity. 
 
The polarisation between Sunna and bid‘a is best reflected by ibn Jibrīn’s definition 
of the phrase ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a.  These people, ibn Jibrīn says, are the ones 
who follow the Prophetic path, and they are also known as ‘The People of the 
Tradition’ [ahl al-ḥadīth].  In contrast, those who come under the definition of ahl al-
bid‘a, who do not recognise the powers of Allah and who question the truth of the 
Qur’an and the reliable aḥādīth, cannot be included under the banner of ahl al-sunna 
wa’l-jamā‘a.  
 
Even a person who committed a bid‘a without the intention of challenging Allah, or 
raising doubt about the Qur’an, would be excluded from ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a; 
however, he maintains, there are exceptions.  For instance, a person who used to 
belong to ahl al-bid‘a, but at a certain point of his life abandoned the bid‘a and started 
                                                                                                                                            
Jibrīn, ‘Asmā’ Allah wa-ṣifātuhu’, http://ibn-jebreen.com/book.php?cat=8&book=104&page=6196  
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
1  Ibn Jibrīn, Sharḥ lum‘at al-i‘tiqaād, p. 86 http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=7&book=88&page=5562 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
2  Ibn Jibrīn, Sharḥ lum‘at al-i‘tiqād, p. 85 http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=7&book=88&page=5561 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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to live according to the Prophetic path, would be considered once again as belonging 
to the ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a.1 
 
Ibn Jibrīn considers the graveyards of some of the sects which he defines as bid‘a 
sects (like the rāfiḍa), as places that should not be sanctioned by the Saudi 
Department for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice.  In these places, 
he says, shirk is practised, as people use them to pray ad‘iya, to ask for intercession 
from the dead, and build [shrines] on graves.
2
 
 
According to al-Ḥawālī, a bid‘a is every innovation which strives to resemble the acts 
included in the Shari‘a but is actually non-shar‘ī.  The most important element to take 
into consideration is whether a deed classified as a bid‘a began during the lifetime of 
the Prophet or after his death.  However, al-Ḥawālī adds, the matter is complicated 
and depends on the time and the person from whom a certain bid‘a emerged.3  He 
does not believe that every innovation is a sinful bid‘a, rather only those relating to 
rituals of worship.  Hence cars, roads and universities have nothing to do with bid‘a.  
Even communism, he states, cannot be considered a bid‘a, because those who 
promoted it did not intend to enter it into the Shari‘a in the first place.4 
 
Al-Ḥawālī stresses the fact that the best and strongest advice given by Allah to the 
believers is to fully adopt the Sunna and avoid the bid‘a.  He refers to Sunna and 
bid‘a as polar or mirror opposites.  Acknowledging Sunna as the second source of 
authority of jurisprudence [fiqh], al-Ḥawālī refers to bid‘a as the second worst sin in 
Islam, directly after unbelief [kufr].
5
  Like Ibn Jibrīn, the dichotomy that al-Ḥawālī 
makes between the Sunna and bid‘a leads him to divide people into two groups: ahl 
al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a, and ahl al-bid‘a. 
  
                                                 
1 ‘Adel Bana’ima, ‘Ḥiwār hātifī ma‘a al-shaykh’, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=9&book=186&page=7013 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
2  Ibn Jibrīn, ‘Ḥājat al-bashar ila al -amr bi’l-ma‘rūf wa’l-nāhi ‘ala al-munkar’  
3  ibid 
4  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Ḍābit al-bid‘a’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=3555&keywords=ةعدبلا  
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
5  Al-Ḥawālī, ibid 
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In many of his fatāwā, lectures, lessons and interviews, al-Ḥawālī describes the great 
devotion of the ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a with regard to the implementation of the 
straight path of Islam.  He presents this group as the mainstream of Islam, those who 
stand firmly in the heart of the consensus and as the right between two wrongs: the 
mu‘tazila on the one hand and the Sufis on the other, between the speculative 
theologians [ahl al-kalām] and the people of the considered opinion [ahl al-rā’y].1   
 
In one of his interviews, al-Ḥawālī refers to the ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a in its 
contemporaneous political meaning.  Asked why the West has launched an offensive 
against it, he replies that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, 
the West lives in horror and fears that the dormant giant, meaning the Muslim Nation, 
especially ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā’a, will awaken and fight against Christians in the 
war of civilisations.
2
 
 
Al-Ḥawālī’s fatāwā and lessons indicate that he thinks people who urge or cause 
others to commit bid‘a should be put to death, no matter whether this bid‘a leads to 
unbelief [kufr] or not.  He bases his opinion on the early ‘ulamā’ [salaf].  In this 
regard, he discusses a situation in which a person performs ijtihād, and mistakenly 
commits, or causes others to commit a bid‘a.  Although such a person, he claims, 
should be rewarded once (in contrast to a successful mujtahid, who is rewarded twice), 
a distinction should be made between the rewards and punishments of this world [al-
dunya] and those of the next world [al-ākhira].  In other words, such a person should 
be punished by death in this world, and the one reward he is entitled to will be given 
in the next world.
3
  
  
                                                 
1  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘al-Mumayyizāt al-‘amaliya li-ahl al-sunna wa’l -jamā‘a’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=4723&keywords=ةنسلا 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
2  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Asbāb hujūm al-‘ālam al-gharbi ‘ala ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=998&keywords=ةنسلا 
(Last accessed  - 1 May 2014)  
3  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Qutl al-da‘i ila al-bid‘a bighadh al-nadr ‘an takfīrihi’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=6445&keywords=ةعدبلا 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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V. Bid‘a – what needs to be done to avoid it 
 
In order to avoid bid‘a, Ibn Bāz suggests, Muslims must abstain from doing anything 
which counters the Shari‘a, by an unconditional belief in the unity of Allah [tawḥīd] 
and by strictly adhering to the Qur’an and Sunna.  This, he maintains, was exactly 
what was being done and promoted by the rulers and religious scholars of Saudi 
Arabia.  According to Ibn Bāz, the Saudi government and ‘ulamā’ practised rigour 
only in the following issues: promoting the concept of tawḥīd, adherence to the 
Qur’an and Sunna, and confronting bid‘a.1 
 
From Ibn Bāz’s texts, lessons and fatāwā, it can be adduced that in order to prevent 
bida‘, one should not only abstain from it himself, but also look around and act inside 
his society.  He should not visit people who commit bid‘a, with one exception – if by 
visiting them or talking to them, he can help promote the right path and advise them 
what to do or what not to do in order to avoid bid‘a and return to the rightful way of 
the Prophetic path.
2
 
  
Ibn Jibrīn does not go into many details on the subject.  His only advice is that in 
order to avoid a bid‘a, one must follow the Qur’an and the Sunna in a very strict 
way.
3
 
 
Al-Ḥawālī is asked how to eradicate all sorts of bid‘a.  His answer is that the only 
way to eradicate the evil of all bida‘ is to obey the Qur’an and follow the Prophetic 
Sunna.  He argues that every believer who lives in a neighbourhood or other locality 
in which people are not aware of these rules, must guide those people to obey the 
Qur’an and follow the Sunna.  A Muslim who committed a bid‘a should seek 
forgiveness by any of the following means – using his money for deeds which are 
                                                 
1
 Ibn Bāz, ‘Wujūb luzūm al-Sunna wa’l-ḥaḍr min al-bid‘a’   
2  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Naṣīḥat al-ahl min al-bida‘ wa’l-shirk’,  
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/18273 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014)  
3  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, ‘al-Irshād sharḥ lum‘at al-i‘tiqād al-hādī ila sabīl al-rashad’, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=1&book=57&page=2982 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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Sunna, practising Jihad for Allah, memorising the Qur’an, giving alms to the poor and 
performing acts of charity.
1
   
 
Finally, al-Ḥawālī provides a list of books written by various ‘ulamā’ who have 
defined all types of bid‘a and warned against them.  Reading these books by ‘ulamā’ 
like Ibn Ḥanbal, Al-Ajārī (d. 360 h), Ibn Batta (d. 387 h), Tartushī, Salīm al-Hilālī and 
a few modern Wahhābī ‘ulamā’, may help a believer to avoid committing bid‘a.2 
 
VI. Other types of bid‘a 
Celebrating the Prophet’s birthday 
 
According to Ibn Bāz, celebrating the Prophetic birthday is strictly forbidden and 
considered bid‘a.  This is founded in the Hadith already referred to: 
 
He who innovates something in this matter of ours that is not of it, is executing 
apostatsy [raḍḍ]. 
 
In addition, it is founded on the famous Hadith which characterises every bid‘a as 
ḍalāla.  Moreover, he continues, celebrating any person’s birthday is considered bid‘a 
as well: the Prophet, his ṣaḥāba and their followers did not celebrate birthdays, and 
customs like these only began in later times.
3
  Celebrating the Prophet’s birthday is 
therefore not only a bid‘a but definitely unnecessary too.  
 
First, because Muslims already have two great occasions to celebrate -- ‘id al-fiṭr and 
‘Id al-adḥa; secondly, there are other ways for a believer to demonstrate his love for 
the Prophet and God, especially by following the Prophet’s deeds, by obeying the 
                                                 
1  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Bid‘at al-Mawlid wa-khatriha’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=1068&keywords=
2799#ةعدب 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
2  Al-Ḥawālī, ‘Ḍabit al-bid‘a’ 
3  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Hal yuḥal li’l-Muslimīn ‘an yaḥtafilu bi’l -Mawlid al-Nabawī?’, 
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/85 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014)  
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Shari‘a, by performing the Jihad for the sake of Allah, and by using da‘wa aimed at 
delivering the message of the Prophetic Sunna.
1 
 
Like other Wahhābī ‘ulamā, Ibn Bāz claims that the first to introduce this bid‘a were 
the Fatimids in Egypt and North Africa in the fourth and fifth hijrī centuries.  Ibn Bāz 
notes that the Fatimids used to mark the birthdays of Ḥasan, Ḥusayn, Fātima and other 
shi‘ī figures.  Celebrating these birthdays, he continues, was not only a bid‘a, but also 
led to shirk and ghulūw in regard to these figures.2  
 
Sedgwick reports on a controversy in 1973, when various Ḥijāzi ‘ulamā publicly 
disagreed in a Kuwaiti newspaper with the Wahhābī establishment’s renewed 
condemnation for Sufi celebrations of the Prophet’s birthday, which had been 
practised for centuries; Ibn Bāz, he says, condemned the mawlid forthrightly, on the 
simple grounds that it was a bid‘a.  It was not until the 1980s, Sedgwick continues, 
that the Baluchi Naqshbandis again celebrated this mawlid.
3
 
 
In one of his fatāwā, Ibn Bāz rules that a believer wishing to practise the off-season 
pilgrimage [‘umra] should not perform it intentionally in accordance with birthdays 
(of the Prophet and others).  Performing the ‘umra is permitted at all times, without 
linking it to birthdays, and it is best to perform it during the month of Ramaḍān; the 
Prophet himself, Ibn Bāz remarks, said that performing the ‘umra during Ramadān 
should be considered equal to performing it in the Hajj season.
4
  
 
Ibn Jibrīn also provides several reasons as to why the Prophet’s birthday should not be 
celebrated.  First, there is no evidence that the Prophet himself marked his own 
birthday, and the same applies to the first Caliphs and to the Prophet’s ṣaḥāba.  If 
these people, who loved the Prophet so much, did not mark his birthday, neither 
should the believer in modern times.  Secondly, there are many more appropriate days 
and dates for the believer to mark and celebrate, such as the day in which the word of 
                                                 
1  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Ḥukm al-iḥtifāl bi’l -Mawlid al-Nabawī’, 
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/4855 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014) 
2  ibid  
3 Mark J. R. Sedgwick, "Saudi Sufis: Compromise in the Hijaz, 1925-40" Die Welt des Islams, New 
Series, vol. 37, issue 3, Shiites and Sufis in Saudi Arabia (Nov., 1997), pp. 366-367 
4  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Ada al-‘umra fi’l-mawlid’, http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/8471 (Last 
accessed - 1 May 2014)  
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Allah reached the prophet [yawm nuzūl al-waḥy], the day of the battle of Badr, the 
day of the battle of Hunayn and others.  If a believer wishes to express his devotion, 
this should be done by following the Sunna and implementing the Shari‘a, and not by 
celebrating the Prophet’s birthday.1 
 
Ibn Jibrīn refers to the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday as a bad creed [‘aqīda 
say’a] and as bid‘a.  He claims that this bid‘a was first introduced in the fourth hijrī 
century by the Buwayhids (a shi‘ī dynasty in Persia and Iraq) and afterwards spread 
into most of the Muslim lands to such an extent that it was accepted by the ‘ulamā of 
these lands.  Those who introduced and disseminated this bid‘a, he adds, introduced 
an alien element to Islam.
2
 
 
Al-Ḥawālī deals with the question of whether celebrating the Prophet’s birthday 
should be considered Sunna or bid‘a.  Such an event, he explains, was marked or 
celebrated neither by the Prophet nor by his ṣaḥāba.  The people who celebrated the 
Prophet’s birthday were those who hated God’s religion and the Prophet’s ṣaḥāba the 
most.  According to al-Ḥawālī, they were the rāfiḍa (Shi‘a), the esoteric people 
calling themselves the bātiniyyūn (who claim to have a sacred spirit within them for 
personal guidance), and the Zoroastrians [majūsiyya] whom al-Ḥawālī considers 
zanādiqa.  The main group to introduce this celebration into Islam, he continues, were 
the Fatimids, whose state -- he claims -- was actually Jewish, despite the fact that they 
identified themselves as descendants of the Prophet; and it is well known, he adds, 
that Jews are the enemies of the Prophet and of Muslims.  Hence, al-Ḥawālī concludes, 
celebrating the Prophet’s birthday is a bid‘a which should not be allowed.3  
 
Another question which al-Ḥawālī refers to is whether celebrating the Prophet’s 
birthday would lead to secularism [‘almāniyya].  This, he answers, is a new 
phenomenon which satisfies the mind but neglects the Sunna.  Those who started with 
this celebration caused a situation in which people dream about the Prophet’s ghost at 
                                                 
1
 Ibn Jibrīn, al-Lu’lu al-mukīn fi fatāwā ibn Jibrīn, p. 27, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=6&book=67&page=3567 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
2  ibid; ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, ‘Fatāwā fi’l-tawḥīd’, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=6&book=16&page=700 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014).  
3
 Safar al-Ḥawālī,  ‘al-Iḥtifāl bi’l-Mawlid al-Nabawī bid‘a’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=3027&keywords=ةعدب 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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night and afterwards in daytime as well, to such an extent that these dreams prevent 
them from performing their religious duties correctly.  Henceforth, the way to further 
violations of Islamic laws is swift.  Al-Ḥawālī concludes by saying that Muslims 
should pray to Allah to spare them these modes of bid‘a.1 
 
Another point which al-Ḥawālī raises is connected with the exact date on which the 
Prophet was born.  While it is known that the Prophet passed away on 12th Rabi‘ al-
Awwal, the exact date or even month in which he was born are uncertain.  Fatimids 
(who are considered to be Jews), who in the past ruled Egypt and North Africa, and 
had control over Muslims there, tried to introduce a tradition of celebrating the 
Prophet’s birthday in order to cause the Muslims to confuse it with the date of the 
Prophet’s death, which for the Jews -- he asserts -- is a celebration.  Hence, al-Ḥawāli 
claims, whoever marks a certain date as the Prophet’s birthday actually performs a 
bid‘a.  Furthermore, the Shi‘a, who are also the enemies of Islam, use the same 
mourning slogans, songs and speeches both during the ‘Āshūra and the Prophet’s 
Birthday, and this, of course, is a bid‘a as well.2  
The night of Mid-Sha‘ban 
Ibn Bāz claims that marking, celebrating or fasting on the night of Mid-Sha‘ban is 
considered bid‘a.  If there are any aḥādīth which permit this innovation, they are all 
weak and unreliable.  In order to explain his position, Ibn Bāz refers to the same 
argument that he invoked when considering the issue of the Prophet’s birthday -- it is 
something that was innovated many years after the Prophet's days, and not something 
that Allah or the Prophet had advanced.  As in the case of the Prophet’s birthday, Ibn 
Bāz relies upon the same aḥādīth, and adds the Qur’anic verse: 
 
“O you who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger and those charged with 
authority among you.  If you differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah 
                                                 
1
Safar al-Ḥawālī,  ‘al-Iḥtifāl bi’l-Mawlid al-Nabawī bid‘at al-‘abidiyyin’,  
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=2137&keywords=ةعدب 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
2  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Bid‘at al-Mawlid wa-khatriha’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=1068&keywords=ةعدب 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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and His Messenger, if ye do believe in Allah and the Last Day: that is best, and most 
suitable for final determination”.  [Qur’an 59: 4] 
 
For a believer seeking a certain night to perform a special worship, Ibn Bāz offers 
other options which, he continues, are more apposite.  One example is on a Friday 
night, since Friday is the best day of the week; other, more specific dates are the 
aforementioned  Laylat al-Qadr and the nights of Ramaḍān.  Ibn Bāz mentions a 
reliable Hadith regarding these nights: 
 
Whoever makes [the month] of Ramaḍān a time for belief and self criticism, will be 
pardoned for all his sins, and whoever makes Laylat al-Qadr a time for belief and 
self criticism, will [also] be pardoned.
1
 
 
If the night of Mid-Sha‘bān was so important to mark, he adds, then the Prophet 
would have instructed the Nation to mark it, or at least he would either have marked it 
himself or he would have said something to his ṣaḥāba.  Since none of the above took 
place, Ibn Bāz concludes, marking this night should be considered bid‘a and believers 
should refrain from doing so.
2
 
 
With regards to fasting through this night, Ibn Bāz suggests that this is also a bid‘a; 
however, if someone is used to fasting every month of the [lunar] year in the ‘three 
white days’,3 he would not be committing a bid‘a, because the Prophet himself used 
to fast on these days.
4
  It should be noted that according to Ibn Bāz it is also forbidden 
to make a sacrifice in Mid-Sha‘bān, eat the meat of a sacrifice that had been made on 
that day,
5
 and even make a special prayer.  All of these acts are considered bid‘a. 6  
 
Ibn Jibrīn is asked whether it is permitted to perform special rituals in the night of 
Mid-Sha‘bān, and whether people should fast during this day.  He rules that the 
                                                 
1
 Al-Bukhārī, Kitāb faḍl laylat al-qadr, no. 1 
2  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Ḥukm al-iḥtifāl bi-laylat al-niṣf min Sha‘bān’,  
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/8186  (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
3 Ibn Bāz refers to the days of 13-15 each month, when the moon is full 
4  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Ḥukm takhṣīṣ al-khamīs ‘ashar min Sha‘bān bi’l-ṣiyyām’, 
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/9894  (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
5  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Ḥukm al-dhabḥ fi layla mu‘ayyana ka-laylat al- niṣf min Sha‘bān wa-
sab‘a wa-‘ishrin min Rajab’,  http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/9963  (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
6  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Ḥukm ṣalat al-khamīs ‘ashar min Sha‘bān’, 
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/10130 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014) 
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source of the stories or aḥādīth regarding such rituals as well as the fast may have 
come from one of the followers of the ṣaḥāba, but all are questionable or unreliable, 
and were transmitted in countries in which unbelief was widespread.  Ibn Jibrīn 
concludes that no special rituals are allowed in this night and no fast was allowed 
specifically during the day.
1
 
 
In al-Ḥawālī’s opinion, considering the night of Mid-Sha‘bān a special night for 
worshipping Allah is bid‘a.  There are people, he observes, who believe that the 
following Qur’anic verse actually refers to the night of Mid-Sha‘bān, but they are 
wrong:  
 
We sent it down during a blessed night
 
.
 
  [Qur’an 44: 3] 
 
The sacred night definitely comes during the month of Ramaḍān and not Sha‘bān, as 
two other Qur’anic verses suggest: 
Ramaḍān is the [month] in which we sent down the Qur’an.  [Qur’an 2: 185]  
 
We have indeed revealed this [Message] in the night of Power.  [Qur’an 97: 1] 
 
Al-Ḥawālī admits that there are ‘ulamā who claim that the night of Mid-Sha‘bān 
should be dedicated to worship, based on a Hadith which says that Allah reveals 
himself to the believers in that night and pardons everyone who is not a mushrik nor 
has abandoned the Sunna.  However, he says, even if this is true, it does not mean that 
this night should be dedicated to a special worship and therefore people who do so 
commit bid‘a.
2
 
  
                                                 
1  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, ‘Fatāwā al-ṣiyyām’, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=6&book=18&page=849 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
2
 Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Bida‘ Shahr Sha‘bān’,  
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=906&keywords=نابعش 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014); Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Laylan al-niṣf min Sha‘bān’,     
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=2683&keywords=نابعش 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
208 
 
The celebration of al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj 
 
According to Ibn Bāz, there is no doubt that the Prophet’s night journey to the furthest 
mosque and subsequent ascent to heaven [al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj] was a significant event; 
this journey proved the Prophet’s truthfulness and the great status he acquired in the 
eyes of Allah, the almightiness of Allah and the superiority of Allah over all creatures.  
However, he continues, we must distinguish between the importance of the journey 
itself and the commemoration of Laylat al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj, a custom that some 
people perform on the night of the 27
th
 of Rajab.  
 
There is no reliable Hadith from which a believer could deduce that this night should 
be marked by any special worship or rituals.  Ibn Bāz argues that neither the Prophet 
nor his ṣaḥāba celebrated or marked this night, and none of them ever ordered or 
recommended doing so.  Therefore, no Muslim should mark this night, and these acts 
are considered bid‘a. As in other cases previously discussed, Ibn Bāz quotes the 
Hadith which states that an innovator is an apostate, as well as other aḥādīth which 
condemn all religious innovations.  Ibn Bāz says that Muslims committing bida‘ like 
this were behaving like Jews and Christians, who had introduced innovations into 
their religions.
1
 
 
Like Ibn Bāz, Ibn Jibrīn regards the act of celebrating the night of al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj 
with special rituals as bid‘a.  In addition, similarly to Ibn Bāz, he states that this night 
should not be celebrated in any special way, since there is no reference to it in any 
reliable aḥādīth.  However, unlike Ibn Bāz, Ibn Jibrīn does not deal with the issue 
specifically, nor does he issue a special detailed fatwā on the subject.  Instead, Ibn 
Jibrīn addresses it as part of a discussion on other bida‘ which he sees as damaging to 
the Muslim creed -- such as the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday or other 
birthdays, the commemoration of Mid-Sha‘bān and more.2  
 
                                                 
1 ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Ḥukm al-iḥtifāl bi-laylat al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj’,  
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/8185 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014); 
1 ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, 
‘Bida‘ fi Shahr Rajab’, http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/1105 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014)  
2
 Ibn Jibrīn, Qawadih fi’l-‘aqīda, p. 11, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=8&book=110&page=6376 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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Like Ibn Bāz, al-Ḥawālī distinguishes between two issues -- on the one hand, the 
importance of the actual occurrence of al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj to Islamic doctrine, and on 
the other, the commemoration of it on the night of 27
th
 of Rajab.  The first issue is 
rather clear and simple; al-Ḥawālī emphasises that al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj is an integral 
part of the Qur’an, and whoever denies it actually denies the Qur’an, and thus 
becomes an unbeliever.
1
  
 
With regard to the second issue, al-Ḥawālī’s starting point is that the exact date on 
which the night of the Isrā’ took place is unknown.  It was, he says, the Egyptian 
writer Shihab al-Dīn al-Khafajī (d. 1069 h) who first stated in his book Nasīm al-riyād 
fi sharḥ shifa’ al-qāḍī Iyād that it took place on 27th of Rajab.  Having established that, 
al-Ḥawālī continues, not only commemorating this night is a bid‘a, but it is also a 
very late innovation.  Al-Ḥawālī repeats the same arguments presented by both Ibn 
Bāz and Ibn Jibrīn, and says that neither the prophet nor his ṣaḥāba or their followers 
have ever commemorated the night of al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj. 
 
Nowadays, al-Ḥawālī says, there are many people who gather in mosques.  During 
this gathering, the opening verse of the relevant Sura, (“Glory be to Him Who took 
His Servant [Muḥammad] on a journey by night”, [Qur’an 17: 1]) is narrated, and 
many radio and television stations also broadcast these rituals.  There is, of course, no 
objection to reading this verse, but when read on the night of 27th Rajab, it gives 
people the wrong impression and misleads them into thinking that this night concerns 
the actual event.  Al-Ḥawālī summarises his argument by repeating the Hadith which 
defines the innovator as an apostate.
2
  
Mourning rituals  
Ibn Bāz considers several mourning rituals performed in the Muslim world as bid‘a.     
These incude, for example, the custom of instructing the dead after the burial [talqīn], 
and even if made before death; reading the shahāda following a death, during the 
                                                 
1 Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Ḥukm man ankara al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=4613&keywords=جارعملاو 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
2  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Ḥukm al-iḥtifāl bi-laylat al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=5565&keywords=جارعملاو  
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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funeral, after it or while digging the grave.  Another custom is grabbing some dirt 
from the grave and, while doing so, reading some Qur’anic verses.  All these acts 
have no origin whatsoever in the Sunna -- the deeds or sayings of the early Muslims, 
the Prophet and his ṣaḥāba.  Back then, people who participated in a funeral only 
spoke in low voices.  In addition, all the aḥādīth which allowed these customs are 
unreliable.
1
 
 
According to Ibn Bāz, prayers should be said in a special place set aside for prayers, 
prior to the funeral, and quoting the shahāda is permitted only prior to the death of a 
person.  During the funeral itself, the only words that should be said must urge the 
participants to seek forgiveness for the deceased for all his wrongdoing during his 
lifetime.  Ibn Bāz bases his opinion upon the Prophetic Hadith: 
 
Seek forgiveness for your brother and ask for his steadfastness for indeed he is now 
being questioned.
2
 
 
Ibn Bāz further argues, regarding mourning rituals, that gathering in the house of the 
deceased after his death to eat, drink and read from the Qur’an is a bid‘a.    
As in other cases, this relies on the Prophet and his ṣaḥāba, who never performed 
such rituals upon hearing the news of the death of one of their fellow-believers.  
 
The Sunna accepts the performance of certain rituals after the funeral once all people 
have left, such as offering condolences to the family [ta‘ziya], and for the relatives or 
neighbours to send food to the family.  When Ja‘far, one of the Prophet’s companions, 
died, the Prophet said: ‘Make food for the family of Ja‘far to occupy their minds'.   
Furthermore, if people gather in the deceased’s house, they should not perform a 
                                                 
1  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Bida‘ ‘ind al-dafn’, http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/10215 (Last 
accessed - 1 May 2014)  
2  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘al-Talqīn ba‘d al-dafn bid‘a’, http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/2670 (Last 
accessed - 1 May 2014); ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘Ḥukm al-ṣalāt ‘ala al-mayyit fi’l-maqbara – al-
taḥlīl bi-raf‘ al-sawt ‘ind al-dafn – wa talqīn al-mayyit ba‘d al-mawt’, 
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/14082  (Last accessed – 1 May 2014);  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘al-
qirā’a fi turbat al-qabr thumma hathuha ‘ala kafn al-mayyit bid‘a munkara’, 
http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/2656  (Last accessed – 1 May 2014) (the Hadith is quoted from See Al-
Bayhaqī, Sunan, vol. 4, p. 56 
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prayer there, a custom which also has no origin in early Islam and is therefore a bid‘a.   
Prayers, according to Ibn Bāz, should only be performed in a mosque.1  
 
Ibn Jibrīn refers to the custom of quoting the shahāda after the death or burial of a 
deceased person.  He says that this is a widespread bid‘a in Iraq, Syria and Africa and 
that the origin of this ritual is an unreliable Hadith in which the Prophet allegedly said: 
 
Say after your dead there is no God but Allah  
 
However, Ibn Jibrīn continues, whoever performs this custom ignores the fact that this 
Hadith is unreliable; similarly to Ibn Bāz, Ibn Jibrīn also states that quoting the 
shahāda is only permitted prior to a person’s death.  When asked whether it is 
permitted to quote verses from Surat Ya Sin after one’s death or burial, his answer is 
rather similar -- that the origin of this custom is also an unreliable Hadith, in which 
the Prophet allegedly said: 
  
Recite Surat Ya Sin over your dead. 
 
If this Hadith were to be taken seriously, he adds, then there could be no doubt that its 
original meaning was to read this Sura next to a dying person, and not over the grave 
of a deceased.
2
 
 
Regarding funeral rituals, Ibn Jibrīn is asked about words being said over a deceased’s 
grave, and he mentions the phrase that many scholars suggested people should say: 
‘In the name of Allah and the nation of the messenger of Allah’.3  There is no sign Ibn 
Jibrīn sees it as a bid‘a.  Like Ibn Bāz, Ibn Jibrīn does not approve of speaking loudly 
during a funeral, but unlike Ibn Bāz, he does not consider it a sin or bid‘a, but refers 
to it as a disliked practice [makrūh].4  
 
                                                 
1  ‘Abd al-‘Azīz‘Azīz Ibn Bāz, ‘al-Ijtima‘ fi-bayt al-mayyit li’l-akl wa’l-sharab wa-qirā’at al-Qur’an 
bid‘a’, http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/2772 (Last accessed  - 1 May 2014)  
2  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, Fiqh wa-aḥkām, Online version, p. 96, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=3&book=51&page=2453 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
3  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, Fatāwā, p. 57, http://ibn-jebreen.com/book.php?cat=6&book=50&page=2179 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
4  ‘Abd Allah ibn Jibrīn, Kitāb al-rawḍ al-murabba‘, online version, vol. 1, p. 45, http://ibn-
jebreen.com/book.php?cat=7&book=77&page=4326 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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Ibn Jibrīn also differs from Ibn Bāz over the issue of prayer inside the cemetery.  He 
claims that if a prayer is not performed before the funeral, it is permitted to pray near 
the grave itself, even if many years have passed since the death of the deceased.
1
  
 
Al-Ḥawālī addresses the question of whether it is permitted to read from the Qur’an 
over a grave.  In his opinion, the most important issue here is the number of people 
who gather near the grave and participate in the reading.  All the ‘ulamā, he claims, 
have agreed that if a large number of people gather near a grave and read from the 
Qur’an; if a person reads from the Qur’an after the funeral to many others; or if a 
person comes to read from the Qur’an near the deceased’s grave when several days 
have passed since his death – these are clear cases of bid‘a.  Even if a person stands 
on his own near a grave of a dear relative, and while asking forgiveness for the 
deceased inserts Qur’anic verses into his words, this is still a bid‘a, albeit the lightest, 
most tolerable and most forgivable act of all such matters.
2
 
 
Neither Ibn Jibrīn nor Safar al-Ḥawālī elaborate or even refer to rituals being 
performed after the funeral in the deceased’s house.  Yet these issues are dealt with by 
Shaykh Ṣaliḥ al-Fawzān.  In a small booklet dedicated to the issue of bid‘a, Fawzān 
sees more or less eye-to-eye with Ibn Bāz on issues related to mourning rituals.  He 
considers reciting Qur’anic verses (especially from Sūrat al-Fātiḥa) after someone’s 
death a bid‘a, and also says that if the family members of the deceased prepare food 
and claim that this act benefits the dead, they will be committing bid‘a.  
 
Al-Fawzān, like Ibn Bāz, Ibn Jibrīn and al-Ḥawālī, names other rituals and acts that 
have already been referred to as bida‘: the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, the 
performance of special rituals in the night of al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj, the performance of 
special rituals during the night of Mid-Sha‘bān, building mosques on graves, shaping 
graves like mosques, visiting graves to receive blessings and calling upon the 
deceased for assistance.
3
 
                                                 
1  Ibn Jibrīn, ibid, p. 31,http://ibn-jebreen.com/book.php?cat=7&book=77&page=4312 (Last accessed – 
1 May 2014) 
2  Safar al-Ḥawālī, ‘Ḥukm qirā’at al-Qur’an ‘ala al-amwāt’, 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=3557&keywords=تاوملاا 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
3  Salih al Fauzaan, Innovation and its bad effects, translated by Dr Hafiz Muhammad Shabbir Usmani,  
Birmingham, Maktabah Darussalam UK, 2000, pp.12-16.  
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It should be noted that the Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Fatāwā, in 
which Fawzān is a member, has also issued rulings on matters relating to mourning 
and funeral rituals.  Like the other ‘ulamā’  discussed in this chapter, it rules that 
reciting the Qur’an during a funeral or near the deceased’s grave are definitely not 
acts which were performed by the Prophet.  The Permanent Committee recalls that 
many important ‘ulamā’, like the great Ibn Taymiyya, have said that performing these 
rituals was bid‘a.1 
 
VII. The Shi‘a in the eyes of current Wahhābī ‘ulamā  
 
In late February 2009, a crowd of several thousand Shi‘a from the Eastern Province 
(al-Ahsa’) of Saudi Arabia made a pilgrimage to the al-Baqī‘ cemetery in Medina, 
close to the Prophet’s mosque.  This cemetery is well known as the place in which 
some ṣaḥāba, one of the Prophet’s wives and several important Shi‘ī Imāms are 
buried.  The Saudi religious police [Mutawa‘a], who work under the authority of the 
‘Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice’, filmed some 
shi‘ī women near the cemetery.  In the riots which broke out as a result of this 
incident, three shi‘ī pilgrims were killed and nine arrested.2  
 
This incident is symbolic of the state of relations between the Saudi regime and the 
shi‘ī minority in Saudi Arabia, which comprises between 10% and 15% of the 
kingdom’s population, and which resides mainly in al-Ahsa’ Province.  The deep 
hostility between the Saudi Wahhābī regime and the Shi‘a in the country has existed 
from the mid-eighteenth century, when the first Saudi state was established; currently, 
the hostility is reflected in both its religious and national aspects.  There is no doubt 
that the Wahhābī religious establishment is one of the main instigators of the tension 
between the Shi‘a and the Saudi regime.  The friction began when the Shi‘ī population 
                                                 
1
 Muhammad bin Abdul Aziz al Musnad (collected), Fatāwā Islamiyah – Islamic Verdicts, Vol. 3, 
Riyadh, Jeddah, Sharjah, Lahore, London, Houston & New York, Darussalam, 2002, pp. 109-110.  
2 Rannie Amiri, ‘Unrest in Medina’, 2 March 2009,  
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=30707 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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of the al-Qatif and al-Ahsa’ came under Saudi rule in 1913, when Ibn Saud occupied 
the Province.
1
 
 
The hostility has been developing since then, and has also brought about the gradual 
politicisation of the shi‘ī community in Saudi Arabia, mainly during the 1950s and 
1960s.  On several occasions over the years, this political tension also manifested 
itself in religious terms -- with the Saudi regime banning the publication and 
distribution of religious or political texts; forcing limitations on mosque construction 
or ruining destroying sacred and social centres; or persecuting those observing shi‘ī 
rituals such as ‘Āshūra and visits to graves.2  Violent and active shi‘ī resistance 
continued during most of the 1980s, but in the early 2000s, shi‘ī leaders joined the 
reformist forces in their fight against al-Qā‘ida. 
 
The ongoing shi‘ī-Wahhābī tensions have also been expressed in intellectual religious 
terms.  Senior ‘ulamā’,  including those who have been cited in this chapter, and 
many others, issued fatāwā against the Shi‘a in general and those living in the 
kingdom in particular, claiming they were non-believers, and that their rituals should 
be considered bid‘a. 
 
Ibn Bāz, for example, when asked about the difference between the ahl al-sunna and 
the Shi‘a, says:  
 
There is a difference between them. Allah has not created the people equal. Those 
who do the good things cannot be compared to the wrongdoers. The innocent and 
the sinners are not the same… We should distinguish between the non-believers and 
the Muslims, and between the Shi‘a and the others. The Shi‘a are innovators 
[mubtadi‘a] with all their [sub] groups: the Rāfiḍa, the Nusairis, the Ismailis and 
others. They are divided into sects and castes and fragments. There are among them 
                                                 
1 Najīb al-Khanīzī, ‘al-Nashāṭ al-siyyāsī li’l-shi‘a fi’l-Sa‘ūdiyya’, Al-Jazeera 03/10/2004, 
http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/78043615-9EE9-4403-8C01-A60FF61A98C3.htm (Last accessed - 
1 May 2014)  
2
 See for example ‘The Shi‘i Question in Saudi Arabia’ – Middle East Report no. 45 (19 September 
2005), International Crisis Group, pp. 1-2; ‘The Shi‘i Question in Saudi Arabia’, pp. 3-4; Jacob 
Goldberg, ‘The Shi‘i  Minority in Saudi Arabia’, in Juan Cole & Nikki Keddie (eds.) Shi‘ism and 
Social Protest, New York, Yale University Press, 1986, p. 
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the Rāfiḍa, the Nusairis and others who worship Ahl al-Bayt1 even without 
worshipping Allah. They ask for Ahl al-Bayt’s help. They are non-believrs…2 
 
Al-Ḥawālī warns that the Shi‘a pose a danger to the real and true believers:  
 
Those people always stand side by side with the enemies of Allah. They form 
alliances with the Jews, the Christians, the Mongols, the Tatars and with whoever 
attacks the Muslims’ land. They stand side by side with those against the Muslims. 
They seek to fight against the People of the Sunna, even if that means standing side 
by side with the non believers.
3
 
 
According to Al-Atawneh, Ibn Jibrīn went even further by declaring that the killing of 
Shi‘a was not a sin.4  Michaela Prokop provides an insight into Saudi school 
textbooks; she notes that many of them, especially those concerned with tawḥīd, refer 
to various rituals examined here as bida‘.  According to her, until 1993, schoolbooks 
openly denounced Sufi and Shi‘a beliefs as bid‘a, warned the students against mixing 
with the ‘innovators’ and many times refered to the Shi‘a as mushrikūn or even kuffār. 
This should partly be attributed to the rivalry with Iran.  The curriculum was changed 
after protests, Prokop adds, and the supposedly ‘repugnant’ and ‘deviating’ aspects 
and religious practices are no longer attributed to one particular sect.  Nevertheless, 
she concludes, Shi‘a beliefs continue to be denounced in books distributed at Saudi-
financed mosques both within the country and abroad.
5
 
VIII.   The Muslim Brotherhood in the eyes of current Wahhābī 
‘ulamā’  
 
Modern Wahhābī ‘ulamā use the issue of bid‘a to attack non-Wahhābī groups 
throughout the Muslim world.  One example is the way that these ‘ulamā look at the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which is dealt with in a separate chapter.  
 
                                                 
1 Those figures believed by the Shi‘a to have been divinely appointed to teach the true faith after the 
Prophet.  
2  See: http://www.binBaz.org.sa/mat/4172 (Last accessed - 1 May 2014)  
3  See: 
http://www.alHawali.com/index.cfm?method=home.SubContent&contentID=2993&keywords=ةعيشلا 
(Last accessed – 1 May 2014) 
4 Al-Atawneh, Middle Eastern Studies, p. 256 
5 Michaela Prokop, "Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Education", International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 79, No. 1 (Jan., 2003), p. 81 
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Ibn Bāz was very strict in his fatāwā, interviews and publications about the Muslim 
Brotherhood, saying that their fate is to be burnt in hell.  Various sources cite an 
interview (whose exact timing is unknown) in which Ibn Bāz quotes the famous 
Hadith which says that the Muslim Nation would split into seventy-three sects -- with 
all, except for the saved sect, belonging in hell.  This, according to Ibn Bāz, includes 
the Muslim Brotherhood, which means that he considers the Brotherhood to be a 
group which does not follow the Sunna. 
 
In a different place, answering a question on the Muslim Brotherhood, Ibn Bāz says 
that the movement has been criticised by the people of knowledge [ahl al-‘ilm] since 
its participation in spreading the da‘wa is not for the sake of the unity of God, nor in 
order to reject shirk or bid‘a.  Furthermore, he continues, the Muslim Brotherhood has 
its own methods of worshipping which are inconsistent with those of the ahl al-sunna.   
In his answer, Ibn Bāz criticises Muslim Brotherhood rituals such as visiting the 
tombs of saints like Ḥusayn, Ḥasan or al-Badawī, and asking for the saints’ 
intercession -- which, according to the true faith, is considered shirk.
1
 
 
Another objection raised by Ibn Bāz is that various groups like the Muslim 
Brotherhood or Tablighi Jamaat are organised as parties, an anomaly which is not 
allowed; the true believers belong only to the Party of Allah and should never form 
parties in their political sense, even ones based on religion.  Since neither the Prophet 
nor his followers were organised in parties, such acts should be considered bid‘a.2 
 
In general, it looks as if this view is shared by many Wahhābī ‘ulamā.  For example, 
Shaykh Ṣāliḥ ibn Fawzān also includes the Muslim Brotherhood, alongside other 
political groups such as Tablighi Jamaat and Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr, in the seventy-two sects 
destined to go to hell, since they have violated the principles of the ahl al-sunna.  Ibn 
Fawzān even goes as far as to say that members of such groups should not be 
welcome in the Lands of the Muslims [Bilād al-Muslimīn] – which probably refers to 
                                                 
1 See: 
http://www.isfalah.com/vb/showthread.php?s=ecd0ff589f03d9dc0faa33489e840398&p=16038#post16
038 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014). See also: http://www.ajurry.com/vb/showthread.php?t=10594 (Last 
accessed – 1 May 2014) 
2  See: http://www.sahab.net/forums/showthread.php?t=363727 (Last accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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Saudi Arabia – since they want to practise deviation [inḥirāf] and divide the people of 
that land, which is equivalent unbelief. 
 
Another Wahhābī scholar – Shaykh Ṣāliḥ ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Āl al-Shaykh – the Saudi 
Minister for Religious Affairs – also attacks the Muslim Brotherhood.  In one of his 
fatāwā, he accuses the Brotherhood of neither respecting the Sunna nor liking the 
people of the Sunna.  All the Muslim Brotherhood is interested in is political benefits, 
and their true objective is not to perform a proper da‘wa but to utilise it as a means to 
seize political power in any given country.
1
  
 
Ibn Jibrīn, on the other hand, does not treat all members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
as one group, but distinguishes between various groups and members inside the 
Brotherhood: according to him, thosewho follow the path of the ahl al-sunna, abstain 
from asking for help from dead saints, perform acts of worship properly, and 
command the right and forbid the wrong, should be seen as good people and good 
believers [min ahl al-khayr].   
 
Furthermore, in contrast to Ibn Bāz, who places the Muslim Brotherhood on the same 
level as Sufis and the Shi‘a (among the seventy two groups who will be burnt in hell), 
Ibn Jibrīn distinguishes between various groups – referring to Sufis as mushrikūn and 
to the Shi‘a as non-believers.2  According to ibn Jibrīn, the name of a group to which 
a person belongs does not matter; the only factor which matters is whether a person is 
faithful, believes in the unity of Allah and lives his life according to the right path [al-
ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm].  From his fatāwā it can be understood that only non-Muslim 
groups -- such as Jews, Christians and Buddhists, belong in hell as a single group.
3
  
 
Finally, given Safar al-Ḥawālī’s background and the influence exerted on him by 
significant Muslim Brotherhood scholars, it should not come as a surprise that there is 
no indication he holds similar views. 
                                                 
1  See al-Fawzān and Āl al-Shaykh’s opinions quoted on:  
http://www.nationalkuwait.com/vb/showthread.php?t=91538  
2  See: http://ibn-jebreen.com/ftawa.php?view=vmasal&subid=5756&parent=786 (Last accessed – 1 
May 2014)  
3  See: http://www.ibn-jebreen.com/ftawa.php?view=vmasal&subid=10948&parent=3954 (Last 
accessed – 1 May 2014)  
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter has focused mainly on the opinions and rulings of three of the most 
famous Wahhābī ‘ulamā’ in Saudi Arabia in the last century -- individuals who 
represent not only three different generations, but also two currents in modern Saudi 
Wahhābiyya: the ‘official’ and ‘non-official’‘ulamā’.  
 
Despite the differences in age and general attitude towards the ruling family, there are 
many common denominators among the three with regard to the focus of this study.   
They all stress the great importance of the Sunna, all consider bid‘a as something very 
bad which should be avoided and eradicated, and all agree this should be done by 
strict adherence to the Qur’an and Sunna.  They all refuse to distinguish between a 
‘good’ and a ‘bad’ bid‘a, and only divide the bida‘ into two levels of severity.  In 
addition, they present bid‘a as the polar opposite of the Sunna; they all consider 
Sunna and bid‘a as a ‘zero-sum game’; and all have more or less the same opinion 
concerning rituals which Wahhābiyya condemns.  All three attribute the origins of 
bid‘a to groups which the Wahhābīs hate the most: Shi‘a, the mu‘tazila and the 
khawārij.  
 
The fact that all three deliberate on, and concentrate far more on rulings about Sunna, 
shirk and bid‘a compared to issues such as ijtihād or ijmā‘, shows that all of them are 
very loyal to the Wahhābiyya and its pillars; in other words, they say in all possible 
ways that the Sunna is highly important, and thus, by not respecting the Sunna, one 
puts himself in a risk of ending up committing bid‘a and / or shirk.  In addition, they 
speak relatively briefly about ijmā‘ and ijtihād -- two issues which the Wahhābiyya 
treats with suspicion.  
 
However, in spite of these common denominators, it is also not difficult to observe the 
differences between Ibn Bāz and Ibn Jibrīn on the one hand, and Safar al-Ḥawālī on 
the other.  Al-Ḥawālī, while dealing with all issues under study here, not only refers in 
his rulings much more to current events, groups and individuals – for example, the 
Palestinian intifāḍa, the Ibadis in Oman, and the writer Naguib Maḥfuz – but also 
exposes his relatively extremist opinions, by referring to the struggle between the 
Muslim and Western civilisations, by attacking Jews and Christians much more than 
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the other two scholars, and by claiming that the appropriate treatment for people who 
commit bid‘a is execution.  
 
At least some of these discussions show how deeply al-Ḥawālī was influenced by the 
Qutbist trend within the Muslim Brotherhood, its language and the subjects it tackles. 
 
Another difference is that the scholars affiliated with the regime – Ibn Bāz, Ibn Jibrīn 
and even al-Fawzān – deliberate much more than al-Ḥawālī on other theological 
issues, including mourning rituals.  One can attribute this to age and experience, but it 
can also be assumed that these issues were much less on the agenda of relatively 
young and oppositionist scholars such as al-Ḥawālī. 
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Conclusions 
 
This research has opened a window to a dispute in the modern period of the Arab 
Middle East, in challenging times when the Ottoman Empire collapsed and brought 
the rule of Islam into a gradual decline, while the influence of Western countries grew.  
Two groups stood at the focus of this dispute, each trying to bring to the forefront 
Islam and their respective views with regard to innovations in religion.  The first two 
chapters dealt with the thought of the revivalist camp, which aspired to bridge 
between modern developments and religion, and the third and fourth introduced the 
conservative Wahhābī trend.  According to these opposite worldviews, each side was 
expected to have treated the subject of bid‘a and its affiliated terms differently.  
 
The aims of the study were to look at the influence over each group’s thinking, try to 
observe whether any developments were made in treating bida‘, explore the types of 
bid‘a that the ‘ulamā’ of each group tend to concentrate on and try to find a 
connection between all this and the circumstances under which each group of ‘ulamā’ 
operated.   
 
Before reaching the main chapters, a shorter background chapter was offered, 
summing up the findings of the main studies in the field, and trying to define the 
different historic approaches to bid‘a and the types of actions included under its title; 
the intention was first to place this very complicated issue into certain patterns, and 
second -- to serve as a point of reference to the views of the ‘ulamā under discussion 
in this study. 
 
Chapter one looked into the views of the early Salafi scholars, who operated under the 
shadow of the final stages of decline of the Empire and the growing influence of 
Western countries, which they personally experienced; the cultural Western influence 
over countries like Egypt, where most of them operated, was felt in the intellectual 
circles they wished to belong to.  Thus, these scholars had to balance between the 
tension of their aspiration to revive religion, apply it to modern times and re-open the 
gates of ijtihād, while avoiding wrongful innovations, most of the time focusing on 
what they saw as the need for social and educational reforms. 
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Afghānī was the first to choose this path, and sought to combine religion with modern 
science and its discoveries, which, he maintained, had hidden references in the Qur’an.   
He saw stagnation and imitation as the main enemies of religion, so in order to 
promote iṣlāḥ and tajdīd had no problem in adopting views from outside Islam, which 
according to the plain definition of bid‘a could be considered as falling under the 
category of ‘aqīdāt.  The question for him lay in the identity of those allowed to 
perform such acts and bring about the renewal of ijtihād, who should be 
knowledgeable and authoritative enough.  Afghānī was followed by ‘Abduh who 
spoke specifically about fighting bid‘a, while broadening the scope of what was 
included under this title not just to strict religious issues but also to many superstitions 
which entered Islam and needed to be addressed. 
 
Since the early Salafi thinkers generally had a positive attitude toward open-minded 
thinking and voiced their objection to taqlīd, various Islamic sects condemned in 
other chapters for being part of the group performing bida‘ of ‘aqīdāt are not referred 
to.  Both ‘Abduh and Riḍā who followed him tended to place on Jews and Christians 
the blame for bringing such conduct into Islam.  However, while ‘Abduh looked 
mostly at what he referred to as superstitions and the necessity to rid religion of them, 
Riḍā was much more strict in defining what bid‘a was, stating that innovations were 
only allowed in secular and earthly matters.  
 
The main source of reference in this chapter was the periodical al-Manār, which 
tended to be very Egyptian-centric, drawing most of the examples it provided from 
local conduct, but gradually developing itself into an international platform of 
revivalists.  As noted and explained, in most of the period it was published, al-Manār 
was primarily under the influence of Riḍā.  While al-Manār referred to the division 
made by al-Shāṭibī into bida‘ ḥaqīqiyya and iḍāfiyya, in other places it also referred to 
different known categories such as the repugnant bid‘a [qabīḥa] or even created new 
types. 
 
In some places a separation between the legal bid‘a [bid‘a shar‘iyya] and the non-
legal, or erring bid‘a [bid‘a laghwiyya] can be found, perhaps to continue with Riḍā’s 
approach that no innovation at all was allowed in religious issues.  In addition, 
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according to al-Manār, even in such matters it was not always allowed to present 
innovations, and bid‘a dunyawiyya (mundane) was brought up. 
   
An exceptional example which could reflect Riḍā’s rejection of the pro-Western spirit 
in Egypt made him speak about a ‘trendy’ innovation [bid‘a kanasiyya].  
Such expressions of Western conduct in Egypt, and the wide Sufi influence which 
manifested itself in public events of celebrations and commemorations, also caused 
early Salafi scholars, al-Manār most of all, to focus their attacks on such bida‘ of 
‘ibādāt.  At the same time, ‘Abduh, Riḍā and al-Manār were very careful when 
speaking about ‘ulamā’ whom they believed brought about the decline of religion; at 
least when it came to the subject of bid‘a, they tended to speak about mistakes which 
led to these circumstances.  Speaking about the division of bid‘a into ‘good’ and ‘bad’, 
al-Manār did not rule it out but said that a loophole was created by those ‘ulamā’ who 
allowed it, and the current situation of widespread bid‘a was a result of this act, which 
brought about perplexity and lack of knowledge.  
 
Even harsher were two others discussed in this chapter as a point of reference – al-
Kawākibī who put a stronger emphasis on the false spirit of passive taqlīd by leaders, 
and Nadvi who specifically focused on ‘One of the greatest fallacies that had very 
often led the people astray, namely bid‘a ḥasana, which can never be accepted’. 
 
Chapter two looked at the Muslim Brotherhood, analyzing the views of several 
scholars who represent a number of trends within the Movement, to which the 
Brotherhood refers as a current, global ideology.  As explained, some of these trends 
were represented more than the others, which hardly deal with the subject at all.  For 
the Muslim Brotherhood, ijtihād was elevated to a degree of religious duty, and a 
special place was dedicated to tajdīd and the place of the mujaddid as ‘agent’ of the 
Prophets and the Islamic revelation who deliever the permanent message to the 
believers.  
 
Among the scholars under discussion in this chapter, the most widely represented was   
the trend led by Shaykh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, who today leads the international trend of 
the Brotherhood.  On an overall view of the subject of bid‘a, Qaraḍāwī continues the 
line of Riḍā, stating that bid‘a does not belong to religion, which was given by Allah, 
223 
 
but rather to daily and earthly living [ḥayāt al-dunya].  Qaraḍāwī places bid‘a as the 
main course through which very problematic phenomena which have corrupted 
religion found their way into it, such as shirk and ghulūw.  Qaraḍāwī also continues 
with a similar approach regarding Jews and Christians, who are said to have inserted 
bida‘ into their religions.  At the same time, he is more tolerant toward Muslims who 
perform bid‘a, stating that eventually they are always returned to Sunna. 
 
Qaraḍāwī explains bid‘a in shar‘ī terms, dividing it into bid‘a i‘tiqādiyya (in belief or 
creed – also called bid‘at al-aqwāl) and bid‘a ‘amaliyya (in deeds – also called bid‘at 
al-af‘āl), showing as in the previous chapter the emphasis put by revivalists on 
activism.  In his discussion he adds new types of bida‘ according to degrees of 
severity – bid‘a mughalata (erring) and bid‘a mukhafafa (softened) which originates 
in a mistaken ijtihād or an ambiguity in reasoning.  When looking at certain ‘ādāt, he 
uses the term bida‘ shirkiyya which demonstrates the proximity of the two terms in 
his view.  Ḥasan al-Bannā discussed a bid‘a of leaving the Shari‘a, which he called 
bid‘a tarkiyya. 
 
Qaraḍāwī is more specific than the early Salafis in labelling other sects, putting the 
Nusayris, Druze, ‘radical Shi‘a’ and the Isma‘iliyya on the verge of unbelief [kufr] 
and other groups such as khawārij, rāfiḍa, qadariyya, mu‘tazila as straying groups 
[fasq].  However, his general apparoach toward Shi‘a in general is more complicated, 
and seems to have been affected by political circumstances, mainly having to do with 
his support in various muqāwama (resistance) organisations.  In fact, the tendency to 
politicise religious terms is reflected in many examples provided, starting with the 
days of Ḥasan al-Bannā who suggested solving the long term controversy over the 
celebration of the Prophet’s birthday by turning it into a day for Palestine, as well as 
other ‘ibādāt that the Muslim Brotherhood used as political instrument such as 
commemorating the night of al-isrā’ wa’l-mi‘rāj.  
 
For Sayyid Quṭb and the Qutbist trend, most of the whole discussion falls under his 
definition of society as being in a permanent state of jāhiliyya; an interesting anecdote 
was his own branding by Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī as a figure whose beliefs constituted a 
bid‘a, almost similar to declaring takfīr, a tendency affiliated more with early 
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Wahhābī ‘ulamā’ – this coming from a leader best known for his attempts to steer the 
Brotherhood away from violence and radicalisation. 
 
Chapters three and four focused on the Wahhābī trend, covering its history from its 
early days until recent times as well as the thinking of the major ‘ulamā’ who lived 
and operated during the days of the three Saudi states.  The Wahhābī focus on the 
concept of tawḥīd naturally led it to reject anything which went against it, including 
shirk, ḍalāla and bid‘a (including a reference to bid‘a shirkiyya).  Chapter three 
looked into the writings of five ‘ulamā belonging to Āl al-Shaykh, starting with the 
founder of the Wahhābiyya – Shaykh Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, who 
reportedly considered ahl al-bidʻa to be the worst of all people, and continuing with 
his descendants, most of whom lived in the first and second Saudi states. 
 
Regarding Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, his unique approach towards ijtihād was 
demonstrated, which distinguished between the absolute ijtihād [al-muṭlaq], carried 
out by the ʻulamā’ of the first generations, and the partial or limited ijtihād [juz’ī / 
maḥdūd], which was performed by later ʻulamā’ with vast and profound knowledge 
who also had to rely on the Qur’an and the Sunna alone.  
 
Among the ʻulamā’ dealt with in this work, only a small number in this chapter could 
be perceived as belonging to the first group of ʻulamā’ which was introduced in the 
background chapter – those who rejected any innovation completely.  These put a 
special emphasis on the duty of performing Jihad against the non-believers, taking the 
subject of takfīr far beyond the views of Ibn Taymiyya who considered takfīr a bid‘a 
by itself.  In most cases, an explanation was provided for their behaviour, which 
seemingly could be seen in light of the socio-political circumstances and the tension 
between umarā’ and ʻulamā’ in their times.  
 
A similar explanation was given to the considerable attention paid to bid‘a of ‘ibādāt, 
especially those involving worshipping the living or dead, or the widespread practice 
of turning graves into mosques and building over them.  It seems that the ʻulamā’ 
were concerned with changing the habits of the tribes, in an attempt to unite them 
under the Saudi states. 
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This chapter also included a case study discussing the different views expressed by 
Wahhābī ʻulamā’ on drinking coffee or smoking tobacco.  Commonly these examples 
are quoted as issues which the Wahhābiyya forbade as bida‘.  In fact, these issues 
where part of a discourse throughout the Arab and Muslim world, and those who 
forbade them usually did it on medical grounds.  Apparently these kinds of myths on 
Wahhābiyya were created by Christian travellers to the area, who usually viewed the 
tribes from a patronising point of view.  At least some of these myths were later 
adopted by classic Western scholars. 
 
Chapter four referred to geo-political, economic, demographic and social 
developments, changes which occurred in the modern Saudi state since the beginning 
of the 1990s and brought upon the stage new groups of prominent ‘unofficial’ ‘ulamā’ 
next to the official ones.  This era witnessed the spread of strictly radical approaches; 
some of the shaykhs who had previously been in opposition to the government were 
now helping it combat these radical tendencies, while others were themselves 
instigators of the same approach.  This chapter was therefore dedicated to looking into 
the views of some of the most prominent shaykhs in the Saudi state in the past 
decades who served in senior positions, as well as into the views of Safar al-Ḥawālī, a 
Qutbist scholar – once a fierce oppositionist – who with his friend Salmān al-‘Awda 
started to cooperate with the government in later stages to counter the most radical 
views.  
 
Although these ‘ulamā’ continued to see only the negative side of bid‘a, and to reject 
any attempts to accept the notion of bid‘a ḥasana, some more flexibility on the 
subject was noticeable, and the use of takfīr was less common.  Both Ibn Bāz and Ibn 
Jibrīn divided bida‘ into those related to creed and belief [i‘tiqādiyya] (more broadly 
referred to in this work as ‘aqīdāt) and those related to acts [‘amaliyya], including 
various commemorations included in this work under the title ‘ibādāt; Ibn Bāz even 
stated that the latter type was less severe than the former.  
 
Another division which Ibn Jibrīn made was also based on the severity of the bida‘ – 
a bid‘a that leads to a sin [bid‘a mufsaqa] such as these commemorations, and and a 
bid‘a which leads to unbelief [bid‘a mukfira], such as the one resulting from the 
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behaviour of certain sects like the rāfiḍa, jahmiyya and khawārij, or various issues 
related to tomb worship.  
 
It should be noted that the discussion on the place of Sufis in religion and regarding 
their contribution to spreading bida‘ in religion was relevant to this chapter only, and 
appears almost nowhere in the writings of the ‘ulamā’ covered in chapter three.  
There is future room for scholars to look at the history of Sufis under Wahhābiyya 
and try to explain this. 
 
This chapter also looked into the views of several Wahhābī ‘ulamā’ regarding the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  Ibn Bāz for example included the Brotherhood as part of the 
seventy three sects which belonged in hell on the day of resurrection; Shaykh Ṣāliḥ 
ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Āl al-Shaykh – the Saudi Minister for Religious Affairs attacked 
the Brotherhood for disrespect of the Sunna or ahl al-sunna, stating that the 
Brotherhood was interested only in political benefits, and that its true objective was 
not to perform a proper da‘wa but to utilise it as a means to seize political power in 
any given country. 
 
This work reflected on the religious writings and continuous discourse on the subject 
of bid‘a.  As part of the discussion, opposite views of scholars were presented, from 
those thinking that any innovation in religion was prohibited to those who believe that 
the route of branding acts and thoughts as bid‘a actually served as an alternative legal 
system to allow the integration of renewals in religion. It seems that modern 
discussion on the subject has expanded in terms of the different kinds which bid‘a is 
defined as.  Most of this debate still concerns bida‘ of ‘ibādāt and ‘aqīdāt, however, 
as elucidated, in many cases ‘ulamā’ choose what and whom to attack and what and 
whom to accept, taking under consideration geo-political and social circumstances, 
while adding new classifications of bida‘ which help them establish their decisions 
and reinforce them on religious grounds. This appears to derive from the fact that 
while discussing issues of bid‘a, the ‘ulamā’ are confind to dealing only with what 
falls under the category of Islam. 
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In 2004, Ali Mazrui, the renowned professor for African and Islamic studies, wrote in 
an article:  
 
Muslim doctrines, which have hurt our progress, have included the concept of bid‘a. 
Originally intended to protect the young religion from premature reform and 
distortion, bid‘a became a symbol of Muslim distrust of all kinds of innovations and 
inventions. While the word innovation has positive connotations in the English 
language, the word bid‘a in Islamic discourse carries negative and sinful 
implications. The concept of bid‘a came to symbolise a fundamental Muslim 
resistance to change. Orthodoxy defended itself against innovation.
1
 
 
In various academic publications, different acts and ways of behaviour by Muslims 
are stated to have been defined as bida‘, from the prohibition of photography and 
television, or even the use of knives and forks in eating (as claimed by the Fahmī 
Huwaydī, the well-known Egyptian journalist affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood)
2
 to declarations by the Saudi authorities that anti-regime demonstrations 
are bida‘3 and claiming homosexuality to constitute bid‘a.4  Thus, in modern times, 
the common use of the term bid‘a in various circles seems to have become more 
widespread than ever, in many cases in order to embarrass those said to have branded 
any action or tendency as bid‘a, as part of a ‘blame-game’ to express a revulsion 
against their backwardness. 
 
So if in the past, the academic discourse of the term bid‘a  concerned itself with the 
differences between its etimological meaning and the connotations it has acquired, 
today a further layer should be added -- understanding what bid‘a actually means 
requires more than ever comprehending the identity of the speaker, the context and 
tone of speech in which the term is used and also the way it is argued. 
  
                                                 
1
 Ali A. Mazrui, "Islam and the United States: Streams of Convergence, Strands of Divergence", Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2004), p. 813 
2
 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, "Issues in the Understanding of Jihad and Ijtihād", Islamic Studies, Vol. 
41, No. 4 (Winter 2002), p. 626 
3
 Mai Yamani, "Passing Nightmare?", The World Today, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), p. 17 
4
 Sara Scalenghe, "We Invite People to Think the Unthinkable": An Interview with Nizar Saghieh", 
Middle East Report, No. 230 (Spring, 2004), p. 36 
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1984. 
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